
delineate Madison’s reasoning about faction and the separation of powers, test its premises against Paine’s practical case in Section 4 of Common Sense, and lead part of a civil, prepared seminar with assigned roles.
Instruction
Start with Paine’s practical case. In Section 4, Of the Present Ability of America, Paine stops asking whether independence is right and asks whether it is possible. His answers are concrete: the colonies have a large body of armed men, the tar, timber, iron and cordage to build their own navy, no debt worth fearing, and unoccupied land that can pay for the war. His strongest point is about timing and size: “Youth is the seed time of good habits, as well in nations as in individuals.” Wait half a century, he warns, and “The vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and population, would create confusion. Colony would be against colony.” He also demands “a large and equal representation,” because “A small number of electors, or a small number of representatives, are equally dangerous.” Keep those sentences in front of you in this seminar. Paine treats a growing variety of interests as the danger to union; Madison will treat the same fact as the protection of liberty.
In Section 1 Paine argued that government should be simple. Eleven years after Common Sense, James Madison, writing as “Publius” in New York newspapers to persuade voters to ratify the new Constitution, argued nearly the opposite: a large, complicated republic with divided powers is the best protection of liberty. 11-12.RI.2.D asks you to delineate and evaluate the reasoning in seminal U.S. texts, including the application of constitutional principles. Delineate means trace the outline exactly: claims, premises, and the steps between them.
Federalist 10: the problem. Madison defines a faction as a group, majority or minority, united by a passion or interest “adverse to the rights of other citizens.” Notice that a majority can be a faction. That is the problem Paine did not face: in a republic, the people themselves can be the tyrant.
Two ways to cure faction, both rejected. You could remove its causes — destroy liberty, or give everyone the same opinions. The first is “worse than the disease”: liberty is to faction “what air is to fire.” The second is impossible, because the causes of faction are “sown in the nature of man,” above all in the unequal distribution of property.
So control the effects. A minority faction is outvoted. A majority faction is the danger, and Madison’s answer is size. In a small democracy one interest easily becomes a majority. In a large republic there are so many interests that a single oppressive majority is hard to form, and elected representatives will “refine and enlarge” public views.
Delineating it. Written as a chain: (1) Factions are inevitable where people are free. (2) Removing liberty is worse than faction. (3) Therefore we must control faction’s effects. (4) Majority factions are the chief danger in a republic. (5) A larger territory with more interests makes a majority faction less likely. (6) Therefore a large representative republic protects rights better than a small democracy. Now evaluate: premise 5 is an empirical prediction. Has it held? A strong seminar tests it with evidence — for example, whether an enslaved population, excluded from representation altogether, was protected by the multiplicity of interests. It was not; Madison himself was an enslaver. That is not an ad hominem attack if you use it to test the premise, not to dismiss the argument.
Federalist 51: the structure. Here Madison applies the principle inside the government. Each branch needs “the constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” The premise is candid: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” The system does not rely on virtue; it channels self-interest.
How ideas develop (11-12.RI.2.A). Track how the idea of self-interest moves from a danger (No. 10) to a tool (No. 51).
Seminar roles (11-12.SL.1.A). This seminar has roles: a facilitator who sets the goal and keeps time, two evidence leads (one per paper), a premise-tester and a synthesizer. Roles rotate across the year. Come prepared (11-12.SL.1.A): your premise chart is your ticket in, and every claim must point to a sentence in the text.
📖 Before this lesson, read: Common Sense, Section 4
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were.
Reading: Three positions on the large republic: Paine, Madison and Brutus, with a seminar protocol
Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), Project Gutenberg #147; The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51 (1787-88), Project Gutenberg #1404; Brutus, Essay I (18 October 1787), text as posted by Teaching American History, teachingamericanhistory.org/document/brutus-i/ (its transcription modernizes some spellings; for example it prints “increasing” where the constitution.org transcription prints “encreasing”); all retrieved 2026-09-26…. Identifiers: Project Gutenberg 147; Project Gutenberg 1404; https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/brutus-i/ · SLS original; quoted passages are public domain (Thomas Paine, 1776; James Madison, 1787-88; Brutus, 1787)
Federalist No. 10 was first printed 22 November 1787 and No. 51 on 6 February 1788.
Your seminar argues from three positions on one question: can a large, complicated republic protect liberty? Paine (1776) says government should be simple and that the colonies should unite while they are young, before a growing variety of interests sets colony against colony. Madison (1787–88) says the opposite. “Brutus,” an anonymous New York writer who opposed ratification (1787), says a large republic cannot work at all. The words in the quotation boxes are theirs, in their own spelling; each paragraph in a box is a separate passage, in order. The protocol, question stems and model are SLS original.
Position 1: Paine, Common Sense (1776)
I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered; and the easier repaired when disordered;
— Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Philadelphia, 1776), Of the Origin and Design of Government
Youth is the seed time of good habits, as well in nations as in individuals. It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the Continent into one government half a century hence. The vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and population, would create confusion. Colony would be against colony.
In a former page I likewise mentioned the necessity of a large and equal representation; and there is no political matter which more deserves our attention. A small number of electors, or a small number of representatives, are equally dangerous.
— Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Philadelphia, 1776), Of the Present Ability of America
Position 2: Publius (James Madison), The Federalist No. 10, 22 November 1787
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man;
But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
— The Federalist No. 10, in The Federalist (1788), Project Gutenberg #1404. Gutenberg’s text reads “adversed to the rights of other citizens” in the definition of faction.
Position 2, continued: The Federalist No. 51, 6 February 1788
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority–that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.
— The Federalist No. 51
Position 3: “Brutus,” Essay I, 18 October 1787
a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States.
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other.
The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse.
— Brutus, Essay I (New-York Journal, 18 October 1787), as posted by Teaching American History (teachingamericanhistory.org/document/brutus-i/), retrieved 2026-09-26
How the three answer each other (SLS original). Paine and Brutus agree that simple, small and similar is safer, though Paine wants one assembly for all the colonies and Brutus wants smaller republics. Madison answers both on the same ground: what they count as the danger, many different interests, he counts as the protection. Paine’s Section 4 states the danger most sharply: wait, and “Colony would be against colony.”
Worked premise chart: Federalist No. 51 (SLS original)
- Power tends to gather in one department unless something stops it.
- Appointing honest people cannot be relied on to stop it.
- So each department must have “the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”
- Self-interest, a danger in No. 10, can be used as the mechanism: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”
- Therefore the structure, and not the virtue of officeholders, protects liberty.
Weakest step, marked: step 4. It assumes the departments will really compete. If two branches share an interest, ambition no longer counteracts ambition. A seminar opening can test that with evidence.
Seminar protocol (SLS original)
- Set the question (facilitator, 1 minute): “Does a large republic with divided powers protect liberty better than a small, simple government?”
- Evidence round (the two evidence leads, 60 seconds each): one reads a passage from No. 10, the other from No. 51. Say which paper and which paragraph, and paraphrase before interpreting.
- Premise test (premise-tester, 90 seconds): name one premise and the evidence that supports or weakens it.
- Open discussion (about 10 minutes). Every claim points to a sentence in the text. Speak to ideas, not people.
- Synthesis (synthesizer, 90 seconds): what the group agrees on, where the disagreement lies, and what evidence would settle it.
Question stems
- Which sentence shows that? Can you read it to us?
- What must be true for that step to follow from the one before?
- Is that a claim about what happens, or about what should happen?
- What would Paine, or Brutus, say to Madison here?
- Paine feared that a variety of interests would set colony against colony; Madison counted on it. Whose evidence is stronger?
- Who counts as a “citizen” in this passage, and who does not appear at all? (Compare the letter of Abigail Adams and the poem of Phillis Wheatley in this unit.)
- What evidence would change your mind?
Model contribution (SLS original, about 60 seconds)
My claim is that step 5 of Madison’s chain in No. 10 is his weakest, because it is a prediction and not a definition. He writes, “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests,” and concludes that a majority is then less likely to unite against others. The test of a prediction is the record. Abigail Adams wrote in 1776, “Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could,” and women did not vote in the republic Madison was defending. A variety of interests protects only the interests that are counted. My question for the premise-tester: does this weaken Madison’s premise, or only show that he did not apply it to everyone?
Notice the moves in the model: one claim, one named step, one quotation from the text, one piece of outside evidence from another text in the unit, and a question that invites disagreement.
Formative check
Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.
Why does Madison reject removing the causes of faction?
In Madison’s definition, a faction can be a majority of citizens.
How does the role of self-interest change between No. 10 and No. 51?
In Section 4 of Common Sense, Paine warns that a growing “variety of interests” would set “colony … against colony.” How does Madison’s Federalist No. 10 treat a variety of interests?
Premise chart: write the chain of reasoning for No. 10 or No. 51 in numbered steps, mark the step you think is weakest, and write a 60-second seminar opening that tests it with evidence, using at least one sentence from Section 4 of Common Sense as a rival view. Add one question for the premise-tester.
How confident are you that you can trace and evaluate the reasoning of a Federalist paper and contribute to a prepared seminar?
Common Sense, Section 4
Common Sense, Of the Present Ability of America
Source: Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Philadelphia, 1776), Project Gutenberg eBook #147 (gutenberg.org) · Public domain
I have never met with a man, either in England or America, who hath not confessed his opinion, that a separation between the countries, would take place one time or other: And there is no instance, in which we have shewn less judgment, than in endeavouring to describe, what we call, the ripeness or fitness of the Continent for independance.
As all men allow the measure, and vary only in their opinion of the time, let us, in order to remove mistakes, take a general survey of things, and endeavour, if possible, to find out the very time. But we need not go far, the inquiry ceases at once, for, the time hath found us. The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things prove the fact.
It is not in numbers, but in unity, that our great strength lies; yet our present numbers are sufficient to repel the force of all the world. The Continent hath, at this time, the largest body of armed and disciplined men of any power under Heaven; and is just arrived at that pitch of strength, in which no single colony is able to support itself, and the whole, when united, can accomplish the matter, and either more, or, less than this, might be fatal in its effects. Our land force is already sufficient, and as to naval affairs, we cannot be insensible, that Britain would never suffer an American man of war to be built, while the continent remained in her hands. Wherefore, we should be no forwarder an hundred years hence in that branch, than we are now; but the truth is, we should be less so, because the timber of the country is every day diminishing, and that, which will remain at last, will be far off and difficult to procure.
Were the continent crowded with inhabitants, her sufferings under the present circumstances would be intolerable. The more sea port towns we had, the more should we have both to defend and to lose. Our present numbers are so happily proportioned to our wants, that no man need be idle. The diminution of trade affords an army, and the necessities of an army create a new trade.
Debts we have none; and whatever we may contract on this account will serve as a glorious memento of our virtue. Can we but leave posterity with a settled form of government, an independant constitution of its own, the purchase at any price will be cheap. But to expend millions for the sake of getting a few vile acts repealed, and routing the present ministry only, is unworthy the charge, and is using posterity with the utmost cruelty; because it is leaving them the great work to do, and a debt upon their backs, from which they derive no advantage. Such a thought is unworthy a man of honor, and is the true characteristic of a narrow heart and a pedling politician.
The debt we may contract doth not deserve our regard if the work be but accomplished. No nation ought to be without a debt. A national debt is a national bond; and when it bears no interest, is in no case a grievance. Britain is oppressed with a debt of upwards of one hundred and forty millions sterling, for which she pays upwards of four millions interest. And as a compensation for her debt, she has a large navy; America is without a debt, and without a navy; yet for the twentieth part of the English national debt, could have a navy as large again. The navy of England is not worth, at this time, more than three millions and an half sterling.
The first and second editions of this pamphlet were published without the following calculations, which are now given as a proof that the above estimation of the navy is just. See Entic’s naval history, intro. page 56.
The charge of building a ship of each rate, and furnishing her with masts, yards, sails and rigging, together with a proportion of eight months boatswain’s and carpenter’s sea-stores, as calculated by Mr. Burchett, Secretary to the navy.
£ [pounds sterling] For a ship of 100 guns = 35,553 90 = 29,886 80 = 23,638 70 = 17,785 60 = 14,197 50 = 10,606 40 = 7,558 30 = 5,846 20 = 3,710
And from hence it is easy to sum up the value, or cost rather, of the whole British navy, which in the year 1757, when it was at its greatest glory consisted of the following ships and guns:
Ships. Guns. Cost of one. Cost of all. Cost in £ [pounds sterling] 6 100 35,553 213,318 12 90 29,886 358,632 12 80 23,638 283,656 43 70 17,785 764,755 35 60 14,197 496,895 40 50 10,606 424,240 45 40 7,558 340,110 58 20 3,710 215,180 85 Sloops, bombs and fireships, one with another, at } 2,000 170,000 ———— Cost 3,266,786 Remains for Guns 233,214 ———— 3,500,000
No country on the globe is so happily situated, or so internally capable of raising a fleet as America. Tar, timber, iron, and cordage are her natural produce. We need go abroad for nothing. Whereas the Dutch, who make large profits by hiring out their ships of war to the Spaniards and Portuguese, are obliged to import most of the materials they use. We ought to view the building a fleet as an article of commerce, it being the natural manufactory of this country. It is the best money we can lay out. A navy when finished is worth more than it cost. And is that nice point in national policy, in which commerce and protection are united. Let us build; if we want them not, we can sell; and by that means replace our paper currency with ready gold and silver.
In point of manning a fleet, people in general run into great errors; it is not necessary that one fourth part should be sailors. The Terrible privateer, Captain Death, stood the hottest engagement of any ship last war, yet had not twenty sailors on board, though her complement of men was upwards of two hundred. A few able and social sailors will soon instruct a sufficient number of active landmen in the common work of a ship. Wherefore, we never can be more capable to begin on maritime matters than now, while our timber is standing, our fisheries blocked up, and our sailors and shipwrights out of employ. Men of war, of seventy and eighty guns were built forty years ago in New-England, and why not the same now? Ship-building is America’s greatest pride, and in which, she will in time excel the whole world. The great empires of the east are mostly inland, and consequently excluded from the possibility of rivalling her. Africa is in a state of barbarism; and no power in Europe, hath either such an extent of coast, or such an internal supply of materials. Where nature hath given the one, she has withheld the other; to America only hath she been liberal of both. The vast empire of Russia is almost shut out from the sea; wherefore, her boundless forests, her tar, iron, and cordage are only articles of commerce.
In point of safety, ought we to be without a fleet? We are not the little people now, which we were sixty years ago; at that time we might have trusted our property in the streets, or fields rather; and slept securely without locks or bolts to our doors or windows. The case now is altered, and our methods of defence, ought to improve with our increase of property. A common pirate, twelve months ago, might have come up the Delaware, and laid the city of Philadelphia under instant contribution, for what sum he pleased; and the same might have happened to other places. Nay, any daring fellow, in a brig of fourteen or sixteen guns, might have robbed the whole Continent, and carried off half a million of money. These are circumstances which demand our attention, and point out the necessity of naval protection.
Some, perhaps, will say, that after we have made it up with Britain, she will protect us. Can we be so unwise as to mean, that she shall keep a navy in our harbours for that purpose? Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us. Conquest may be effected under the pretence of friendship; and ourselves, after a long and brave resistance, be at last cheated into slavery. And if her ships are not to be admitted into our harbours, I would ask, how is she to protect us? A navy three or four thousand miles off can be of little use, and on sudden emergencies, none at all. Wherefore, if we must hereafter protect ourselves, why not do it for ourselves? Why do it for another?
The English list of ships of war, is long and formidable, but not a tenth part of them are at any one time fit for service, numbers of them not in being; yet their names are pompously continued in the list, if only a plank be left of the ship: and not a fifth part, of such as are fit for service, can be spared on any one station at one time. The East and West Indies, Mediterranean, Africa, and other parts over which Britain extends her claim, make large demands upon her navy. From a mixture of prejudice and inattention, we have contracted a false notion respecting the navy of England, and have talked as if we should have the whole of it to encounter at once, and for that reason, supposed, that we must have one as large; which not being instantly practicable, have been made use of by a set of disguised Tories to discourage our beginning thereon. Nothing can be farther from truth than this; for if America had only a twentieth part of the naval force of Britain, she would be by far an over match for her; because, as we neither have, nor claim any foreign dominion, our whole force would be employed on our own coast, where we should, in the long run, have two to one the advantage of those who had three or four thousand miles to sail over, before they could attack us, and the same distance to return in order to refit and recruit. And although Britain by her fleet, hath a check over our trade to Europe, we have as large a one over her trade to the West- Indies, which, by laying in the neighbourhood of the Continent, is entirely at its mercy.
Some method might be fallen on to keep up a naval force in time of peace, if we should not judge it necessary to support a constant navy. If premiums were to be given to merchants, to build and employ in their service ships mounted with twenty, thirty, forty or fifty guns, (the premiums to be in proportion to the loss of bulk to the merchants) fifty or sixty of those ships, with a few guardships on constant duty, would keep up a sufficient navy, and that without burdening ourselves with the evil so loudly complained of in England, of suffering their fleet, in time of peace to lie rotting in the docks. To unite the sinews of commerce and defense is sound policy; for when our strength and our riches play into each other’s hand, we need fear no external enemy.
In almost every article of defense we abound. Hemp flourishes even to rankness, so that we need not want cordage. Our iron is superior to that of other countries. Our small arms equal to any in the world. Cannon we can cast at pleasure. Saltpetre and gunpowder we are every day producing. Our knowledge is hourly improving. Resolution is our inherent character, and courage hath never yet forsaken us. Wherefore, what is it that we want? Why is it that we hesitate? From Britain we can expect nothing but ruin. If she is once admitted to the government of America again, this Continent will not be worth living in. Jealousies will be always arising; insurrections will be constantly happening; and who will go forth to quell them? Who will venture his life to reduce his own countrymen to a foreign obedience? The difference between Pennsylvania and Connecticut, respecting some unlocated lands, shews the insignificance of a British government, and fully proves, that nothing but Continental authority can regulate Continental matters.
Another reason why the present time is preferable to all others, is, that the fewer our numbers are, the more land there is yet unoccupied, which instead of being lavished by the king on his worthless dependants, may be hereafter applied, not only to the discharge of the present debt, but to the constant support of government. No nation under heaven hath such an advantage as this.
The infant state of the Colonies, as it is called, so far from being against, is an argument in favour of independance. We are sufficiently numerous, and were we more so, we might be less united. It is a matter worthy of observation, that the more a country is peopled, the smaller their armies are. In military numbers, the ancients far exceeded the moderns: and the reason is evident. For trade being the consequence of population, men become too much absorbed thereby to attend to anything else. Commerce diminishes the spirit, both of patriotism and military defence. And history sufficiently informs us, that the bravest achievements were always accomplished in the non-age of a nation. With the increase of commerce, England hath lost its spirit. The city of London, notwithstanding its numbers, submits to continued insults with the patience of a coward. The more men have to lose, the less willing are they to venture. The rich are in general slaves to fear, and submit to courtly power with the trembling duplicity of a Spaniel.
Youth is the seed time of good habits, as well in nations as in individuals. It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the Continent into one government half a century hence. The vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and population, would create confusion. Colony would be against colony. Each being able might scorn each other’s assistance: and while the proud and foolish gloried in their little distinctions, the wise would lament, that the union had not been formed before. Wherefore, the present time is the true time for establishing it. The intimacy which is contracted in infancy, and the friendship which is formed in misfortune, are, of all others, the most lasting and unalterable. Our present union is marked with both these characters: we are young and we have been distressed; but our concord hath withstood our troubles, and fixes a memorable area for posterity to glory in.
The present time, likewise, is that peculiar time, which never happens to a nation but once, viz. the time of forming itself into a government. Most nations have let slip the opportunity, and by that means have been compelled to receive laws from their conquerors, instead of making laws for themselves. First, they had a king, and then a form of government; whereas, the articles or charter of government, should be formed first, and men delegated to execute them afterward: but from the errors of other nations, let us learn wisdom, and lay hold of the present opportunity–To begin government at the right end.
When William the Conqueror subdued England, he gave them law at the point of the sword; and until we consent, that the seat of government, in America, be legally and authoritatively occupied, we shall be in danger of having it filled by some fortunate ruffian, who may treat us in the same manner, and then, where will be our freedom? where our property?
As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of all government, to protect all conscientious professors thereof, and I know of no other business which government hath to do therewith. Let a man throw aside that narrowness of soul, that selfishness of principle, which the niggards of all professions are so unwilling to part with, and he will be at once delivered of his fears on that head. Suspicion is the companion of mean souls, and the bane of all good society. For myself, I fully and conscientiously believe, that it is the will of the Almighty, that there should be diversity of religious opinions among us: It affords a larger field for our Christian kindness. Were we all of one way of thinking, our religious dispositions would want matter for probation; and on this liberal principle, I look on the various denominations among us, to be like children of the same family, differing only, in what is called, their Christian names.
In page forty, I threw out a few thoughts on the propriety of a Continental Charter, (for I only presume to offer hints, not plans) and in this place, I take the liberty of re-mentioning the subject, by observing, that a charter is to be understood as a bond of solemn obligation, which the whole enters into, to support the right of every separate part, whether of religion, personal freedom, or property. A firm bargain and a right reckoning make long friends.
In a former page I likewise mentioned the necessity of a large and equal representation; and there is no political matter which more deserves our attention. A small number of electors, or a small number of representatives, are equally dangerous. But if the number of the representatives be not only small, but unequal, the danger is increased. As an instance of this, I mention the following; when the Associators petition was before the House of Assembly of Pennsylvania; twenty-eight members only were present, all the Bucks county members, being eight, voted against it, and had seven of the Chester members done the same, this whole province had been governed by two counties only, and this danger it is always exposed to. The unwarrantable stretch likewise, which that house made in their last sitting, to gain an undue authority over the delegates of that province, ought to warn the people at large, how they trust power out of their own hands. A set of instructions for the Delegates were put together, which in point of sense and business would have dishonoured a schoolboy, and after being approved by a few, a very few without doors, were carried into the House, and there passed in behalf of the whole colony; whereas, did the whole colony know, with what ill-will that House hath entered on some necessary public measures, they would not hesitate a moment to think them unworthy of such a trust.
Immediate necessity makes many things convenient, which if continued would grow into oppressions. Expedience and right are different things. When the calamities of America required a consultation, there was no method so ready, or at that time so proper, as to appoint persons from the several Houses of Assembly for that purpose; and the wisdom with which they have proceeded hath preserved this continent from ruin. But as it is more than probable that we shall never be without a Congress, every well wisher to good order, must own, that the mode for choosing members of that body, deserves consideration. And I put it as a question to those, who make a study of mankind, whether representation and election is not too great a power for one and the same body of men to possess? When we are planning for posterity, we ought to remember, that virtue is not hereditary.
It is from our enemies that we often gain excellent maxims, and are frequently surprised into reason by their mistakes. Mr. Cornwall (one of the Lords of the Treasury) treated the petition of the New- York Assembly with contempt, because that House, he said, consisted but of twenty-six members, which trifling number, he argued, could not with decency be put for the whole. We thank him for his involuntary honesty. ¹
¹ Those who would fully understand of what great consequence a large and equal representation is to a state, should read Burgh’s political disquisitions.
To Conclude, however strange it may appear to some, or however unwilling they may be to think so, matters not, but many strong and striking reasons may be given, to shew, that nothing can settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined declaration for independance. Some of which are,
First.–It is the custom of nations, when any two are at war, for some other powers, not engaged in the quarrel, to step in as mediators, and bring about the preliminaries of a peace: but while America calls herself the Subject of Great-Britain, no power, however well disposed she may be, can offer her mediation. Wherefore, in our present state we may quarrel on for ever.
Secondly.–It is unreasonable to suppose, that France or Spain will give us any kind of assistance, if we mean only, to make use of that assistance for the purpose of repairing the breach, and strengthening the connection between Britain and America; because, those powers would be sufferers by the consequences.
Thirdly.–While we profess ourselves the subjects of Britain, we must, in the eye of foreign nations, be considered as rebels. The precedent is somewhat dangerous to their peace, for men to be in arms under the name of subjects; we, on the spot, can solve the paradox: but to unite resistance and subjection, requires an idea much too refined for common understanding.
Fourthly.–Were a manifesto to be published, and despatched to foreign courts, setting forth the miseries we have endured, and the peaceable methods we have ineffectually used for redress; declaring, at the same time, that not being able, any longer, to live happily or safely under the cruel disposition of the British court, we had been driven to the necessity of breaking off all connections with her; at the same time, assuring all such courts of our peaceable disposition towards them, and of our desire of entering into trade with them: Such a memorial would produce more good effects to this Continent, than if a ship were freighted with petitions to Britain.
Under our present denomination of British subjects, we can neither be received nor heard abroad: The custom of all courts is against us, and will be so, until, by an independance, we take rank with other nations.
These proceedings may at first appear strange and difficult; but, like all other steps which we have already passed over, will in a little time become familiar and agreeable; and, until an independance is declared, the Continent will feel itself like a man who continues putting off some unpleasant business from day to day, yet knows it must be done, hates to set about it, wishes it over, and is continually haunted with the thoughts of its necessity.