THE VR SCHOOL
  • Schools & Districts
    • License the academy
    • Free program for your students
    • Request a demo
  • Catalog
    • AI & Data
    • Cybersecurity & Web
    • Programming
    • Health Science
    • All Guilds
    • All courses
  • Families
  • Accreditation
  • Log In
  • Request a demo
  • Home
  • Courses

RLP U.S. History B — Depression, World War, Cold War and Civil Rights

Curriculum

  • 5 Sections
  • 25 Lessons
  • 10 Weeks
Expand all sectionsCollapse all sections
  • Unit 1: The Great Depression and the New Deal
    5
    • 1.1
      Crash — Explaining the Great Depression
      50 mins
    • 1.2
      Dust, Drought and Eviction — The Human Toll on the Plains and in the Missouri Bootheel
      50 mins
    • 1.3
      Seminar — Did the New Deal Go Too Far, or Not Far Enough?
      50 mins
    • 1.4
      Workshop — Labor’s Advances and Retreats, from the AFL to the UFW
      50 mins
    • 1.5
      Performance Task — Did the New Deal Change the Federal Government for Good?
      150 mins
  • Unit 2: The Second World War
    5
    • 2.1
      From Neutrality to Pearl Harbor
      50 mins
    • 2.2
      Strategy and Sacrifice — Fighting a Two-Ocean War
      50 mins
    • 2.3
      Seminar — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
      50 mins
    • 2.4
      Workshop — Whose Freedoms? The Home Front and Its Contradictions
      50 mins
    • 2.5
      Performance Task — Moot Court: Korematsu v. United States Reheard
      200 mins
  • Unit 3: The Cold War and the Affluent Society
    5
    • 3.1
      Building a Postwar Order — The UN, Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and Containment
      50 mins
    • 3.2
      Containment Tested — The Red Scare, Korea, Cuba, the Bomb and Vietnam
      50 mins
    • 3.3
      Seminar — Who Shared the Affluent Society?
      50 mins
    • 3.4
      Workshop — How the Cold War Ended, and American Interests in the Middle East
      50 mins
    • 3.5
      Performance Task — Structured Academic Controversy: An Imperial Presidency?
      200 mins
  • Unit 4: Civil Rights and a Changing Nation
    5
    • 4.1
      From Dred Scott to Brown — Courts, Lawyers and the Color Line
      50 mins
    • 4.2
      The Freedom Movement — Leaders, Strategies and the Laws of 1964 and 1965
      50 mins
    • 4.3
      Seminar — Many Movements: Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, American Indians and Women
      50 mins
    • 4.4
      Workshop — A Changing Nation: Immigration, the Sunbelt, the Hancock Amendment and the Technology Revolution
      50 mins
    • 4.5
      Performance Task — Oral History: Living Memory of a Changing Community
      250 mins
  • Unit 5: Missouri American History Supplement
    5
    • 5.1
      Reconstruction: Who Held the Power, and What Happened to the Economy
      50 mins
    • 5.2
      Westward Expansion: Gateway Missouri, Land and Resources, and Native Nations
      50 mins
    • 5.3
      Reading the Map, Judging the System: The Missouri Bootheel, 1937-1941
      50 mins
    • 5.4
      Art and Culture in the Depression and World War II: A Capitol Mural, Kansas City Jazz and Posters
      50 mins
    • 5.5
      Citizens and Institutions: Who Solves the Problem? Missouri and the Fight Against Bribery
      50 mins

Workshop — How the Cold War Ended, and American Interests in the Middle East

Unit 3  ·  Evidence-Based Writing Workshop  ·  Lesson 14 of 25

Workshop — How the Cold War Ended, and American Interests in the Middle East

US.11.9.5RLP-USHB
Civilians cross an opening in the Berlin Wall as workers dismantle the barrier.
By the end of this lesson I can…

analyze the role of the Reagan administration and other factors in the end of the Cold War, describe U.S. Middle East policy and its interests through the Gulf War, and write an argument that weighs competing explanations.

Instruction

In 1985 few experts predicted that the Soviet Union would be gone within seven years. Explaining why the Cold War ended — and ended peacefully — is one of the great debates of recent history.

Détente and its end. In the 1970s Nixon eased tensions: he visited China in 1972 and signed the SALT I and ABM treaties with the Soviet Union. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 recognized Europe’s borders and committed all signers, including the Soviet bloc, to respect human rights — commitments dissidents then used against their own governments. Détente collapsed when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

Reagan’s strategy. Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” built up American forces, and in 1983 proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative, a missile shield critics called “Star Wars.” Under the Reagan Doctrine the United States armed anti-communist insurgents, including Afghan mujahideen and the Nicaraguan Contras; secret arms sales to Iran used to fund the Contras despite a congressional ban became the Iran-Contra scandal. Yet Reagan also wanted to abolish nuclear weapons. After Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985, the two leaders met repeatedly, and the INF Treaty (1987) eliminated an entire class of nuclear missiles.

Collapse. Gorbachev’s reforms — glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) — were meant to save the Soviet system. Instead they released criticism and nationalism. In 1989 Soviet forces left Afghanistan, Poland’s Solidarity movement won elections, and Gorbachev did not use force to hold Eastern Europe. On 9 November 1989 East Germans crossed the Berlin Wall. Germany reunified in 1990, and the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991.

Competing explanations. (1) American pressure: some historians and Reagan’s supporters argue that the military buildup, SDI and support for insurgents strained a Soviet economy that could not compete. (2) Internal decay: others argue that the Soviet economy was stagnating on its own, hurt by falling oil prices and the cost of Afghanistan, and that pressure mattered less than the system’s failures. (3) Gorbachev’s choices: many stress that a different leader could have used force, as Soviet leaders had in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. (4) People power: Poles, Czechs, East Germans and Baltic peoples, supported by the Helsinki human-rights framework and by Pope John Paul II, forced the pace. HR.3 asks you to weigh such debates by their evidence and to avoid oversimplification: the strongest accounts combine factors and explain how they interacted.

Interests in the Middle East. American policy in the region has pursued several interests at once: access to oil for the world economy; containing Soviet influence during the Cold War; support for Israel, which Truman recognized minutes after its independence in 1948; and stability among friendly governments. These interests sometimes conflicted. In 1953 the CIA helped overthrow Iran’s elected prime minister and restore the Shah’s power. The 1973 Arab oil embargo quadrupled oil prices and shook the American economy. Carter brokered the Camp David Accords (1978), leading to peace between Egypt and Israel. The Iranian revolution of 1979 brought the 444-day hostage crisis. In 1983 a truck bomb in Lebanon killed 241 American service members.

The Gulf War. On 2 August 1990 Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait, threatening Saudi Arabia and a large share of the world’s oil. Bush assembled a UN-authorized coalition, and Congress voted to authorize force in January 1991. Operation Desert Storm began with an air campaign on 17 January; a ground offensive of about 100 hours drove Iraq from Kuwait, and fighting ended on 28 February. Bush did not pursue Saddam to Baghdad, a decision debated for years afterward. The war left a large American military presence in the region.

Writing the argument. WHST.11-12.1.b asks you to develop claims and counterclaims fairly. WHST.11-12.1.d asks for a formal style and objective tone: describe Reagan and Gorbachev by what they did, not with praise or contempt. RH.11-12.8 asks you to evaluate an author’s claims: is Reagan’s 1987 speech evidence that his pressure worked, or evidence of what he wanted?

📖 Read for this lesson

The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.

  • What a Speech Can Prove: Berlin 1987 and the Gulf 1990Ronald Reagan, Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin (12 June 1987), Public Papers of the Presidents; George H. W. Bush, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (5 August 1990), Public Papers of the Presidents · about 8 min

    The essay must use Reagan’s speech as evidence and evaluate what it can and cannot prove. Eighteen words cannot be evaluated. Here is the Brandenburg Gate address at length, including the passages where Reagan credits West German tax policy, Soviet internal failure and alliance firmness – three of the four competing explanations, in the words of the man usually credited with the fourth. And Bush’s actual words on 5 August 1990.

Reading: Two presidents at turning points

Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin (12 June 1987); George H. W. Bush, Remarks on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (5 August 1990) · Public domain (U.S. government works)

Reagan spoke to an audience in West Berlin and, through the press, to the Soviet leader. Bush spoke to reporters three days after Iraq’s invasion.

Reagan (1987): Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

Bush (1990): This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.

Vocabulary in context

  • détente — The easing of Cold War tensions in the 1970s.
  • Strategic Defense Initiative — Reagan’s 1983 proposal for a missile-defense system.
  • glasnost and perestroika — Gorbachev’s policies of openness and economic restructuring.
  • INF Treaty (1987) — U.S.-Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
  • Operation Desert Storm — The 1991 UN-authorized, U.S.-led campaign that drove Iraq out of Kuwait.

Formative check

Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.

+50 XP

Which evidence would most support the ‘internal decay’ explanation for the Soviet collapse?

Timing matters: problems that predate U.S. pressure point to internal causes.
Myth or Fact?

Congress voted to authorize the use of force before Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991.

True. Congress passed an authorization in January 1991, after UN Security Council authorization.

Write an argument essay (700-850 words): Why did the Cold War end when and how it did? Weigh at least three of the four explanations, give evidence for each, state which mattered most and why, and develop the strongest counterclaim fairly. Use Reagan’s speech as evidence and evaluate what it can and cannot prove. Keep a formal, objective tone.

0 words
Quick self-check

How confident are you that you can weigh explanations for the end of the Cold War and explain U.S. interests in the Middle East through the Gulf War?

Not yetVery confident

Practice

Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.

Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)

Fluency

Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.

  1. Order: INF Treaty; fall of the Berlin Wall; Camp David Accords; Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; dissolution of the Soviet Union; Operation Desert Storm.
    Check your answer
    Answer: Camp David (1978); Afghanistan invasion (December 1979); INF Treaty (1987); Berlin Wall falls (November 1989); Desert Storm (January-February 1991); Soviet dissolution (December 1991).
  2. Define glasnost and perestroika.
    Check your answer
    Answer: Gorbachev’s policies of openness and of economic restructuring.

Application

Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.

  1. Reagan said at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987: ‘Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!’ What is this speech good evidence of, and what is it weak evidence of?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Good evidence of American aims and of how Reagan framed the Cold War for audiences in Berlin and at home; weak evidence of what caused the Wall to fall two years later, which requires Soviet and East European sources.
  2. Bush said on 5 August 1990: ‘This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.’ Corroborate: what did the United States do next, and what interests does the lesson say were at stake?
    Check your answer
    Answer: It built a UN-authorized coalition; Congress authorized force in January 1991; Desert Storm drove Iraq from Kuwait by 28 February. Interests: access to oil, stability among friendly governments, and deterring aggression.
  3. Reagan spoke in June 1987 and the Wall fell in November 1989. Did the speech end the Cold War?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Model answer: the dates show sequence, not cause. Historians weigh American pressure, Soviet economic decay, Gorbachev’s choice not to use force, and Eastern Europeans’ own movements. A strong answer ranks several of these with evidence and does not treat the speech as the cause.

Review

Keep earlier skills sharp.

  1. From Lesson 3.1: which 1956 crisis showed that leadership of the West had passed from Britain to the United States?
    Check your answer
    Answer: The Suez crisis, when Eisenhower forced Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Egypt.
  2. From Unit 2: which Allied conference demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender in July 1945?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Potsdam.

Missouri Learning Standards — Social Studies addressed: 9-12.AH.6.CC.A, 9-12.AH.5.CC.A, 9-12.AH.6.CC.B, 9-12.AH.6.CC.C, WHST.11-12.1, RH.11-12.6, RH.11-12.8, 9-12.AH.1.CC.D

Instructional focus: Argumentative writing evaluating competing historical explanations

Reading

What a Speech Can Prove: Berlin 1987 and the Gulf 1990

Ronald Reagan, Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin (12 June 1987), Public Papers of the Presidents; George H. W. Bush, Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (5 August 1990), Public Papers of the Presidents · Public domain (U.S. government works)

Why this reading. The workshop asks you to weigh three or four explanations for the end of the Cold War, to “use Reagan’s speech as evidence and evaluate what it can and cannot prove,” and to keep a formal, objective tone. You cannot evaluate what a speech proves from six words of it. This reading gives you the Brandenburg Gate address at the length where its claims become testable, Bush’s actual words at the start of the Gulf crisis, and the two things the lesson’s eighteen words leave out entirely: what Reagan said about the Soviet economy, and what he said about arms control in the same breath. What to look for: in one speech Reagan makes an argument for each of the four explanations, including the two that credit somebody other than himself.

1. Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin, 12 June 1987

He begins by addressing an audience he cannot see:

Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, I extend my warmest greetings and the good will of the American people. To those listening in East Berlin, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in the West, in this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.]

The central economic argument — note that it is about West German policy, not American pressure:

In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty—that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled.

In the 1950’s, Khrushchev predicted: “We will bury you.” But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind—too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity.

On Gorbachev’s reforms, he is openly uncertain:

And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together…

Then the demand:

There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

And immediately afterwards — this is the part almost never quoted — an argument for arms reduction and a claim about why the Soviets returned to the table:

To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counterdeployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides…

But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then—I invite those who protest today—to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table…

But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty.

2. What this speech can and cannot prove

This section is ours, not quoted, and it is the heart of what RH.11-12.8 asks of you. A speech is direct evidence of one thing only: what its speaker chose to say in public, to that audience, on that date. Everything else has to be argued.

  • It cannot prove that American pressure ended the Cold War. It was delivered twenty-nine months before the wall came down, and the person it addressed did not open the gate in response to it. Using it that way is arguing from a prediction to a result.
  • It is good evidence that American strategy was deliberate — the counterdeployment passage describes a strategy, names its aim, and claims a result (the Soviets returned to negotiations) that is checkable against the record of the Geneva talks and the INF Treaty signed in December 1987.
  • It supplies the internal-decay argument in the speaker’s own words — “failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health… the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself.” That is Reagan asserting that the Soviet system was failing on its own. If you use the speech to credit his pressure, you must deal with the fact that he is also crediting the system’s internal failure and West German tax and trade policy.
  • It concedes uncertainty about Gorbachev. Reagan asks whether the reforms are real or token; he does not know. That undercuts any account, friendly or hostile, that treats 1987 as a plan already succeeding.

A useful test question for any evidence in this essay: would this document look different if the opposite explanation were true? If the answer is no, the document is not evidence for your claim.

3. Evidence for the other explanations, and where to find it

This section is ours, not quoted.

  • Internal decay. The strongest form is about timing: Soviet growth was slowing through the 1970s, before the American buildup; world oil prices, the Soviet Union’s main source of hard currency, collapsed in the mid-1980s; and the war in Afghanistan, begun in December 1979, drained money and legitimacy. Evidence that predates the pressure is what makes this explanation work — the quiz in this lesson is testing exactly that point. Notice that George Kennan predicted the mechanism in February 1946, in the telegram you read in Lesson 3.1: the Soviet system had “yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power.”
  • Gorbachev’s choices. The decisive evidence is negative — what did not happen. Soviet forces had crushed Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1989 they left Afghanistan, and when Poland, Hungary and East Germany moved, Moscow did not intervene. A different general secretary was available, and the tanks existed.
  • People power. Solidarity in Poland won the elections of June 1989; East Germans crossed the wall on 9 November 1989 because crowds kept arriving at the checkpoints. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which the Soviet bloc signed in exchange for recognition of Europe’s borders, committed its signatories to respect human rights, and dissident groups then used their own governments’ signatures against them.

The strongest essays combine factors and explain how they interacted — for example, that American pressure was expensive to answer only because the Soviet economy was already stagnating, and that neither mattered until a leader decided not to shoot. Weigh, do not list.

4. Bush on the invasion of Kuwait, 5 August 1990

Three days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush spoke to reporters on the South Lawn as he returned from Camp David. He described a diplomatic campaign — calls to Turkey, Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Britain, Saudi Arabia — and then, at the end, in answer to a question about protecting Americans:

I’m not going to discuss what we’re doing in terms of moving of forces, anything of that nature. But I view it very seriously, not just that but any threat to any other countries, as well as I view very seriously our determination to reverse out this aggression. And please believe me, there are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I’ve just said, and I salute them. They are staunch friends and allies, and we will be working with them all for collective action. This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.

Earlier in the same exchange he had said: “What’s emerging is nobody seems to be showing up as willing to accept anything less than total withdrawal from Kuwait of the Iraqi forces, and no puppet regime… I want to see the United Nations move soon with chapter VII sanctions.”

Sourcing. This is not a prepared address; it is an unscripted answer, and the repetition is a man deciding something out loud. Read it for the interests the lesson lists: oil supply for the world economy, the stability of friendly governments, and a coalition assembled through the United Nations rather than alone. Note what he does not say: no mention of oil, and no commitment to force. Congress voted to authorize force in January 1991, after the Security Council had acted — a sequence that matters for this unit’s culminating question about presidential war power.

Sources: Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin (12 June 1987), Reagan Presidential Library (reaganlibrary.gov); Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (5 August 1990), American Presidency Project (presidency.ucsb.edu); The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. VI, Office of the Historian (history.state.gov)

Up NextComplete & Continue →

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Seminar — Who Shared the Affluent Society?
Prev
Performance Task — Structured Academic Controversy: An Imperial Presidency?
Next

© 2026 The VR School | Career content by Wiley | Powered by Sejal Learning Systems.

Join free · Accreditation · Privacy Policy · Terms of Service

Modal title

Main Content