
argue both sides of whether the Cold War created an imperial presidency, using the record from Korea through Vietnam and Watergate, seek a reasoned shared conclusion, and write a position paper defending my own view.
Instruction
The question. Did the Cold War create an “imperial presidency” that threatened the constitutional balance? The historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. popularized the phrase in 1973. You will argue both sides before deciding.
How the presidency grew. The Depression and the New Deal made the president the manager of the economy and the leader of legislation (Unit 1). The Second World War made him commander of a global military and gave him broad power at home, including Executive Order 9066. The Cold War made that power permanent. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. The United States kept a large standing military and nuclear weapons that only the president could order used. Truman sent troops to Korea without a declaration of war, calling it a UN “police action.” Presidents ordered covert operations in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba and elsewhere. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson open-ended authority in Vietnam, and Nixon extended the war into Cambodia and Laos.
Watergate. On 17 June 1972 five men were arrested breaking into the Democratic National Committee’s offices at the Watergate complex in Washington. They were connected to Nixon’s re-election campaign. Nixon won re-election in a landslide that November, but journalists, a federal judge, a Senate committee and a special prosecutor uncovered a wider pattern: illegal campaign funds, a White House unit that burgled the office of the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg (who had leaked the Pentagon Papers), attempts to use the IRS and FBI against opponents, and a cover-up directed from the White House. In July 1973 a former aide revealed that Nixon had secretly taped his conversations. When the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, subpoenaed the tapes, Nixon ordered him fired; the attorney general and deputy attorney general resigned rather than do it (the “Saturday Night Massacre,” October 1973). In United States v. Nixon (24 July 1974), the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Nixon must surrender the tapes. That week the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles of impeachment: obstruction of justice, abuse of power and contempt of Congress. A newly released tape showed that Nixon had ordered the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation six days after the break-in. Facing certain impeachment and removal, Nixon resigned on 9 August 1974, the only president to do so. President Ford pardoned him a month later.
Why it was a constitutional crisis. The question was whether a president is above the law: whether he can refuse a court’s order, fire the prosecutor investigating him, and use federal agencies against political enemies. The system answered through a free press, a grand jury, the courts, Congress and, finally, members of Nixon’s own party who told him he had lost their support.
Reforms. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (1973) over Nixon’s veto, requiring the president to report to Congress within 48 hours of sending forces into hostilities and to withdraw them within 60 days without authorization; a budget law ending presidential “impoundment” of appropriated funds (1974); campaign-finance limits (1974); intelligence oversight after the Senate’s Church Committee exposed abuses by the CIA and FBI; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978).
The two sides. Yes: the Cold War concentrated war, secrecy and surveillance in the executive, Congress repeatedly surrendered its war power, and Watergate grew from the same habits of secret power. No: the system worked — the Court checked Truman in 1952 and Nixon in 1974, Congress forced a president out and passed reforms, and a nuclear age requires an executive who can act quickly. HR.1 asks you to test the logic on both sides: does Nixon’s fall prove the system works, or only that it worked once, narrowly, because tapes existed?
The controversy and paper. Follow the four rounds from the first semester. In your position paper, use at least five primary sources and state the opposing argument so that its holders would accept it (SL.11-12.1.d).
📖 Read for this lesson
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.
Reading: The Court and the tapes
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), opinion of Chief Justice Burger for a unanimous Court · Public domain (U.S. government work)
Nixon claimed an absolute privilege to withhold the tapes. Read what the Court says a president may and may not withhold.
…neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
Formative check
Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.
What did the Supreme Court decide in United States v. Nixon (1974)?
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was passed over President Nixon’s veto.
How confident are you that you can argue both sides of the imperial-presidency question and defend my own conclusion from the record?
Unit 3 checkpoint
Do this before you start the task. It covers the whole unit and tells you what to review first.
Which institutions were created at Bretton Woods in 1944?
Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the commission that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Marshall Plan provided about $ billion to Western Europe from 1948 to 1952; the Soviet refused to take part.
What does Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provide?
Why did Truman fire General MacArthur in 1951?
About a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site beginning in 1951.
Which amendment lowered the voting age to eighteen in 1971?
What happened by the mid-1950s in the workforce?
The Supreme Court upheld Truman’s 1952 seizure of the steel mills.
In United States v. (1974) the Court ruled that executive privilege is not absolute; the president resigned on 9 August .
How long did the Iranian hostage crisis last?
Which claim confuses sequence with cause?
Submit: Recorded SAC + Position Paper (900-1,100 words)
Task: Complete a structured academic controversy on whether the Cold War created an imperial presidency, then write a position paper defending your own conclusion from at least five primary sources.
Submission workflow
- Stage 1 — Plan. Evidence chart for both sides (at least four primary sources per side, from Korea through Watergate and the 1970s reforms), with the premise under each argument identified.
- Stage 2 — Reviewed draft. Draft position paper; a parent, guardian or study partner (or you, after a day away from it) checks that the opposing argument is stated as its holders would state it. Save a revision note.
- Stage 3 — Revised final. 900-1,100 words, at least five cited primary sources, one paragraph testing a premise from each side.
- Stage 4 — Controversy. The structured academic controversy (all four rounds), recorded aloud or written as a two-voice dialogue, scored as the presentation stage; if a parent, guardian or study partner joins, each of you takes one side in rounds one and two.
How it is scored
| Criterion | What proficient looks like |
|---|---|
| Collaborative discussion (SL.11-12.1, SL.11-12.1.c) | Prepared, evidence-based participation; poses questions that probe reasoning. |
| Representing other views (SL.11-12.1.d) | Restates the other side accurately enough that its holders agree; seeks common ground. |
| Evaluating reasoning (9-12.AH.1.CC.B / 9-12.AH.1.CC.D) | Distinguishes valid from fallacious arguments on both sides. |
| Position paper (WHST.11-12.1) | Precise claim, at least five primary sources, strongest counterclaim answered. |
| Historical accuracy (US.11.11.4, US.11.8.5) | Accurate account of presidential power, Watergate and the constitutional response. |
| Revision (WHST.11-12.5) | Revision note shows substantive changes in response to review. |
An Imperial Presidency? Six Documents, 1947-1974
National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, secs. 101-102; Joint Resolution of 10 August 1964 (Gulf of Tonkin); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (17 January 1961); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), secs. 2-5; House Report 93-1305 (1974) · Public domain (U.S. government works)
Why this reading. The task requires a position paper using at least five primary sources, and an evidence chart with at least four primary sources per side. The lesson supplies one sentence of one case. Here are six documents covering thirty years, from the statute that built the national-security state to the statute that tried to take part of it back. Each can be used on either side of the controversy, which is what makes it a controversy and not a quiz. What to look for: read the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as a lawyer would. Who decides when it ends?
1. The machinery: National Security Act of 1947
Sec. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council… The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council… The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof.
Both bodies sit inside the executive branch, advise the president, and are presided over by him. Congress created them and then had no seat at the table. That is a structural fact, and both sides of the controversy have to account for it.
2. The blank check: Joint Resolution of 10 August 1964 (Gulf of Tonkin)
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
Three things to notice, all of them in the text. The resolution passed the House 416 to 0 and the Senate 88 to 2. Section 2 authorizes force “as the President determines.” And section 3 lets the resolution expire when the President decides the area is secure. Congress kept a repeal power, and used it in 1971 — seven years and tens of thousands of American deaths later. Whichever side you argue, this document is the sharpest evidence in the packet, because the surrender of authority was voluntary and nearly unanimous.
3. The warning, from a general: Eisenhower’s Farewell Address, 17 January 1961
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
Sourcing note: this is a retiring five-star general and two-term president, in his last speech, warning about the apparatus he had spent eight years commanding. He also says “we recognize the imperative need for this development” — he is not calling for it to be dismantled. Both halves belong in your paper.
4. The limit: United States v. Nixon, 24 July 1974
Chief Justice Burger, for a unanimous Court (Justice Rehnquist not participating):
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President’s need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Read what the Court grants as well as what it refuses. It recognizes a constitutionally based executive privilege for the first time, gives it “great deference,” and carves out “military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets” from its holding. A student arguing that the system worked should quote the second paragraph; a student arguing that it did not should quote the exception.
5. The answer: War Powers Resolution, 7 November 1973, passed over the president’s veto
Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities…
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities…
Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war… the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
Sec. 5. (b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted… the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted… unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use… (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.
The clock runs only from the moment a report is submitted “or is required to be submitted,” and section 3 requires consultation only “in every possible instance.” Every president since 1973 has reported “consistent with” the resolution rather than under it, denying that it binds him. That is either proof that Congress reclaimed its power or proof that it could not.
6. Watergate and the articles of impeachment
We have not been able to verify the text of the three articles against an official printing while writing this reading, so we describe them in our own words rather than quote them, and you should do the same unless you can check the resolution yourself. On 27–30 July 1974 the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles against President Nixon. Article I charged obstruction of justice: that he had personally and through subordinates engaged in a course of conduct to delay and obstruct the investigation of the Watergate break-in, including making false statements, withholding evidence and approving payments to buy the silence of witnesses. Article II charged abuse of power: misuse of the Internal Revenue Service, the FBI, the Secret Service and a special investigative unit against citizens, in violation of the rights of those citizens. Article III charged contempt of Congress, for refusing to produce subpoenaed material. Each article ended with the finding that such conduct warranted impeachment, trial and removal from office. The report is House Report 93-1305 (93d Congress, 2d Session).
Building the two sides
This section is ours, not quoted. Every document above works for both sides; that is the point of a structured academic controversy, and stating the other side so its holders accept it is a scored part of the task.
- Yes, the Cold War created an imperial presidency. Section 101 put the whole national-security apparatus inside the executive. Truman went to war in Korea without a declaration. Section 2 of the Tonkin Resolution authorized force “as the President determines” and section 3 let him decide when it ended. Eisenhower — a general — warned that the apparatus had acquired a political weight of its own. Watergate grew out of the same habits of secrecy, and United States v. Nixon expressly protects national-security secrets from its own holding.
- No, the system held. The Court stopped Truman from seizing the steel mills in 1952 and stopped Nixon in 1974, unanimously. Congress repealed the Tonkin Resolution in 1971, passed the War Powers Resolution over a veto, ended impoundment, limited campaign money, and created intelligence oversight after the Church Committee. A president resigned rather than face a trial he would lose, and the votes that decided it came from his own party. And a nuclear age genuinely requires an executive who can act in minutes.
Test the premises, which is what HR.1 asks. The “yes” side assumes that concentrated power is the same as unconstitutional power — but Congress voted for most of it. The “no” side assumes that a system which worked once works generally — but Nixon fell because he had taped himself, and no other president has. Ask each side what evidence would change its mind, and put the answer in your paper.
Sources: National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, United States Statutes at Large, govinfo.gov (govinfo.gov); Joint Resolution of Congress, 10 August 1964 (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), Avalon Project, Yale Law School (avalon.law.yale.edu); Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961), Avalon Project, Yale Law School (avalon.law.yale.edu); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), official U.S. Reports (tile.loc.gov); War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), United States Statutes at Large, govinfo.gov (govinfo.gov)