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RLP World History B — World Wars, Cold War and the Contemporary World

Curriculum

  • 5 Sections
  • 29 Lessons
  • 10 Weeks
Expand all sectionsCollapse all sections
  • Unit 1: The Broken Peace and the Rise of Totalitarianism
    5
    • 1.1
      Making Peace in 1919 — Versailles, the Fourteen Points and the League
      50 mins
    • 1.2
      Redrawing the Map — Borders, Refugees and Money after 1919
      50 mins
    • 1.3
      Seminar — Things Fall Apart: Disillusionment after the Great War
      50 mins
    • 1.4
      Workshop — Lenin, Stalin and the Soviet Dictatorship
      50 mins
    • 1.5
      Performance Task — From Broken Peace to Dictatorship: A Document-Based Argument
      150 mins
  • Unit 2: The Second World War and the Holocaust
    5
    • 2.1
      Roads to War — Empire-Building and Appeasement in the 1930s
      50 mins
    • 2.2
      Theaters, Turning Points and Leaders of a Global War
      50 mins
    • 2.3
      Seminar — The Holocaust: Ideology, Perpetrators, Victims, Rescuers
      100 mins
    • 2.4
      Workshop — Counting the Cost: The Human Toll of the Second World War
      50 mins
    • 2.5
      Performance Task — Witness and Memory: A Digital-History Presentation
      200 mins
  • Unit 3: The Cold War World
    5
    • 3.1
      A World Remade — Yalta, the Bomb, the UN and the New Alliances
      50 mins
    • 3.2
      Containment — Aid, Alliances and Hot Wars in a Cold War
      50 mins
    • 3.3
      Seminar — The Chinese Revolution from Civil War to Tiananmen
      50 mins
    • 3.4
      Workshop — Nationalism, Israel and Palestine in the Modern Middle East
      50 mins
    • 3.5
      Performance Task — Structured Academic Controversy: Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?
      150 mins
  • Unit 4: Nation-Building and Globalization in the Contemporary World
    5
    • 4.1
      After Empire — Decolonisation and Nation-Building in Africa
      50 mins
    • 4.2
      Case Studies — Mexico and China since 1980
      50 mins
    • 4.3
      Seminar — Do Today’s Trends Serve Freedom and Democracy?
      50 mins
    • 4.4
      Workshop — The Connected World: Trade, Migration and the Information Revolution
      50 mins
    • 4.5
      Performance Task — Comparative Research Paper: Building Nations since 1945
      200 mins
  • Unit 5: Missouri World History Supplement
    9
    • 5.1
      Who Counts? Social Structures and Stratification
      50 mins
    • 5.2
      Medieval Empires and the Roads That Joined Them
      50 mins
    • 5.3
      From the Crusades to the Renaissance
      50 mins
    • 5.4
      Reformation and Scientific Revolution: New Institutions, New Ways of Thinking
      50 mins
    • 5.5
      European Overseas Expansion and the Columbian Exchange
      50 mins
    • 5.6
      Trade Networks, New Wealth and Coerced Labor
      50 mins
    • 5.7
      Land Empires: Challenges, Benefits and Governments
      50 mins
    • 5.8
      Republics, Limited and Absolute Government, and Reform
      50 mins
    • 5.9
      Revolutions Remake Places; Technology Remakes the Environment
      50 mins

Roads to War — Empire-Building and Appeasement in the 1930s

Unit 2  ·  Inquiry Launch & Source Work  ·  Lesson 6 of 29

Roads to War — Empire-Building and Appeasement in the 1930s

WH.10.8.1RLP-WHB
Unlabeled map shows three expanding empires, a Nanjing memorial, and an empty conference table suggesting appeasement.
By the end of this lesson I can…

compare the German, Italian and Japanese drives for empire in the 1930s, including the Nanjing Massacre and the Stalin-Hitler Pact, and explain the role of appeasement, isolationism and domestic distractions before the war.

Instruction

The Second World War began at different times in different places. For China it began in 1937, or even 1931; for Europe in 1939; for the United States in 1941. It grew from three separate drives for empire that eventually joined.

Japan. Japan’s leaders, increasingly dominated by the military, argued that Japan needed raw materials and room for its people, and that Western powers denied it the empire they themselves enjoyed. In September 1931 Japanese officers staged an explosion on a railway near Mukden and used it as a pretext to seize Manchuria, which became the puppet state of Manchukuo. When the League of Nations condemned the invasion, Japan left the League. In July 1937 fighting near Beijing grew into full-scale war with China. After capturing the capital, Nanjing, in December 1937, Japanese troops massacred civilians and prisoners and committed mass rape over several weeks. Estimates of the dead range widely, from tens of thousands to 300,000, the figure used by the Chinese government; the postwar Tokyo tribunal estimated more than 200,000. Japanese forces committed other atrocities across China, including biological-weapons experiments by Unit 731, and forced tens of thousands of women from Korea, China, the Philippines and elsewhere into sexual slavery as so-called “comfort women.” The Chinese American writer Iris Chang’s 1997 book brought Nanjing to wide attention in the English-speaking world, and memorials to the “comfort women” now stand in Seoul and in other cities.

Italy. Mussolini promised a new Roman empire. Italy invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, using poison gas, and annexed it in 1936. The League imposed sanctions but excluded oil, and they failed. Emperor Haile Selassie’s appeal to the League in 1936 went unanswered.

Germany. Hitler aimed to overturn Versailles, unite all Germans and conquer Lebensraum, “living space,” in eastern Europe. He rearmed openly from 1935, sent troops into the demilitarised Rhineland in 1936, annexed Austria in March 1938, and demanded the German-speaking Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. At Munich in September 1938, Britain and France agreed to the demand without Czechoslovakia at the table; British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain told crowds he believed it meant “peace for our time.” In March 1939 Germany seized the rest of Czech lands.

Why appeasement? It is easy to condemn with hindsight. At the time, British and French leaders remembered the slaughter of 1914-1918; many believed Versailles had been unfair to Germany; the Depression made rearmament costly; some feared Soviet communism more than Nazism; and their militaries told them they were not ready. The United States, disillusioned by the First World War, passed Neutrality Acts (1935-1937) to stay out of foreign wars, and Roosevelt’s 1937 call to “quarantine” aggressors met a cool response. Domestic distractions — unemployment, strikes, political divisions in France — pulled attention inward.

The Stalin-Hitler Pact. Britain and France finally promised to defend Poland. Then, on 23 August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union — ideological enemies — signed a non-aggression pact. A secret protocol divided Poland and the Baltic region between them. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939; Britain and France declared war on 3 September; Soviet forces invaded eastern Poland on 17 September. In 1940 Soviet police murdered about 22,000 Polish officers and others, many in the Katyn forest.

Comparing the three drives (RH.9-10.9). Organize your chart by motive (economic, ideological, strategic), method (conquest, puppet states, terror against civilians) and the international response. Notice what they shared: rejection of the post-1919 order, glorification of war, and racial or national ideologies that denied the humanity of conquered peoples.

📖 Read for this lesson

The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.

  • Three Drives for Empire: Lytton on Manchuria, Tokyo on Nanjing, Hossbach on Living SpaceLeague of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (1932. VII. 12), chapters IV and VI; Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1948), Part B, chapter VIII; Hossbach memorandum, 5 November 1937, in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, vol. 1 (US GPO, 1949) · about 8 min

    The chart compares three empires and the lesson supplies documents only for the United States and the Soviet Union. Here is one substantial document for each drive: the League’s own investigation of Manchuria, the Tokyo tribunal on Nanjing, and the German minutes in which Hitler states the aim of living space – plus an honest note where we could not obtain a translation of Haile Selassie’s appeal that we could attribute.

Reading: Two documents of 1937 and 1939

Franklin D. Roosevelt, address at Chicago, 5 October 1937; Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 August 1939, Article 2, as published in Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (U.S. Department of State, 1948) · Public domain (U.S. government works)

The protocol was secret; the Soviet government denied its existence until 1989. What does that tell you about its purpose?

Roosevelt, 1937: It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

Secret protocol, Article 2: In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

Vocabulary in context

  • appeasement — Giving in to an aggressor’s demands in the hope of avoiding war, as at Munich in 1938.
  • isolationism — A policy of avoiding involvement in other nations’ conflicts, as in the U.S. Neutrality Acts.
  • Lebensraum — ‘Living space’; Hitler’s goal of conquering land in eastern Europe for Germans.
  • Nanjing Massacre — The mass killing and rape of Chinese civilians and prisoners by Japanese troops after capturing Nanjing in December 1937.
  • Stalin-Hitler Pact — The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939, with a secret protocol dividing eastern Europe.

Formative check

Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.

+50 XP

What did the secret protocol of the Stalin-Hitler Pact do?

It set the line along the Narew, Vistula and San rivers, and both powers invaded Poland within weeks.
Myth or Fact?

All historians agree on the exact number of people killed in the Nanjing Massacre.

False. Estimates range from tens of thousands to 300,000; the Tokyo tribunal estimated more than 200,000. That the massacre happened is established.
+50 XP

Which was NOT a reason British and French leaders gave for appeasement?

Their military advisers warned that they were not ready — one reason they sought to delay war.

Complete the comparison chart for Japan, Italy and Germany: motives, methods, key dates and the international response. Then source the two documents: for each, give the author, purpose and audience, and explain what it shows about why aggression was not stopped.

0 words
Quick self-check

How confident are you that you can compare the three drives for empire in the 1930s and explain why appeasement and isolationism failed to stop them?

Not yetVery confident

Practice

Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.

Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)

Fluency

Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.

  1. Order: (a) Munich Agreement; (b) Japan seizes Manchuria; (c) Italy invades Ethiopia; (d) Stalin-Hitler Pact; (e) full-scale war between Japan and China begins.
    Check your answer
    Answer: (b) September 1931 → (c) October 1935 → (e) July 1937 → (a) September 1938 → (d) 23 August 1939.
    For China the war began in 1937 (or 1931), two years before Germany invaded Poland.
  2. Define appeasement and isolationism, with one example of each from the 1930s.
    Check your answer
    Answer: Appeasement: giving in to an aggressor’s demands to avoid war — Munich, 1938. Isolationism: avoiding involvement in other nations’ conflicts — the U.S. Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937.
    A strong answer pairs each term with a specific policy.

Application

Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.

  1. Source the secret protocol’s Article 2 (1939): the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. “shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.” Why was it secret, and how did the English text become available?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Because it divided Poland between two powers before either invaded; announcing it would have exposed their plan. The U.S. State Department published an English text in 1948 from captured German records; the Soviet government denied the protocol until 1989.
    A strong answer explains the purpose of secrecy and the document’s path to the public record.
  2. Roosevelt said in 1937: “It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.” What was he proposing, and why did it get a cool response at home?
    Check your answer
    Answer: A ‘quarantine’ of aggressor nations by the community of nations. Many Americans, disillusioned by the First World War and focused on the Depression, supported the Neutrality Acts and wanted to stay out of foreign wars.
    A strong answer connects the speech to the domestic distractions and isolationism named in WH.10.8.2.
  3. Cause or sequence? “Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement in September 1938; Germany invaded Poland in September 1939.” Did Munich cause the war? What else must a causal explanation include?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Munich did not cause the war by itself. A causal explanation must include Hitler’s aims (overturning Versailles, conquering Lebensraum), the lessons Hitler may have drawn from Western concessions, Germany’s seizure of the rest of Czech lands in March 1939, and the Stalin-Hitler Pact, which removed the risk of a two-front war.
    A strong answer treats appeasement as one contributing factor, names the aggressor’s decisions, and avoids a single cause.

Review

Keep earlier skills sharp.

  1. Review (Unit 1): which weakness of the League of Nations did Japan’s seizure of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia expose?
    Check your answer
    Answer: It could condemn aggression but not enforce its decisions: Japan simply left the League, and sanctions on Italy excluded oil and failed. The absence of the United States weakened it further.
    A strong answer links the League’s design and membership to its failures.

Missouri Learning Standards — Social Studies addressed: 9-12.WH.5.CC.B, 9-12.WH.5.CC.A, 9-12.WH.5.GS.B, RH.9-10.1, RH.9-10.9, 9-12.WH.1.CC.E

Instructional focus: Comparative analysis of the causes of war

Reading

Three Drives for Empire: Lytton on Manchuria, Tokyo on Nanjing, Hossbach on Living Space

League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (1932. VII. 12), chapters IV and VI; Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1948), Part B, chapter VIII; Hossbach memorandum, 5 November 1937, in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, vol. 1 (US GPO, 1949) · Public domain

Why this reading. Lesson 2.1 asks you to fill a comparison chart for the Japanese, Italian and German drives for empire — motives, methods, key dates and the international response — and then to source two documents. The lesson supplies documents only for the United States and the Soviet Union. You cannot compare three empires from the words of two other countries. Here is one substantial document for each drive, and an honest note where we could not get one.

A. Japan in Manchuria: the League’s own investigation

League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (the Lytton Report), signed at Peiping 4 September 1932, circulated 1 October 1932; Series of League of Nations Publications, VII. Political, 1932. VII. 12. A League of Nations official publication of 1932: public domain.

The League sent a commission under the Earl of Lytton to find out what had happened at Mukden. Its conclusions, in Chapter IV:

“The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th–19th, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese … had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorised attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10.30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night … cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.”

And on the new state of Manchukuo, in Chapter VI:

“The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that, while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of ‘Manchukuo’, the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgment, the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military. For this reason, the present regime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement.”

Use this for the “international response” column, and be precise about what the response was. The League investigated carefully, reported accurately, and then did nothing that stopped anything: the Assembly adopted the report in February 1933, Japan walked out of the League, and Manchukuo stayed. An institution that can establish the truth and cannot enforce it is exactly what Article 16 of the Covenant was supposed to prevent. Look again at that article in the lesson 1.1 reading.

B. Japan in China: the method, as a court established it

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment (Tokyo, 1948), Part B, chapter VIII, “Conventional War Crimes (Atrocities)”, pp. 1012–1018. The record of an Allied tribunal, published as an official document: public domain.

“Estimates made at a later date indicate that the total number of civilians and prisoners of war murdered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000. That these estimates are not exaggerated is borne out by the fact that burial societies and other organizations counted more than 155,000 bodies which they buried. They also reported that most of those were bound with their hands tied behind their backs. These figures do not take into account those persons whose bodies were destroyed by burning, or by throwing them into the Yangtze River, or otherwise disposed of by Japanese.”

“The barbarous behaviour of the Japanese Army cannot be excused as the acts of a soldiery which had temporarily gotten out of hand when at last a stubbornly defended position had capitulated — rape, arson and murder continued to be committed on a large scale for at least six weeks after the city had been taken and for at least four weeks after MATSUI and MUTO had entered the city.”

“Such burning appeared to follow a prescribed pattern after a few days and continued for six weeks. Approximately one-third of the city was thus destroyed.”

Sourcing this document. It is a judgment of the victors’ court, written in 1948, and that is a real limitation you should state. Notice, though, what the judges do with the number: they give an estimate, then give the independently countable figure behind it (155,000 bodies buried), then say what the count cannot include. That is how a careful source handles an uncertain number, and it is why the true/false check in this lesson is about the range rather than the fact.

C. Italy in Ethiopia

The following two paragraphs are written by the course authors, not quoted. Emperor Haile Selassie’s appeal to the League Assembly on 30 June 1936 is the document this section should contain, and we could not obtain a copy of the official English text published in the League’s Official Journal with a stated translator. Rather than print a translation we cannot attribute, we summarize, and you should cite this passage as our summary.

Italy invaded Ethiopia — an independent state and a member of the League — in October 1935, and used poison gas against soldiers and civilians from the air. The League declared Italy an aggressor and imposed economic sanctions, but the list excluded oil, and the Suez Canal stayed open to Italian shipping. Italy annexed Ethiopia in May 1936.

In June 1936 Haile Selassie went to Geneva and addressed the Assembly in person — the first head of state to do so. He described the gas attacks on his people, said that he had come to claim the justice due to his nation and the assistance that fifty states had promised, and asked what the League was worth if a strong state could destroy a weak one without consequence. He warned the Assembly that the answer it gave in his case would be the answer it had given to every small state. The sanctions were lifted the following month.

What to do with a source you cannot obtain. This is a real research situation and you will meet it again. The honest moves are: say what the document is, say what it says in your own words, say that you are summarizing, and never present a paraphrase inside quotation marks. In your chart, put the Ethiopian case in the “international response” column beside Manchuria and ask what the two have in common.

D. Germany: Hitler states the aim, in a German record

Memorandum by Colonel Friedrich Hossbach of a conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, 4.15–8.30 p.m., attended by Hitler, the war minister and the heads of the three services. Translation published in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, Series D, vol. 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949). A US government translation of a captured German record: public domain.

“The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space.”

“The only remedy … lay in the acquisition of greater living space — a quest which has at all times been the origin of the formation of states and of the migration of peoples.”

“Germany’s future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the need for space, and such a solution could be sought, of course, only for a foreseeable period of about one to three generations.”

Sourcing: not a speech and not propaganda — minutes taken by a staff officer of a secret meeting, for the record, five days after it happened, and not intended to be read outside a handful of men. That is why it carried such weight at Nuremberg. Its limitation: Hossbach wrote from notes and memory, and historians argue about whether the meeting was a firm plan or Hitler talking. What it does establish is the aim, stated in November 1937 — before Austria, before Munich, before Poland.

E. Filling the chart

Three drives, three documents, one question in common.

JapanItalyGermany
Stated motiveSelf-defence and order (Lytton, ch. IV, rejects this)Empire and national greatness“A question of space” (Hossbach)
MethodStaged incident, puppet state, terror against civilians (IMTFE, ch. VIII)Invasion, poison gas, annexationRearmament, remilitarization, annexation, demand and seizure
Key datesSept 1931; Dec 1937; from 1937 full-scale warOct 1935; May 19361935, 1936, March 1938, Sept 1938, March 1939, Sept 1939
International responseReport, condemnation, Japan leaves the LeagueSanctions without oil; lifted July 1936Negotiation at Munich, then guarantees to Poland

The question in common. In each case the response was real, and in each case it was a response that cost the responding states nothing. Ask what the League or Britain and France would have had to risk in 1931, in 1935 and in 1938 to stop each drive — and then ask whether that is a fair test to apply with hindsight, when the people making those choices had buried a generation in 1918.

Sources: Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Lytton Report), 1932, chapters IV and VI (Wikisource, scan-backed) (en.wikisource.org); Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Part B, chapter VIII (Library of Congress) (loc.gov); Hossbach memorandum, 5 November 1937 (Avalon Project, Yale Law School) (avalon.law.yale.edu)

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