
analyze the arguments for war given by leaders on all sides in 1914, the roles of rivalry, nationalism, domestic discontent and propaganda, and evaluate historians’ competing interpretations of responsibility.
Instruction
On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb nationalist, shot dead Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo. Within six weeks, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France and Britain were at war. How did one assassination become a world war?
The long-term pressures. Students often remember them as MAIN: militarism (huge conscript armies, an Anglo-German naval race, and war plans built for speed); alliances (the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy; the Triple Entente of France, Russia and Britain); imperialism (colonial rivalries, such as two crises over Morocco); and nationalism (Serbian ambitions to unite South Slavs, including those inside Austria-Hungary; French resentment over losing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871; pan-Slavism in Russia). Add domestic discontent: strikes in Russia, a crisis over Irish Home Rule in Britain, and a large socialist party in Germany that some conservatives feared.
The July Crisis, and each side’s argument.
- Austria-Hungary argued that Serbia sponsored terrorism that threatened the empire’s survival, and that only a war could end the threat. It sent Serbia a harsh ultimatum on 23 July and declared war on 28 July.
- Germany promised Austria unconditional support — the “blank check” of 5-6 July. Its leaders argued that Germany was encircled by France and Russia and that war would only get harder as Russia rearmed. Its war plan (the Schlieffen Plan) required attacking France through neutral Belgium before Russia could fully mobilize.
- Russia argued it could not abandon Serbia, a fellow Slavic, Orthodox nation, without losing its standing as a great power; it began general mobilization on 30 July. Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August and on France on 3 August.
- France presented the war as defense of the homeland against invasion; President Poincaré called for a union sacrée, a “sacred union” of all parties.
- Britain declared war on 4 August after Germany invaded Belgium, whose neutrality Britain had guaranteed by treaty in 1839. Germany’s chancellor reportedly dismissed the treaty as a “scrap of paper,” a phrase British propaganda used endlessly.
- The Ottoman Empire joined Germany in late 1914; Italy joined the Allies in 1915 after being promised territory; Japan joined the Allies in 1914 and seized German holdings in China and the Pacific.
Mobilizing civilians. This was to be a total war, in which whole societies — factories, farms, women’s labor, colonies — served the war effort. Governments used censorship and propaganda posters and newspapers portraying the enemy as barbaric. In August 1914 socialist parties that had promised to oppose war mostly voted for war credits.
Historians disagree (HR.3). The Treaty of Versailles (1919) blamed Germany and its allies. In 1961 the German historian Fritz Fischer argued that Germany’s leaders deliberately risked, even sought, a major war to become the dominant power in Europe. Others, such as Christopher Clark in The Sleepwalkers (2012), argue that responsibility was shared among leaders in several capitals who each took risks without foreseeing a catastrophe. Your seminar will test these interpretations against the July timeline.
Evaluating a speaker (SL.9-10.3). In the seminar, listen for the evidence behind each claim. “Germany caused the war because it was aggressive” is circular. “Germany’s blank check made an Austrian war on Serbia far more likely, because Austria knew Russia would be deterred or met” identifies a mechanism and can be tested.
📖 Read for this lesson
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.
Reading: Two leaders at the edge of war
Edward Gray (British Foreign Secretary), Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (1925), vol. 2, recalling 3 August 1914; Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress requesting a declaration of war against Germany, 2 April 1917 · Public domain
Gray wrote his memoir ten years after the event. How might that affect what he remembers?
Grey: The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time.
Wilson, 1917: The world must be made safe for democracy.
Formative check
Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.
What reason did Britain give for declaring war on 4 August 1914?
Christopher Clark argues that responsibility for 1914 was shared. What evidence would most strengthen Fritz Fischer’s opposing view?
Before the seminar, rank Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Serbia and Britain by responsibility for the outbreak of war, giving one piece of evidence for each placement. During the seminar (written, recorded, or talked through with a parent, guardian or study partner), evaluate one argument, from the readings or from someone you are discussing the question with: was the reasoning a mechanism or a circular claim, and was the evidence sufficient?
How confident are you that you can analyze the arguments each side gave for war in 1914 and evaluate interpretations of responsibility?
Practice
Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.
Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)
Fluency
Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.
- Order the July Crisis: (a) Britain declares war; (b) assassination in Sarajevo; (c) Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia; (d) Germany’s ‘blank check’; (e) Russia begins general mobilization.
Check your answer
Answer: (b) 28 June → (d) 5-6 July → (c) 23 July → (e) 30 July → (a) 4 August 1914.Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July; Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August and France on 3 August. - Define total war and give two ways civilians were mobilized in 1914-1918.
Check your answer
Answer: War in which a nation mobilises its whole economy and population. Examples: factory and farm labor, including women’s work; propaganda posters and censored newspapers; colonial recruitment.A strong answer ties the term to specific examples from the lesson.
Application
Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.
- Source Gray’s remark, “The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time,” as recorded in his memoir. When was it published, and how might that affect its reliability?
Check your answer
Answer: In Twenty-Five Years (1925), about ten years after August 1914, recalling a friend’s memory of what he said. Hindsight after the war’s catastrophe may have shaped how the moment was remembered.A strong answer uses the gap between event and publication, and the second-hand recollection, to judge reliability. - Cause or sequence? “The alliance system existed; then the war broke out; so the alliances caused the war.” Rewrite as a causal explanation that names decisions.
Check your answer
Answer: Model answer: the alliances turned a local crisis into a general one only because of decisions — Germany’s blank check encouraged Austria’s harsh ultimatum; Russia mobilized to support Serbia; Germany’s war plan required invading Belgium, which brought Britain in.A strong answer treats alliances as a long-term pressure and names specific decisions that activated them. - Compare the arguments for war given by Austria-Hungary and by Britain in 1914.
Check your answer
Answer: Austria-Hungary: Serbia sponsored terrorism that threatened the empire’s survival, so only war could end the threat. Britain: Germany’s invasion of neutral Belgium broke a treaty Britain had guaranteed since 1839.A strong answer states each in its government’s terms and notes that each presented its war as defensive.
Review
Keep earlier skills sharp.
- Review (Unit 2): which nineteenth-century force, spread with Napoleon and suppressed after Vienna, drove Serbian ambitions and French resentment over Alsace-Lorraine in 1914?
Check your answer
Answer: Nationalism.The same force that unified Italy and Germany helped destabilise Austria-Hungary.
July 1914 in the Governments’ Own Papers: the Ultimatum, and the Night Britain Entered
Austro-Hungarian note to the Serbian Government, delivered 23 July 1914, and Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, despatch on his final interview with the German Chancellor, 4 August 1914 – both from Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1915), the British Diplomatic Correspondence section; the summaries of Fritz Fischer’s and Christopher Clark’s interpretations are written by the course authors · Public domain
Why this reading. The task is to rank six states by responsibility, “giving one piece of evidence for each placement”, and then to judge in seminar whether a speaker’s reasoning names a mechanism or is circular. The lesson’s reading is twenty-nine words: one remembered sentence of Grey’s from 1925 and one of Wilson’s from 1917, neither of which is evidence about July 1914 at all. So every placement in your ranking would rest on the mini-lecture’s summary of documents you have not seen. Here is the July crisis in the documents the governments themselves published: the ultimatum that started it, the conversation on the night Britain entered, and the timeline with the decisions attached. What to look for: the question is not who was aggressive. It is who had a choice, when, and what they chose. Every entry in your ranking should point to a decision with a date on it.
About this source. When the war began, each government rushed out a collection of its diplomatic papers to prove that it had not wanted war — the British Blue Book, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Book, the Serbian Blue Book, and others. In 1915 they were printed together in English by the Carnegie Endowment as Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. That is what makes this collection so useful and so treacherous: every document in it was chosen by a government defending itself, and documents that hurt were left out. Say that in your seminar contribution, and you have already done half the work of sourcing.
1. The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, delivered at 6 p.m. on 23 July 1914
Serbia was given forty-eight hours. After a required public declaration condemning propaganda against Austria-Hungary, to be read to the Serbian army as an order of the day, the note demanded that the Serbian government undertake ten things. This is the English text as printed in the Blue Book:
1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;
2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ‘Narodna Odbrana’, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;
3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;
5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;
6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;
7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;
8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;
9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,
10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.
The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o’clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.
Read points 5 and 6 again, because they are the whole crisis. Points 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 ask Serbia to act against its own nationalists, and Serbia accepted them. Points 5 and 6 ask Serbia to admit Austro-Hungarian officials onto Serbian soil to suppress a movement and to take part in a criminal investigation. That is a demand that a sovereign state give up part of its sovereignty, and Serbia refused those two while accepting almost everything else. Grey, reading the note in London, called it the most formidable document ever addressed by one state to another.
The seminar move this makes available. “Austria-Hungary was aggressive” is circular. “Austria-Hungary drafted demands that included two points no sovereign state could accept, gave forty-eight hours, and declared war three days later although Serbia accepted eight of the ten” is a mechanism, and every part of it is checkable in the document above. That is what the lesson means by evaluating reasoning.
2. Berlin, the night of 4 August 1914 — the “scrap of paper”, in the dispatch that reported it
Sir Edward Goschen was the British ambassador in Berlin. This is his account, written up for Grey after he got home, of his last interview with the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, after Britain demanded that Germany respect Belgian neutrality:
I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty’s Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — “neutrality,” a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her… What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of “life and death” for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, “But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?”
Four things a careful reader notices. First, this is a British ambassador’s recollection of a German chancellor’s words, written afterwards and published by the British government in wartime — not a transcript. British propaganda used the phrase relentlessly, which is a reason to handle it carefully, not to doubt that something like it was said. Second, both men agree on the facts: Germany was violating Belgian neutrality, and doing it for strategic reasons. They disagree about what a treaty is. Third, Bethmann Hollweg’s complaint — “a word which in war time had so often been disregarded” — is an argument, and not a stupid one: he is saying Britain is invoking a rule that great powers routinely break. Fourth, his last question is the honest one, and it goes to the heart of the seminar: what is a promise worth when keeping it costs a European war?
3. The timeline, with the decision attached to each date
| Date, 1914 | Who decided | What they decided |
|---|---|---|
| 28 June | Gavrilo Princip and his fellow conspirators, armed from Serbia | To kill the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne in Sarajevo |
| 5–6 July | Germany | To promise Austria-Hungary unconditional support before knowing what Austria-Hungary intended to do — the “blank check” |
| 23 July | Austria-Hungary | To send the ten demands above, with a forty-eight-hour limit, nearly four weeks after the murder |
| 25 July | Serbia | To accept eight demands, qualify one and refuse the point on Austro-Hungarian officials operating in Serbia; and to order mobilization |
| 28 July | Austria-Hungary | To declare war on Serbia |
| 30 July | Russia | To order general mobilization rather than partial — a decision that pointed at Germany as well as Austria-Hungary |
| 1 and 3 August | Germany | To declare war on Russia, then on France, and to demand passage through Belgium, because its war plan required beating France before Russia was ready |
| 4 August | Britain | To declare war, on the ground of the Belgian neutrality it had guaranteed by the treaty of 1839 |
Use the table as a test. A claim about responsibility should say which of these decisions could plausibly have gone the other way, and what would have followed. The blank check of 5–6 July is the favorite of Fritz Fischer’s case, because Germany chose to commit before it knew what it was committing to. Russia’s general rather than partial mobilization on 30 July is the favorite of those who spread responsibility, because it converted a Balkan war into a continental one. Germany’s war plan is the favorite of those who argue that military timetables took the decisions out of politicians’ hands — and the answer to that is that men wrote the timetables and other men approved them.
4. Two interpretations, and what would decide between them
Both of these books are modern and under copyright, so these are our summaries. Fritz Fischer argued in 1961, using German government records, that Germany’s leaders had expansionist aims formed before the war and deliberately used the July crisis to pursue them, accepting a European war as the price. Christopher Clark argued in 2012 that responsibility was distributed across several capitals, whose leaders each took risks in a confused and fast-moving situation without grasping what they were setting off.
What evidence would decide between them? Fischer’s case turns on intention, so it needs documents showing German leaders planning for or welcoming a general war before the crisis. Clark’s case turns on the pattern of decisions, so it is strengthened by evidence that other states took comparable risks — Russia’s mobilization, Serbia’s tolerance of nationalist networks, France’s encouragement of Russia. That is a genuine methodological difference, not a disagreement about facts, and saying so is a strong seminar contribution: the two historians are asking different questions of the same July.
One last caution about this source. Every document in this reading was published by a government to defend itself. The Austro-Hungarian note is printed in the British collection because Britain wanted readers to find it outrageous. Goschen’s dispatch is there because Britain wanted the “scrap of paper” remembered. That does not make either document false. It means that what you are holding is a selection, and that the strongest thing you can say about any of it is what it shows and who chose to show it.
Sources: Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War (HMSO, 1915) (archive.org)