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RLP U.S. History B — Depression, World War, Cold War and Civil Rights

Curriculum

  • 5 Sections
  • 25 Lessons
  • 10 Weeks
Expand all sectionsCollapse all sections
  • Unit 1: The Great Depression and the New Deal
    5
    • 1.1
      Crash — Explaining the Great Depression
      50 mins
    • 1.2
      Dust, Drought and Eviction — The Human Toll on the Plains and in the Missouri Bootheel
      50 mins
    • 1.3
      Seminar — Did the New Deal Go Too Far, or Not Far Enough?
      50 mins
    • 1.4
      Workshop — Labor’s Advances and Retreats, from the AFL to the UFW
      50 mins
    • 1.5
      Performance Task — Did the New Deal Change the Federal Government for Good?
      150 mins
  • Unit 2: The Second World War
    5
    • 2.1
      From Neutrality to Pearl Harbor
      50 mins
    • 2.2
      Strategy and Sacrifice — Fighting a Two-Ocean War
      50 mins
    • 2.3
      Seminar — The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
      50 mins
    • 2.4
      Workshop — Whose Freedoms? The Home Front and Its Contradictions
      50 mins
    • 2.5
      Performance Task — Moot Court: Korematsu v. United States Reheard
      200 mins
  • Unit 3: The Cold War and the Affluent Society
    5
    • 3.1
      Building a Postwar Order — The UN, Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and Containment
      50 mins
    • 3.2
      Containment Tested — The Red Scare, Korea, Cuba, the Bomb and Vietnam
      50 mins
    • 3.3
      Seminar — Who Shared the Affluent Society?
      50 mins
    • 3.4
      Workshop — How the Cold War Ended, and American Interests in the Middle East
      50 mins
    • 3.5
      Performance Task — Structured Academic Controversy: An Imperial Presidency?
      200 mins
  • Unit 4: Civil Rights and a Changing Nation
    5
    • 4.1
      From Dred Scott to Brown — Courts, Lawyers and the Color Line
      50 mins
    • 4.2
      The Freedom Movement — Leaders, Strategies and the Laws of 1964 and 1965
      50 mins
    • 4.3
      Seminar — Many Movements: Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, American Indians and Women
      50 mins
    • 4.4
      Workshop — A Changing Nation: Immigration, the Sunbelt, the Hancock Amendment and the Technology Revolution
      50 mins
    • 4.5
      Performance Task — Oral History: Living Memory of a Changing Community
      250 mins
  • Unit 5: Missouri American History Supplement
    5
    • 5.1
      Reconstruction: Who Held the Power, and What Happened to the Economy
      50 mins
    • 5.2
      Westward Expansion: Gateway Missouri, Land and Resources, and Native Nations
      50 mins
    • 5.3
      Reading the Map, Judging the System: The Missouri Bootheel, 1937-1941
      50 mins
    • 5.4
      Art and Culture in the Depression and World War II: A Capitol Mural, Kansas City Jazz and Posters
      50 mins
    • 5.5
      Citizens and Institutions: Who Solves the Problem? Missouri and the Fight Against Bribery
      50 mins

Crash — Explaining the Great Depression

Unit 1  ·  Inquiry Launch & Source Work  ·  Lesson 1 of 25

Crash — Explaining the Great Depression

US.11.6.2RLP-USHB
Depositors wait at a failing bank as nearly empty funds and descending economic bars show the Depression’s collapse.
By the end of this lesson I can…

explain the monetary history that produced the Federal Reserve, the weaknesses of the late-1920s economy, and the main explanations of the Great Depression, and evaluate the responses of the Federal Reserve, Congress, Hoover and Roosevelt.

Instruction

Between 1929 and 1933 the American economy shrank by roughly a quarter and about one worker in four lost their job. Economists and historians still argue about why. This lesson gives you the evidence and the main explanations, and asks you to weigh them.

The monetary background. In the late nineteenth century the United States had no central bank. The supply of currency could not expand when demand for money rose, so banking panics struck in 1873, 1893 and 1907. In 1907 the banker J. P. Morgan personally organized a rescue. Congress concluded that the country needed an “elastic currency,” and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created twelve regional reserve banks and a board in Washington to lend to banks in a crisis. You met the other half of this story — the Populists’ fight over gold and silver — in the first semester.

Weak foundations. The prosperity of the 1920s rested on uneven ground. Farm prices had been depressed since 1920. Coal and textiles were declining. The richest Americans took a growing share of income, while many families bought cars and appliances on credit. Thousands of small banks had no deposit insurance. Investors bought stocks “on margin,” borrowing most of the price. Europe owed large war debts and depended on American loans to pay them.

The crash and the collapse. Stock prices fell sharply on 24 and 29 October 1929. The Dow Jones average, about 381 at its 1929 peak, fell to about 41 by July 1932 — a loss of nearly 90 percent. The crash alone did not cause the Depression, but it destroyed wealth and confidence. Then came waves of bank failures: about 9,000 banks failed between 1930 and 1933, and depositors lost their savings.

Four explanations. (1) Demand collapse. Following John Maynard Keynes, many economists argue that spending fell — consumers, businesses and foreign buyers all cut back — and without demand, firms cut production and jobs in a downward spiral. The remedy is government spending. (2) Monetary contraction. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued in 1963 that the Federal Reserve let the money supply fall by about a third as banks failed, turning a recession into a depression. In the reading, a Federal Reserve governor accepts their verdict. (3) The gold standard. Barry Eichengreen showed that countries tied to gold had to keep interest rates high to protect their reserves, and that the nations that abandoned gold earliest recovered first. (4) Structural weakness and trade. Inequality, farm debt and the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, which raised duties and provoked retaliation, weakened the economy; most economists think the tariff made things worse but was not the main cause.

What leaders did. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates in 1928-1929 to curb speculation, did little to stop the bank runs, and raised rates again in October 1931 to defend the dollar’s gold value. Hoover did more than his reputation suggests: he urged business to hold wages, expanded public works, and in 1932 created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to lend to banks and railroads. But he opposed direct federal relief to individuals, and in 1932 signed a large tax increase to balance the budget. When the Bonus Army of unemployed veterans camped in Washington that summer, the army drove them out. Roosevelt, inaugurated in March 1933, declared a national bank holiday, reopened sound banks under federal inspection, created deposit insurance (FDIC) and took the country off the gold standard.

Skill: indicators. HI.6 asks you to apply economic indicators. The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed divided by the labor force. Worked example: roughly 13 million unemployed out of a labor force of about 52 million is 13 ÷ 52 = 0.25, or 25 percent. Each explanation predicts different evidence: the monetary view predicts that money supply fell before output did; the gold view predicts faster recovery after leaving gold. HR.3 asks you to judge each interpretation by how well its evidence supports it.

📖 Read for this lesson

The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.

  • Four Explanations of the Depression, and the Evidence That Tells Them ApartBen S. Bernanke, remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago (8 November 2002), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Economic Report of the President (2012), Table B-35 · about 7 min

    The chart asks for the evidence behind each of four explanations, and the lesson supplies none. Here is a federal table of what happened to employment from 1929 to 1941, and the Bernanke speech at the length where it becomes evidence – the 1928 tightening, the October 1931 rate rise and 522 bank closings, and the four-way comparison of countries that left the gold standard early and late. Plus what his position and audience do to the weight of his apology, which the task asks you to judge.

Reading: Two laws and an apology

Federal Reserve Act, 23 December 1913, title; Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley), title; Ben S. Bernanke, remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago (8 November 2002), published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · Public domain (U.S. government works)

Bernanke was a Federal Reserve governor speaking at Milton Friedman’s ninetieth birthday. Whose explanation of the Depression is he accepting?

Federal Reserve Act (1913): An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.

Tariff Act of 1930: An Act To provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, to protect American labor, and for other purposes.

Bernanke (2002): Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry.

Vocabulary in context

  • elastic currency — A money supply that can expand and contract with the economy’s needs.
  • buying on margin — Buying stock with a small down payment and borrowed money.
  • Keynesian explanation — The view that the Depression resulted from a collapse in total spending, which government spending can replace.
  • monetarist explanation — The view, argued by Friedman and Schwartz, that the Federal Reserve’s failure to prevent a fall in the money supply caused the Depression’s depth.
  • Reconstruction Finance Corporation — Hoover’s 1932 agency lending federal money to banks, railroads and other businesses.

Formative check

Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.

Make a prediction

About 13 million people are unemployed and the labor force is about 52 million. What is the unemployment rate?

13 ÷ 52 = 0.25, so about 25 percent — roughly the level of 1933, the worst year of the Depression.
+50 XP

Why did Congress create the Federal Reserve in 1913?

Panics in 1873, 1893 and 1907 showed that the banking system had no central lender and an inflexible money supply.
Myth or Fact?

Herbert Hoover took no federal action against the Depression.

False. He expanded public works and created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, but opposed direct federal relief to individuals and raised taxes in 1932.

Complete the chart: for each of the four explanations, state its claim, the evidence that supports it, and the evidence it struggles to explain. Then write a paragraph (150-200 words) ranking them and explaining what evidence would change your ranking. Use Bernanke’s remarks as one piece of evidence and say what his position and audience add to or take from its weight.

0 words
Quick self-check

How confident are you that you can explain and weigh the main explanations of the Great Depression and the responses of the Fed, Hoover and Roosevelt?

Not yetVery confident

Practice

Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.

Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)

Fluency

Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.

  1. Order: Reconstruction Finance Corporation created; Black Tuesday; Federal Reserve Act; Smoot-Hawley Tariff; national bank holiday.
    Check your answer
    Answer: Federal Reserve Act (1913); Black Tuesday (29 October 1929); Smoot-Hawley (1930); RFC (1932); bank holiday (March 1933).
  2. Define ‘buying on margin’ and explain why it made the 1929 crash worse.
    Check your answer
    Answer: Buying stock with a small down payment and borrowed money. When prices fell, borrowers had to sell to repay loans, pushing prices down further.
  3. About 13 million people are unemployed in a labor force of about 52 million. Compute the unemployment rate.
    Check your answer
    Answer: About 25 percent.
    13 ÷ 52 = 0.25.

Application

Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.

  1. Source Bernanke’s 2002 remark to Milton Friedman: ‘Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry.’ Who was speaking, in what role, and which explanation of the Depression does it support? How much weight should it carry?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Ben Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve governor, at Friedman’s ninetieth birthday conference. It endorses the monetarist explanation that the Fed let the money supply collapse. It carries weight because an official of the institution concedes its failure, but it is a celebratory remark, not a full analysis, and other explanations still apply.
  2. Read the title of the Federal Reserve Act: it was meant ‘to furnish an elastic currency.’ Corroborate with the lesson: what problem was this solving, and did the Fed deliver an elastic currency in 1930-1933?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Repeated panics (1873, 1893, 1907) caused by an inflexible money supply and no lender to banks. In 1930-1933 the Fed let the money supply fall by about a third as banks failed, so by the monetarist account it failed at the task it was created for.
  3. The stock market crashed in October 1929 and the Depression followed. Did the crash cause the Depression?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Model answer: the crash destroyed wealth and confidence, but it does not by itself explain a decade-long depression. Strong answers bring in at least two of the lesson’s explanations — collapsing demand, monetary contraction, the gold standard, structural weakness and trade — and explain how they interacted.

Review

Keep earlier skills sharp.

  1. Semester A review: which 1896 speech attacked the gold standard with the image of a ‘cross of gold’?
    Check your answer
    Answer: William Jennings Bryan’s speech to the Democratic National Convention.

Missouri Learning Standards — Social Studies addressed: 9-12.AH.4.EC.A, 9-12.AH.4.CC.B, 9-12.AH.4.EC.B, 9-12.AH.4.GS.B, 9-12.AH.3.EC.C, RH.11-12.1, RH.11-12.8, 9-12.AH.1.CC.D, 9-12.AH.1.EC.A

Instructional focus: Evaluation of competing causal explanations using economic evidence

Reading

Four Explanations of the Depression, and the Evidence That Tells Them Apart

Ben S. Bernanke, remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago (8 November 2002), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Economic Report of the President (2012), Table B-35 · Public domain (U.S. government works)

Why this reading. The lesson names four explanations of the Depression and then asks you to fill a chart: the claim, the evidence that supports it, and the evidence it struggles to explain. The mini-lecture describes the explanations but supplies almost no evidence to weigh them with, and it gives you three sentences of Ben Bernanke without his argument, his figures or his setting — although the task asks what “his position and audience add to or take from its weight.” This reading supplies both: a federal table of what actually happened to employment, and the Bernanke speech at the length where it becomes evidence. What to look for: the monetarist and gold-standard explanations make predictions about timing and about which countries suffered worst. Those predictions can be checked. The demand-collapse and structural explanations mostly do not, which is a fact about the explanations, not about the Depression.

1. What happened to work: the federal series

These rows are from the Economic Report of the President, Table B-35, which carries the Bureau of Labor Statistics series back to 1929. Persons are in thousands, aged 14 and over.

Civilian labor force, unemployment and the unemployment rate, 1929–1941
YearCivilian labor forceEmploymentUnemploymentUnemployment rate
192949,18047,6301,5503.2%
193351,59038,76012,83024.9%
193955,23045,7509,48017.2%
194055,64047,5208,12014.6%
194155,91050,3505,5609.9%

Three things in this table are worth arguing about. Employment in 1933 was about 8.9 million lower than in 1929, while the labor force had grown by about 2.4 million — the hole was deeper than job losses alone. Recovery after 1933 was real and slow: six years later nearly one worker in six was still unemployed. And the last two rows are war orders as much as the New Deal. Any claim you make about what ended the Depression has to survive the 1939 row.

2. A Federal Reserve governor on why it happened

On 8 November 2002, Ben S. Bernanke, then a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, spoke at a University of Chicago conference honoring the economist Milton Friedman on his ninetieth birthday. Friedman and Anna Schwartz had argued in A Monetary History of the United States (1963) that the Federal Reserve turned a recession into the Great Depression. Bernanke’s subject was whether their evidence holds up. Notice who is speaking, to whom, and on what occasion, before you weigh what he says.

The problem any explanation has to solve.

A statistician studying data from the Great Depression would notice the basic fact that the money stock, output, and prices in the United States went down together in 1929 through 1933 and up together in subsequent years. But these correlations cannot answer the crucial questions: What is causing what? Are changes in the money stock largely causing changes in prices and output, as Friedman and Schwartz were to conclude? Or, instead, is the stock of money reacting passively to changes in the state of economy? Or is there yet some other, unmeasured factor that is affecting all three variables?

His answer is a method: find moments when the Federal Reserve tightened policy for reasons that had little to do with the state of the American economy, and see what followed.

Episode one: 1928–1929, tightening against stock speculation. Bernanke quotes Friedman and Schwartz:

by July [1928], the discount rate had been raised in New York to 5 per cent, the highest since 1921, and the System’s holdings of government securities had been reduced to a level of over $600 million at the end of 1927 to $210 million by August 1928, despite an outflow of gold.

During the two months from the cyclical peak in August 1929 to the crash, production, wholesale prices, and personal income fell at annual rates of 20 per cent, 7-1/2 per cent, and 5 per cent, respectively.

Episode two: October 1931, defending the dollar. Britain left gold in September 1931, and speculators turned from the pound to the dollar. Bernanke writes that

Conventional and long-established central banking practice would have mandated responses to both the external and internal drains, but the Federal Reserve—by this point having forsworn any responsibility for the U.S. banking system…—decided to respond only to the external drain.

and quotes Friedman and Schwartz again:

The Federal Reserve System reacted vigorously and promptly to the external drain. . . . On October 9 [1931], the Reserve Bank of New York raised its rediscount rate to 2-1/2 per cent, and on October 16, to 3-1/2 per cent—the sharpest rise within so brief a period in the whole history of the System, before or since.

That action, Bernanke says, “stemmed the outflow of gold but contributed to what Friedman and Schwartz called a ‘spectacular’ increase in bank failures and bank runs, with 522 commercial banks closing their doors in October alone.” Over the decade as a whole, he notes, “something close to half of all U.S. commercial banks either failed or merged with other banks.”

The gold standard as a natural experiment. This is the part of the speech that can settle an argument, because it compares countries rather than retelling one country’s story.

countries adhering to the gold standard were forced to match the contractionary monetary policies and price deflation being experienced in the United States.

[T]he trough of the depression in Britain and the other countries that accompanied Britain in leaving gold was reached in the third quarter of 1932. [In contrast, i]n the countries that remained on the gold standard or, like Canada, that went only part way with Britain, the Depression dragged on.

Bernanke sorts countries into four groups. Those never on gold: China, on silver, was “hardly affected internally by the holocaust that was sweeping the gold-standard world,” and Spain and Japan also escaped the worst. Those that left early: Britain and the Scandinavian countries, trough in 1932. Those that stayed on gold with ample reserves: France, whose trough came only in April 1935. Those that rejoined gold with thin reserves and damaged banks: Austria, Germany, Hungary and Romania, which fell furthest. He adds that later researchers repeated the comparison on larger samples — Choudhri and Kochin, Eichengreen and Sachs on ten countries, Bernanke and James on twenty-four, and others — and found the same pattern: countries that left gold earlier recovered earlier.

The ending. These are the closing sentences of the speech, and they are the ones usually quoted alone:

Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.

3. Using this in the chart

This section is written by us, not quoted. It tells you where in the evidence above each row of your chart can be filled, and where it cannot.

  • Monetary contraction predicts that policy tightening comes before the falls in output and prices. Bernanke’s two episodes are offered as exactly that test, with dates. What it struggles with: the recession of 1937–1938, and why recovery after 1933 was so slow when money was expanding again — see the 1939 row of the table.
  • The gold standard predicts a ranking across countries, and the four-group comparison delivers one. This is the strongest single piece of evidence in the reading. What it struggles with: it explains the international pattern better than it explains American politics, and it says nothing about why the United States tightened in 1928.
  • Demand collapse is supported by the size of the employment hole in the table, by how long it lasted, and by how fast unemployment fell once war orders arrived in 1940–1941. What it struggles with: on its own it does not say why spending fell so far in 1930 and not in the sharp slump of 1920–1921.
  • Structural weakness and trade is supported by the farm-price and inequality evidence from the first semester and by the Tariff Act of 1930. What it struggles with: trade was a small share of the American economy, so the tariff cannot carry the whole fall, and Bernanke’s international comparison suggests the transmission ran through money and gold rather than through tariffs.

On sourcing Bernanke. He is a Federal Reserve governor speaking for the institution he is blaming, at a celebration for the man who made the accusation, in a friendly room. That cuts both ways, and the task wants you to say which way. An official conceding fault against his own institution’s interest is unusually strong evidence; a compliment paid at a tribute dinner is unusually weak evidence. Decide which this is, and say why. Notice also what he does not concede: he nowhere says monetary policy was the only cause, and he calls his own work on bank failures “an embellishment of the Friedman-Schwartz story.”

Sources: Ben S. Bernanke, remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman (8 November 2002), Federal Reserve Board (federalreserve.gov); Economic Report of the President (2012), Table B-35: Civilian population and labor force, 1929-2011, govinfo.gov (govinfo.gov)

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