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RLP U.S. History B — Depression, World War, Cold War and Civil Rights

Curriculum

  • 5 Sections
  • 25 Lessons
  • 10 Weeks
Expand all sectionsCollapse all sections
  • Unit 1: The Great Depression and the New Deal
    5
    • 1.1
      Crash — Explaining the Great Depression
      50 mins
    • 1.2
      Dust, Drought and Eviction — The Human Toll on the Plains and in the Missouri Bootheel
      50 mins
    • 1.3
      Seminar — Did the New Deal Go Too Far, or Not Far Enough?
      50 mins
    • 1.4
      Workshop — Labor’s Advances and Retreats, from the AFL to the UFW
      50 mins
    • 1.5
      Performance Task — Did the New Deal Change the Federal Government for Good?
      150 mins
  • Unit 2: The Second World War
    5
    • 2.1
      From Neutrality to Pearl Harbor
      50 mins
    • 2.2
      Strategy and Sacrifice — Fighting a Two-Ocean War
      50 mins
    • 2.3
      Seminar — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
      50 mins
    • 2.4
      Workshop — Whose Freedoms? The Home Front and Its Contradictions
      50 mins
    • 2.5
      Performance Task — Moot Court: Korematsu v. United States Reheard
      200 mins
  • Unit 3: The Cold War and the Affluent Society
    5
    • 3.1
      Building a Postwar Order — The UN, Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and Containment
      50 mins
    • 3.2
      Containment Tested — The Red Scare, Korea, Cuba, the Bomb and Vietnam
      50 mins
    • 3.3
      Seminar — Who Shared the Affluent Society?
      50 mins
    • 3.4
      Workshop — How the Cold War Ended, and American Interests in the Middle East
      50 mins
    • 3.5
      Performance Task — Structured Academic Controversy: An Imperial Presidency?
      200 mins
  • Unit 4: Civil Rights and a Changing Nation
    5
    • 4.1
      From Dred Scott to Brown — Courts, Lawyers and the Color Line
      50 mins
    • 4.2
      The Freedom Movement — Leaders, Strategies and the Laws of 1964 and 1965
      50 mins
    • 4.3
      Seminar — Many Movements: Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, American Indians and Women
      50 mins
    • 4.4
      Workshop — A Changing Nation: Immigration, the Sunbelt, the Hancock Amendment and the Technology Revolution
      50 mins
    • 4.5
      Performance Task — Oral History: Living Memory of a Changing Community
      250 mins
  • Unit 5: Missouri American History Supplement
    5
    • 5.1
      Reconstruction: Who Held the Power, and What Happened to the Economy
      50 mins
    • 5.2
      Westward Expansion: Gateway Missouri, Land and Resources, and Native Nations
      50 mins
    • 5.3
      Reading the Map, Judging the System: The Missouri Bootheel, 1937-1941
      50 mins
    • 5.4
      Art and Culture in the Depression and World War II: A Capitol Mural, Kansas City Jazz and Posters
      50 mins
    • 5.5
      Citizens and Institutions: Who Solves the Problem? Missouri and the Fight Against Bribery
      50 mins

Seminar — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

Unit 2  ·  Seminar & Historical Discourse Lab  ·  Lesson 8 of 25

Seminar — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

US.11.7.7RLP-USHB
Postwar Japanese street with civilian belongings, a stopped watch, paper crane, blank folders, and sealed bomb casing
By the end of this lesson I can…

explain the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and its consequences, and evaluate competing historians’ interpretations of why the decision was made and whether alternatives existed.

Instruction

Content note: this lesson describes the effects of the atomic bombings on civilians.

No decision in American history has been argued over more. The facts are largely agreed; the interpretation is not. This seminar asks you to weigh the interpretations as historians do: by their evidence.

The bomb. In 1939 the physicists Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein warned Roosevelt that Germany might build an atomic weapon. The Manhattan Project, begun in 1942 under General Leslie Groves and the physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, built secret plants at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington, and a laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, employing well over 100,000 people. The first bomb was tested near Alamogordo, New Mexico, on 16 July 1945. Roosevelt had died in April; Truman learned the full details only after taking office.

The decision and its consequences. On 26 July the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration demanding unconditional surrender. Japan’s government did not accept it. On 6 August a B-29 dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima; on 9 August a plutonium bomb destroyed much of Nagasaki. Estimates of deaths by the end of 1945 are about 90,000 to 140,000 in Hiroshima and about 60,000 to 80,000 in Nagasaki, most of them civilians, including Korean forced laborers and Allied prisoners; many more died later of injuries and radiation. On 8 August the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. On 15 August the emperor announced Japan’s surrender, which was signed on 2 September — after the Allies signaled that the emperor could remain under Allied authority.

Interpretation 1: to end the war and save lives. Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson argued after the war that the bombs ended it quickly and made an invasion unnecessary. American planners were preparing to invade Kyushu in November 1945. After Iwo Jima and Okinawa, they expected fierce resistance, and Japan’s military leaders were still resisting surrender. Later postwar claims of half a million or a million American lives saved were larger than wartime planning estimates, which historians note.

Interpretation 2: atomic diplomacy. Gar Alperovitz (1965) and others argued that Japan was near surrender, that American leaders knew it from decoded messages, and that the bombs were used partly to end the war before the Soviet Union could enter it and to impress Stalin. Critics answer that the decoded messages show Japan’s leaders seeking better terms, not surrender, and that the military still controlled the government.

Interpretation 3: a middle position. J. Samuel Walker concludes that ending the war quickly and saving American lives was the main reason, that diplomatic advantage over the Soviets was a welcome side benefit, and that alternatives existed but were uncertain. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argues that the Soviet declaration of war shocked Japan’s leaders at least as much as the bombs did.

The alternatives. Historians discuss several: a demonstration on an unpopulated area (proposed in the scientists’ Franck Report of June 1945); clarifying that the emperor could stay; waiting for Soviet entry; continuing blockade and conventional bombing, which had already killed many civilians, notably about 100,000 in the Tokyo firebombing of March 1945. Each had costs and uncertainties.

Judging in context. HI.3 asks you to interpret the decision within its time rather than only by present-day values: by 1945 all sides had bombed cities, and leaders did not fully understand radiation. It does not ask you to stop judging. You may conclude the decision was justified, unjustified, or justified by some reasons and not others.

Seminar question: Why did the United States use atomic bombs against Japan, and was the decision justified? SL.11-12.1.c asks you to pose questions that probe reasoning, for example: “What evidence would show that Japan was about to surrender without the bombs?” SL.11-12.3 asks you to evaluate a speaker’s use of evidence and reasoning.

📖 Read for this lesson

The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.

  • The Warning, the Announcement and the Survey: Documents on the BombProclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (26 July 1945); Statement by the President (6 August 1945) and Radio Report to the American People (9 August 1945), Public Papers of the Presidents; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War (1946) · about 8 min

    The comparison chart needs key evidence and the strongest objection for three interpretations, and two sentences cannot be probed. Here is the Potsdam Declaration entire – including its two silences, about the bomb and about the emperor – Truman’s two public statements including the claim that Hiroshima was a military base, and the Strategic Bombing Survey’s conclusion with the qualifications that are always dropped when it is quoted.

Reading: Warning and announcement

Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), 26 July 1945, paragraph 13; Statement by the President of the United States (Hiroshima), 6 August 1945 · Public domain (U.S. government works)

The Potsdam Declaration did not mention the bomb or the future of the emperor. Why might each omission matter?

Potsdam Declaration: We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces… The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Truman (6 August 1945): It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

Vocabulary in context

  • Manhattan Project — The secret U.S. program (1942-1946) that built the atomic bomb.
  • Potsdam Declaration — The July 1945 Allied demand for Japan’s unconditional surrender.
  • unconditional surrender — Surrender without negotiated terms.
  • atomic diplomacy — The interpretation that the bombs were used partly to gain advantage over the Soviet Union.
  • hibakusha — Survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Formative check

Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.

+50 XP

Which evidence would most strengthen the ‘atomic diplomacy’ interpretation?

The interpretation depends on what leaders knew about Japan’s readiness to surrender and why they acted anyway.
Myth or Fact?

Japan surrendered after the Hiroshima bombing but before the Soviet Union entered the war.

False. Hiroshima was bombed 6 August, the Soviet Union declared war 8 August, Nagasaki was bombed 9 August, and the emperor announced surrender 15 August.

Complete the comparison chart for the three interpretations: claim, key evidence, strongest objection. Record a 90-second seminar contribution answering the seminar question. Then write two replies to views in the readings (or from a study partner, if you have one): each must pose a question that probes the other writer’s evidence and evaluate whether their reasoning follows from it.

0 words
Quick self-check

How confident are you that you can explain the decision to use the atomic bombs and weigh historians’ interpretations by their evidence?

Not yetVery confident

Practice

Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.

Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)

Fluency

Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.

  1. Put in order: Nagasaki; Trinity test; Potsdam Declaration; Soviet declaration of war on Japan; Hiroshima; emperor announces surrender.
    Check your answer
    Answer: Trinity (16 July); Potsdam (26 July); Hiroshima (6 August); Soviet declaration (8 August); Nagasaki (9 August); surrender announced (15 August 1945).
  2. Define ‘atomic diplomacy’ as historians use it.
    Check your answer
    Answer: The interpretation that the bombs were used partly to end the war before the Soviet Union could gain from it and to impress Stalin.

Application

Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.

  1. Truman’s statement of 6 August 1945 said: ‘It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe.’ Who was the audience and what was the statement’s purpose?
    Check your answer
    Answer: The American public and the world, including Japan’s leaders. It announced the new weapon and, with the Potsdam warning of ‘prompt and utter destruction’, pressed Japan to surrender.
  2. The Potsdam Declaration demanded ‘unconditional surrender’ and said nothing about the emperor. Why do historians of the decision pay attention to this silence?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Model answer: because Japan’s leaders sought to keep the emperor, and the surrender came after the Allies signaled he could remain; historians debate whether clarifying this earlier might have shortened the war. Strong answers present this as one contested alternative, not a settled fact.
  3. The bombs fell on 6 and 9 August and Japan announced surrender on 15 August. A student writes that the bombs alone caused the surrender. Evaluate.
    Check your answer
    Answer: The Soviet declaration of war on 8 August also shocked Japan’s leaders; Hasegawa argues it mattered at least as much. A strong answer weighs both, using the chronology as evidence rather than treating ‘before’ as ‘because’.

Review

Keep earlier skills sharp.

  1. From Unit 1: name one New Deal program that, like the Manhattan Project, built large federal facilities in Tennessee.
    Check your answer
    Answer: The Tennessee Valley Authority.

Missouri Learning Standards — Social Studies addressed: 9-12.AH.4.CC.C, 9-12.AH.5.CC.C, 9-12.AH.4.PC.B, SL.11-12.1, SL.11-12.3, 9-12.AH.1.CC.D, 9-12.AH.1.CC.B

Instructional focus: Seminar weighing historians’ interpretations of a contested decision

Reading

The Warning, the Announcement and the Survey: Documents on the Bomb

Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (26 July 1945); Statement by the President (6 August 1945) and Radio Report to the American People (9 August 1945), Public Papers of the Presidents; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War (1946) · Public domain (U.S. government works)

Why this reading. Content note: this reading describes the effects of the atomic bombings on civilians. The seminar asks you to fill a chart — claim, key evidence, strongest objection — for three interpretations, and to pose questions that probe another reader’s evidence, including your own. The lesson gives you one sentence of the Potsdam Declaration and two of Truman. Neither can be probed. This reading hosts the warning in full, Truman’s two public statements in full enough to compare with each other, and the United States government’s own postwar conclusion, which is the single most-quoted piece of evidence on one side of this argument and is usually quoted without its qualifications. What to look for: what Potsdam does not say, and what Truman told the American public a Japanese city was.

1. The warning: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, Potsdam, 26 July 1945

(1) We—The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(3) …The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest…

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied…

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals… Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

The two silences. Nowhere in thirteen paragraphs is there any mention of an atomic weapon, and nowhere is there any statement about the emperor — the one term Japan’s government most wanted. Paragraph 13 also asks for the surrender of “all Japanese armed forces,” not of the state. Historians on every side of this argument build cases out of those three facts. So can you.

2. Statement by the President, 6 August 1945

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British “Grand Slam” which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.

The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet…

It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East.

It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.

3. Radio Report to the American People, 9 August 1945

Three days later, on the day Nagasaki was bombed, Truman reported on the Potsdam conference and returned to Hiroshima:

The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately, thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities immediately, and save themselves from destruction.

Hiroshima was a city of roughly a quarter of a million people, with an army headquarters in it. By the end of 1945 something between about 90,000 and 140,000 of its people were dead, the great majority of them civilians, among them Korean forced laborers and Allied prisoners of war; Nagasaki’s dead are estimated at about 60,000 to 80,000. Set those figures beside the two sentences above and you have a document that is evidence of several different things at once: of what the president believed, of what he wanted Americans to believe, and of how a government describes a city it has destroyed.

4. The United States government’s own postwar verdict

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was ordered by the War Department to measure what bombing had achieved. Its summary report on the Pacific war, published in July 1946, ends like this:

There is little point in attempting more precisely to impute Japan’s unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan’s disaster… It seems clear, however, that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan’s surrender and obviated any need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Read the qualifications, because the passage is almost always quoted without them. This is an opinion (the Survey says so), formed after the fact, by an organization examining the effectiveness of the conventional bombing campaign it had itself conducted, on the basis of interviews with defeated leaders who had reasons of their own. It is a serious piece of evidence and a contested one. Historians who reject it point out that it does not show Japan’s government agreeing to surrender in July or August 1945, only that the Survey believed collapse was coming.

Using this in the chart

This section is ours, not quoted. It is guidance, not a verdict: this question is genuinely open, and a seminar contribution that closes it without answering the other side has not done the work.

  • Interpretation 1 (end the war, save lives). Evidence here: Potsdam paragraph 13 and Japan’s failure to accept it; Truman’s own stated reasoning in both statements; the casualty record of Iwo Jima and Okinawa from Lesson 2.2. Strongest objection: the Survey’s conclusion, and the fact that the postwar claims of half a million American lives saved were far larger than the invasion planning estimates made at the time.
  • Interpretation 2 (atomic diplomacy). Evidence here: the timing — Hiroshima on 6 August, Soviet entry on 8 August, Nagasaki on 9 August; the silence of Potsdam about the emperor, when saying something might have brought surrender sooner; the Survey’s conclusion. Strongest objection: the decoded Japanese messages show a government seeking better terms, not surrendering, and the army still controlled it.
  • Interpretation 3 (the middle, and the Soviet shock). Evidence here: Japan surrendered after both the second bomb and the Soviet invasion, and only once the Allies had signaled that the emperor could remain. Strongest objection: a position that includes every factor risks explaining nothing; ask what evidence would make it wrong.

Questions that probe evidence, which is what SL.11-12.1.c asks of you: What would a document have to say for you to accept that Japan was about to surrender? If the Survey is right that Japan would have surrendered by November without the bombs, does that make the decision wrong, or does it make it a decision taken without knowing that? Truman called Hiroshima a military base. Is that a lie, a belief, or a wartime statement that is neither? Judging in context (HI.3) does not mean suspending judgment. By 1945 every major power had bombed cities and leaders did not fully understand radiation — and a student may still conclude that the decision was justified, unjustified, or justified by some of its reasons and not others.

Sources: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration), Avalon Project, Yale Law School (avalon.law.yale.edu); Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima (6 August 1945), Truman Library (trumanlibrary.gov); Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference (9 August 1945), Truman Library (trumanlibrary.gov); United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War (1946), HyperWar (ibiblio.org)

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