
delineate and evaluate the reasoning of the Plessy majority, Harlan’s dissent and the Wong Kim Ark decision, assess how each opinion’s structure serves its argument, and synthesize the seminar’s claims.
Instruction
Two years apart, the Supreme Court read the Fourteenth Amendment in two cases with very different results. This seminar delineates the reasoning in both (11-12.RI.2.D), and asks how the same text could support segregation in one case and birthright citizenship in the other.
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Louisiana’s Separate Car Act of 1890 required railroads to provide “equal but separate” cars for white and Black passengers. A New Orleans civil rights group organized a test case: Homer Plessy, a man of mixed ancestry classified as Black under Louisiana law, took a seat in a whites-only car in 1892 and was arrested. The Court upheld the law, 7-1.
Brown’s reasoning. Delineated: (1) The Fourteenth Amendment was meant to enforce equality before the law. (2) But it could not have been meant to abolish distinctions based on color or to enforce social, as distinct from political, equality. (3) Laws requiring separation do not imply inferiority. (4) If Black citizens feel stamped with inferiority, that is their own “construction,” not something in the law. (5) Therefore the law is a reasonable exercise of the state’s power. Evaluate step 3 and step 4. The premise that separation carries no meaning of inferiority depends on ignoring why the law was passed and who wrote it. That is the premise the Court itself rejected in 1954.
Harlan’s dissent. Harlan, a former slaveholder from Kentucky, argued that the law’s purpose was obvious to everyone — to keep Black people out of cars used by whites, not the reverse — and that “in the eye of the law” there is no superior class: “Our Constitution is color-blind.” He predicted the decision would prove as harmful as Dred Scott. Read his dissent completely, though. In the same opinion, he objects that the law lets Chinese passengers ride with whites while excluding Black citizens, describing the Chinese as a race so different that the United States does not permit them to become citizens. A great dissent can contain a prejudice. Both are evidence.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco to Chinese parents who lived there but, under the Chinese Exclusion Act, could not become citizens. Returning from a visit to China in 1895, he was refused entry on the ground that he was not a citizen. The Court ruled 6-2 that he was a citizen by birth. Justice Gray’s majority opinion traced jus soli, citizenship by birthplace, through English common law and American practice and read “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” to exclude only narrow categories. Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Harlan, dissented, arguing that the phrase required full allegiance, which children of Chinese subjects did not have.
Structure as argument (11-12.RI.2.A). Gray’s opinion is long and historical: its structure — centuries of precedent laid out in order — is itself the argument that birthright citizenship is old and settled. Brown’s is short and dismissive of the plaintiff’s feeling. Evaluate whether each structure makes its points clear and convincing.
How ideas interact (11-12.RI.2.A). Trace how the idea of equality moves across the three opinions and the Reconstruction amendments. The seminar’s central question: can a Constitution be color-blind in one case and still exclude by race in another?
Preparation and synthesis (11-12.SL.1.A, 1.d). Bring your reasoning chart. In the final round, each speaker offers a synthesis that resolves a contradiction where possible and names what remains unresolved.
Reading: Plessy and Wong Kim Ark: the opinions and dissents the seminar argues from
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), majority and dissent, Wikisource; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), majority and dissent, Wikisource. Retrieved 26 September 2026. Fetchable texts: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Plessy_v._Ferguson/Opinion_of_the_Court; https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Plessy_v._Ferguson/Dissent_Harlan; https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_v._Wong_Kim_Ark/Opinion_of_the_Court; https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_v._Wong_Kim_Ark/Dissent_Fuller. · SLS original; quoted passages are public domain (U.S. Supreme Court opinions)
Opinions are excerpted and quoted exactly. The chart, stems and model are SLS original.
Four opinions from two cases, quoted exactly. Every passage is attributed to the justice who wrote it. Passages from Plessy and Wong Kim Ark are excerpts from longer opinions.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896): the majority (Justice Henry Billings Brown)
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.
… We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption.
— Justice Brown for the Court, 1896
Plessy: the dissent (Justice John Marshall Harlan)
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
— Justice Harlan, dissenting, 1896
The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race while they are on a public highway is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution.
… In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.
— Justice Harlan, dissenting
The same dissent contains this passage, which limits its own idea of equality. Read it as evidence and compare it with the passage above.
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.
— Justice Harlan, dissenting
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898): the majority (Justice Horace Gray)
The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.
— Justice Gray for the Court, 1898
Wong Kim Ark: the dissent (Chief Justice Melville Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan)
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment does not exclude from citizenship by birth children born in the United States of parents permanently located therein, and who might themselves become citizens; nor, on the other hand, does it arbitrarily make citizens of children born in the United States of parents who, according to the will of their native government and of this Government, are and must remain aliens.
— Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting, 1898
Reasoning chart (worked key for Brown; SLS original)
| Step | Brown’s argument | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The amendment enforces “the absolute equality of the two races before the law.” | Conceded; the claim is limited to what follows. |
| 2 | But it could not abolish “distinctions based upon color” or enforce social equality. | The line between political and social equality is asserted, not shown. |
| 3 | Laws requiring separation “do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race.” | Weakest premise: it depends on ignoring why the law was passed. |
| 4 | If the separation feels like a badge of inferiority, that is because Black citizens “put that construction upon it.” | Places the injury in the plaintiff’s interpretation. Compare Harlan’s “badge of servitude.” |
| 5 | So the law is a reasonable use of the state’s police power. | Follows only if steps 3 and 4 hold. |
Structure as argument (worked)
Gray’s opinion runs for pages of English and American precedent, so its structure is its argument: birthright citizenship is old and settled. Brown’s is short and puts the injury in the plaintiff’s construction, so its structure is dismissal. Harlan’s dissent is brief and moral and ends with a prediction, so its structure is warning.
Protocol and question stems (SLS original)
Bring your reasoning chart. Each speaker gives a 90-second claim, then answers one probing question. The last speaker in each round synthesizes: what we agree on, where we disagree, what evidence would resolve it.
- Which premise of Brown does Harlan attack, and in what words?
- Gray reads “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” through history; Fuller reads it through allegiance. Which reading does the text of Section 1 support better?
- Harlan writes that the Constitution “is color-blind” and, in the same opinion, singles out the Chinese as a race that cannot become citizens. Is the passage evidence against his principle, or evidence of the limits of his time?
- Can a Constitution be color-blind in one case and exclude by race in another?
Model contribution (SLS original). “I chose Brown’s fourth step. He says the harm exists only because Black citizens ‘put that construction upon it.’ Harlan answers that the law’s purpose was plain, and I find Harlan’s reading better supported by the words of the statute. My question for the group is whether a law’s meaning depends on the intent of its authors, on its effects, or on how the people it governs understand it.”
Formative check
Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.
Which premise of Brown’s opinion does Harlan’s dissent attack most directly?
Justice Harlan joined the majority in Wong Kim Ark.
How does the structure of Justice Gray’s opinion in Wong Kim Ark serve its argument?
Reasoning chart: delineate Brown’s opinion, Harlan’s dissent and Gray’s opinion in numbered steps, mark the premise in each that you find weakest or strongest, and explain why. Prepare a 90-second seminar claim answering: can a Constitution be color-blind in one case and still exclude by race in another? After the seminar, write a five-sentence synthesis.
How confident are you that you can delineate and evaluate the reasoning of Supreme Court opinions and dissents?