
analyze the key court cases in the evolution of civil rights — Dred Scott, Plessy, Gaines, Brown, Bakke and Schuette — and explain how Black and white lawyers built the legal strategy that ended segregation in higher education and then in schools.
Instruction
For a century the Supreme Court helped build the color line, and then, pressed by a patient legal campaign, helped take it down. The same constitutional words — citizenship, equal protection — were read in opposite ways. This lesson follows the cases and the lawyers.
Dred Scott (1857). Dred Scott, enslaved in Missouri, sued for freedom in the St. Louis Circuit Court in 1846 because he had lived in a free state and a free territory. Chief Justice Roger Taney held that Black Americans, free or enslaved, could not be citizens and that Congress had no power to ban slavery in the territories. The decision inflamed the North and helped bring on the Civil War; the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause overturned it.
Plessy (1896). Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths white and one-eighth Black, deliberately boarded a whites-only railway car in Louisiana to test the state’s separate-car law. The Court held that segregation did not violate equal protection if facilities were equal. Justice Harlan, dissenting alone, wrote that the Constitution is “color-blind.” “Separate but equal” became the legal foundation of Jim Crow — and in practice, facilities for Black Americans were almost never equal.
The legal strategy. In 1930 the NAACP hired Nathan Margold, a white lawyer, to plan a campaign against segregation; his report proposed attacking the inequality in segregated facilities. Charles Hamilton Houston, dean of Howard University’s law school, trained a generation of Black lawyers, including Thurgood Marshall, and chose to begin with graduate and professional schools, where states often had no Black school at all and judges were less likely to fear the social consequences. The cases built on each other: Murray v. Pearson (Maryland, 1936) admitted a Black student to the state law school; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938) held that a state must provide equal legal education within its borders; Sweatt v. Painter (1950) held that a hastily created Black law school in Texas could not equal the University of Texas, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950) held that a Black graduate student could not be segregated inside the classroom. Black and white lawyers worked together at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, among them Robert Carter, Constance Baker Motley and Jack Greenberg. By 1950 the lawyers were ready to attack segregation itself.
Gaines (1938). Lloyd Gaines graduated from Lincoln University, the state university Missouri maintained for Black students, which had no law school. When the University of Missouri’s law school refused to admit him, the state pointed to a statute that let it pay his tuition at a law school in an adjacent state; Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois admitted nonresident Black students. In December 1938 Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court that this was not enough. The duty to provide equal treatment belongs to each state within its own borders: “It is there that the equality of legal right must be maintained.” Sending a student elsewhere “may mitigate the inconvenience of the discrimination but cannot serve to validate it.” The Court did not yet strike down separate schools, but it held that “separate” had to mean actually equal, inside the state.
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948). Segregation in housing was enforced through restrictive covenants, private agreements among owners. In 1945 a Black family, the Shelleys, bought a house on Labadie Avenue in St. Louis, on a block where owners had signed a covenant in 1911 barring occupancy by anyone “not of the Caucasian race.” Neighbors sued to take the house back, and the Supreme Court of Missouri sided with the neighbors. In May 1948 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that the private agreements alone did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but that “in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws.” Thurgood Marshall was counsel for the petitioners in the companion case from Detroit.
Brown (1954). The unanimous Court held that segregated public schools violate equal protection, citing evidence that segregation harmed Black children. In 1955 it ordered desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” a phrase that Southern officials used to delay for years.
After Brown: affirmative action. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), the Court struck down the University of California, Davis medical school’s practice of reserving 16 of 100 places for minority applicants, but Justice Powell’s controlling opinion allowed race to be considered as one factor among many. Voters in some states then banned racial and gender preferences by amending their constitutions. In 2006 Michigan voters adopted such a ban by 58 percent to 42 percent, and in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014) the Supreme Court, six Justices to two with Justice Kagan taking no part, held that the amendment did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The plurality opinion said the question was whether voters may decide whether race-based preferences continue, and answered yes; Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, said the voters had “changed the rules in the middle of the game.” In 2023 the Supreme Court ended race-conscious admissions nationally in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard.
Two readings of the Constitution. Notice that Harlan’s “color-blind” phrase is quoted today both by opponents of affirmative action and by those who say it was written to protect people from a racial caste system. CST.1 asks you to compare past and present and weigh consequences; do it with the texts in front of you.
📖 Read for this lesson
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.
Reading: A century of the Court on race
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), Taney, C.J.; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Harlan, J., dissenting; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Hughes, C.J.; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Warren, C.J.; Michigan Constitution, Article I, section 26 (2006), as quoted in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) · Public domain
Content note: the first excerpt states the racist premise of the Dred Scott decision. It is included because students must be able to recognize and answer it. Harlan’s dissent and Brown both use the language of the Constitution to reject it. Gaines was a Missouri case: the state of Missouri, not a Southern school board, was the defendant.
Taney (1857): They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.
Harlan, dissenting (1896): Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
Gaines (1938): We find it impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal right to the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified by requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere. That resort may mitigate the inconvenience of the discrimination but cannot serve to validate it.
Brown (1954): We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Michigan Constitution, Article I, section 26 (2006): The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
Formative check
Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.
Why did the NAACP’s lawyers begin their attack on segregation with graduate and professional schools?
In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (1938), the Court held that Missouri satisfied equal protection by paying a Black student’s tuition at a law school in another state.
Dred Scott (1857)
Tap to revealBlack Americans could not be citizens; Congress could not ban slavery in the territories.
Gaines (1938)
Tap to revealA Missouri case: a state must provide equal legal education inside its own borders, not pay for it elsewhere.
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
Tap to revealA St. Louis case: state courts may not enforce racial restrictive covenants.
Brown (1954)
Tap to revealSeparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Bakke (1978)
Tap to revealStruck down a University of California, Davis medical school quota; allowed race as one factor in admissions.
Complete a case brief chart for Dred Scott, Plessy, Gaines, Brown, Bakke and Schuette: question, holding, reasoning in one sentence, and consequence. Then write a paragraph (150-200 words) tracing how the legal strategy moved from Gaines to Brown, naming at least two lawyers and explaining why the order of cases mattered.
How confident are you that you can explain the key civil rights cases and how the legal strategy against segregation was built?
Practice
Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.
Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)
Fluency
Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.
- Order: Bakke; Sweatt v. Painter; Brown v. Board; Missouri ex rel. Gaines; Shelley v. Kraemer; Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.
Check your answer
Answer: Gaines (1938); Shelley (1948); Sweatt (1950); Brown (1954); Bakke (1978); Schuette (2014). - What does ‘separate but equal’ mean, and which case established it?
Check your answer
Answer: The doctrine that segregation is lawful if facilities are equal; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).
Application
Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.
- Harlan wrote in 1896: ‘Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’ What was his position on the Court, and why is the quotation used today by people on opposite sides of affirmative action?
Check your answer
Answer: He was the lone dissenter in Plessy. Opponents of affirmative action read ‘color-blind’ as barring any racial classification; others read the sentence with its second half — ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes’ — as a rejection of racial caste. A strong answer presents both readings and quotes the text exactly. - Brown (1954) held that ‘Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.’ Corroborate the ruling with what happened in Southern schools over the next decade. What does the comparison show?
Check your answer
Answer: The 1955 ‘all deliberate speed’ order allowed years of delay, and desegregation moved far faster only after Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act let the government cut funds. A ruling is evidence of law, not of practice. - Gaines was decided in 1938 and Brown in 1954. Did Gaines cause Brown?
Check your answer
Answer: Model answer: Gaines was a necessary link — it held that a state must provide equality inside its own borders, which forced the question of whether separate schools could ever be equal — but Brown also rested on Sweatt and McLaurin (1950), on evidence about the harm of segregation, and on years of litigation. A strong answer shows the connections without claiming a single cause.
Review
Keep earlier skills sharp.
- Semester A review: which amendment’s equal protection clause did both Plessy and Brown interpret?
Check your answer
Answer: The Fourteenth Amendment.
A Century of the Court on Race: Six Decisions, Briefed
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (quoting Michigan Constitution, Article I, section 26) · Public domain (U.S. government works and state law)
Why this reading. Content note: the first excerpt states the racist premise of the Dred Scott decision, and the second states the reasoning of Plessy. They are here because the case-brief chart asks you to write down each decision’s reasoning in a sentence, and you cannot summarize reasoning you have not read. The lesson gives one line from each of four decisions and none at all from Gaines or Schuette, and only a sentence about Bakke. Here is enough of each to brief it: question, holding, reasoning, consequence. What to look for: Plessy and Brown reach opposite results from the same clause of the same amendment. The disagreement is about a question of fact — what segregation does to a child — and you can see each Court answer it.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
Chief Justice Taney held that Black Americans, free or enslaved, could not be citizens of the United States and could not sue in federal court, and that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the territories. His reasoning about the Founders’ intentions:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect…
The syllabus of the official report states the holdings plainly: “A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a ‘citizen’ within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States,” and that the two clauses of the Constitution which point to this race “treat them as persons whom it was morally lawful to deal in as articles of property and to hold as slaves.” The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) overturned this holding directly.
2. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
Justice Brown, for the Court, upholding Louisiana’s separate-car law:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it…
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Justice Harlan, dissenting alone. The famous sentence has two sentences in front of it that are almost never quoted, and they change how it reads:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case…
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
Harlan also asked where the principle stopped: if the state may separate races on a railway, why not in courtrooms, in legislative galleries, or between “native and naturalized citizens… or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?” That is the argument from consequences, and it is a tool you can use in the chart’s “consequence” column.
3. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (12 December 1938)
Lloyd Gaines, a Missouri citizen, graduated from Lincoln University in 1935. Lincoln was the university Missouri maintained for Black students, and it had no law school. His credits would have qualified him for the law school of the University of Missouri, but he was refused on the ground that it was, in the words the Court quotes, “contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State to admit a negro as a student in the University of Missouri.” A Missouri statute let the university’s curators arrange for Black Missourians to attend a university in an adjacent state and pay their tuition, and law schools in Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois admitted nonresident Black students. Chief Justice Hughes, for the Court:
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal right must be maintained.
We find it impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal right to the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified by requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere. That resort may mitigate the inconvenience of the discrimination but cannot serve to validate it.
The Court reversed the Supreme Court of Missouri. It did not overrule Plessy; it held that Missouri’s offer to pay tuition elsewhere did not give Gaines equal treatment inside Missouri. Justice McReynolds wrote a separate opinion disagreeing. For the “consequence” column of your chart, ask what the decision left a state free to do next, and why a strategy built on proving inequality would then start with graduate schools.
4. Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Chief Justice Warren, for a unanimous Court:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments… It is the very foundation of good citizenship… In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Notice how the Court gets there: through Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, the graduate-school cases Charles Hamilton Houston’s strategy had built, quoting their language about “those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement.” That is why the order of the cases mattered, which is what your paragraph is about. The Court then expressly rejects the contrary language in Plessy: it answers the factual question Justice Brown had answered in 1896, and answers it the other way.
5. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
The medical school of the University of California, Davis, reserved 16 of 100 places for minority applicants. The Court struck the set-aside down and ordered Allan Bakke admitted, but Justice Powell’s controlling opinion allowed race to be considered. His premise:
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is explicit: “No State shall… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It is settled beyond question that the “rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights…” The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when… applied to a person of another color.
And what an admissions office may therefore do instead:
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats… In short, an admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.
6. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (22 April 2014)
After the Court decided in 2003 that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate point system for race-based preferences was unconstitutional (Gratz v. Bollinger) but that its law school’s more limited use was not (Grutter v. Bollinger), Michigan voters in 2006 adopted Proposal 2, by 58 percent to 42 percent, amending the state constitution. Article I, section 26 provides in part:
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
The Court upheld the amendment, six Justices to two, with Justice Kagan taking no part. Justice Kennedy’s opinion, for three Justices:
By approving Proposal 2 and thereby adding §26 to their State Constitution, the Michigan voters exercised their privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise of their democratic power.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissenting:
But instead, the majority of Michigan voters changed the rules in the middle of the game, reconfiguring the existing political process in Michigan in a manner that burdened racial minorities.
Notice what the two opinions disagree about. Neither says what a university should do. They disagree about who gets to decide — voters through the constitution, or the boards that run the universities — and whether taking that decision away from the boards for race-sensitive admissions alone changes the rules for one group. In 2023 the Supreme Court ended race-conscious admissions nationally in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard.
Two readings of one phrase
This section is ours, not quoted. Put Harlan’s paragraph beside Michigan’s section 26 and you have the argument that runs through the last fifty years of this subject. Section 26 uses Harlan’s principle — the state may not classify by race — as a rule against programs designed to help people the state once classified by race. Those who read Harlan the other way point to the two sentences before the famous one: he is describing a country in which one race is dominant “in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power,” and saying the Constitution forbids the law from ratifying that. Both readings are available in the text. For your paragraph on the legal strategy, the key is that Houston and Marshall chose graduate schools first because there the inequality could be measured — a state with no Black law school had nothing to point to — and because desegregating a handful of adult students frightened judges less. Gaines (1938), Sweatt and McLaurin (1950) each moved the line a little, and Brown cited them all.
Sources: Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): transcript excerpt, National Archives milestone documents (archives.gov); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), official U.S. Reports (tile.loc.gov); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (law.cornell.edu); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), official U.S. Reports (tile.loc.gov); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), official U.S. Reports (tile.loc.gov); Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014), Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (law.cornell.edu)