Can a government designed to distrust itself ultimately be trusted by its citizens to protect their liberty?
explain how separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, an independent judiciary and enumerated powers are meant to protect liberty, and evaluate the Federalist and Anti-Federalist arguments about them.

The founders had a problem: how do you create a government strong enough to govern a large, divided country, and yet unable to become a tyranny? Their answer was not to trust any person or group, but to build a machine in which power checks power. This lab takes the machine apart.
The U.S. Constitution establishes a complex system of enumerated powers, separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism to deliberately limit government power and protect individual liberty from potential tyranny.
📖 Read for this lesson
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.
The founders decided to build a ‘machine’ where ‘power checks power’ instead of just trusting people in government. What might have led them to this design choice?
According to Federalist 10, what is the remedy for faction?
1. Enumerated powers
Article V makes the machine hard to rebuild: amendments need two-thirds of both houses of Congress (or a convention called by two-thirds of the states) and ratification by three-fourths of the states, and only twenty-seven have passed in more than two centuries.
The national government has only the powers listed in the Constitution — most in Article I, Section 8 — plus those “necessary and proper” to carry them out. Everything else, the Tenth Amendment says, is reserved to the states or the people. The theory: a government of limited, listed powers is harder to abuse.
The Bill of Rights has always limited state governments as well as the federal government.
2. Separation of powers
Congress makes laws, the President executes them, and the courts decide cases under them. Each branch has its own source of authority: the House is elected directly, the President through the Electoral College, judges by appointment. Missouri’s Constitution copies the design: Article II, section 1 divides state government into “three distinct departments—the legislative, executive and judicial”.
An amendment is proposed by a vote of both houses and ratified by of the states; Hamilton called the judiciary the least branch.
3. Checks and balances
Separation alone would let each branch act unchecked within its sphere, so the Constitution gives each a hand in the others. The President can veto; Congress can override by two-thirds. The Senate confirms appointments and ratifies treaties. Congress can impeach and remove. Courts can declare acts unconstitutional (a power established in Marbury v. Madison, Unit 2). “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”
Pick one prediction made by Brutus and one by Madison or Hamilton. For each, state the premise, the prediction, and whether history bore it out. Then judge whether the reasoning was valid even where the prediction failed, and say why.
4. Federalism
Power is divided between the national government and the states, which Madison called a “double security” for rights. The line between them is sometimes tested by the states themselves: in Missouri v. Holland (1920), the State of Missouri sued a federal game warden, arguing that a migratory-bird treaty and the statute carrying it out invaded powers the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states. The Court upheld both, reasoning that birds are only transitorily within any state and that “It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.”
The government branches are supposed to work together smoothly, so disagreements between them mean the system is failing.
The U.S. system is designed for ambition to counteract ambition; conflict and limitations between branches are intentional features meant to prevent any single part from becoming too powerful and threatening liberty.
5. An independent judiciary
Federal judges serve “during good behavior” — in practice, for life — and their salaries cannot be cut, so they can rule against the powerful without fear. Hamilton argued in Federalist 78 that the courts were the “least dangerous” branch, having “neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”
6. Organized interests
In Federalist 10, Madison argues that factions — groups united by interests adverse to others’ rights — are inevitable. The cure is not to suppress them but to extend the republic: in a large country with many factions, no single one can easily become a tyrannical majority.
In Madison’s sense, a group united by an interest adverse to others’ rights or the common good.
7. Amendment
The machine can be rebuilt, but not easily. Article V requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress (or a convention called by two-thirds of the states) to propose an amendment, and ratification by three-fourths of the states. Twenty-seven amendments in more than two centuries is the result.
8. The Bill of Rights
The first ten amendments originally limited only the national government. Through the Fourteenth Amendment (1868), the Supreme Court has since applied most of their protections against the states as well — a process called incorporation.
Applying Bill of Rights protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The other side
Anti-Federalists such as “Brutus” argued that a large republic could not represent a diverse people, that the necessary-and-proper and supremacy clauses would swallow the states, and that federal judges with life tenure would be unaccountable. Your analysis skill here (HR.1) is to separate a valid argument from a fallacious one on both sides: which predictions turned out right, and was the reasoning sound even where the prediction failed?
Key terms
Powers specifically granted to Congress by the Constitution.
Powers each branch has to limit the others.
Division of power between national and state governments.
Reading: Faction, ambition and judgment
Madison, Federalist No. 10 and No. 51; Hamilton, Federalist No. 78 (1787-1788); Brutus, Essay I (1787) · Public domain
As you read, list each author’s premise about human nature and each author’s prediction.
Federalist 10: The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man… The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
Federalist 51: Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
Federalist 78: The judiciary… will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them… It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.
Brutus I: In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other.
Practice
Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.
Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)
Fluency
Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.
- Name the check: (a) the President rejects a bill; (b) Congress passes it anyway; (c) the Senate approves a President’s nominee; (d) a court declares a statute unconstitutional; (e) the House charges an official and the Senate tries the case.
Check your answer
Answer: (a) veto; (b) veto override by two-thirds of both houses; (c) confirmation; (d) judicial review; (e) impeachment and removal. - Describe the two stages of amending the Constitution under Article V, with the vote each requires. How many states must ratify?
Check your answer
Answer: Proposal: two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or a convention called by two-thirds of the states. Ratification: three-fourths of the states, which is 38 of 50.Three-fourths of 50 is 37.5, so 38 states are needed. Twenty-seven amendments in more than two centuries shows how hard the process is by design. - Define incorporation. Which amendment is it based on, and why was it needed?
Check your answer
Answer: Incorporation is the Supreme Court’s application of most Bill of Rights protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (1868). It was needed because the first ten amendments originally limited only the national government.
Application
Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.
- Federalist 10 says “the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.” Brutus I says that in a republic “the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar.” Explain how the two authors reach opposite conclusions about a large republic.
Check your answer
Answer: Madison treats diversity as the cure: in a large republic with many factions, no single one can easily become a tyrannical majority. Brutus treats diversity as the disease: if interests differ, representatives of one part will constantly strive against the other, so a large, varied republic cannot govern well. Both accept that people divide by interest; they disagree about whether many competing interests check each other or paralyze the government.A strong answer finds the shared premise and the point where the arguments split. It does not declare a winner; it may note which predictions later events support, with evidence. - Hamilton says the judiciary has “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” What does he mean, and what is the strongest Anti-Federalist reply described in the lesson?
Check your answer
Answer: Courts control neither the military (force) nor the budget and lawmaking (will); they can only decide cases, and they depend on the other branches to enforce their rulings, so they are the “least dangerous” branch. The Anti-Federalist reply: federal judges with life tenure would be unaccountable, and their power to interpret the Constitution could expand national power over the states.Evaluate the reasoning, not just the prediction (HR.1). Hamilton’s premise about enforcement is sound; whether judgment alone is a weak power is the contested step. - Scenario: a state’s governor issues an order that closes a newspaper for printing articles critical of the state government. A resident sues under the First Amendment. Why can she rely on a federal amendment against a state?
Check your answer
Answer: Through incorporation. The First Amendment was written to limit Congress, but the Supreme Court has applied its protections against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, so a state official is bound by the free-press guarantee too.The key step is the Fourteenth Amendment. Without incorporation the answer would have been different before the twentieth century. - Missouri v. Holland (1920): Missouri sued a federal game warden, arguing that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act invaded powers the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states. Why could the Tenth Amendment not settle the case by itself, and what reasoning did Justice Holmes give for letting the national government act?
Check your answer
Answer: The Tenth Amendment reserves only powers “not delegated to the United States,” and the Constitution expressly delegates the treaty power (Article 2, Section 2) and makes treaties part of the supreme law of the land (Article 6), so citing the Tenth Amendment alone could not answer the question. Holmes reasoned that migratory birds are only transitorily within any one state, a national interest that can be protected only by national action in concert with another power, so “It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.”A strong answer gives the textual step (treaty power and supremacy) before the practical one (the states cannot do the job alone), and can say how Brutus and Madison would each read the result.
Review
Keep earlier skills sharp.
- Review from Lesson 1.1: which thinker’s argument does the lesson say is organized into the Constitution’s first three articles, and how?
Check your answer
Answer: Montesquieu’s. Article I gives legislative power to Congress, Article II executive power to the President, and Article III judicial power to the courts, so the three powers are held by different hands.
Missouri copies the design: Article II, section 1 of its Constitution of 1945 divides state government into “three distinct departments—the legislative, executive and judicial”, so power checks power in Jefferson City as it does in Washington.
Considering the Federalist and Anti-Federalist arguments presented, which predictions about the ‘machine’s’ impact on liberty do you think have proven most accurate or insightful over time?
How confident are you that you can explain how each part of the constitutional machinery is meant to protect liberty, and where critics said it would fail?
The Shift
- The U.S. system deliberately limits government power through enumerated powers and federalism.
- Separation of powers and checks and balances ensure no single branch can act unchecked.
- An independent judiciary, the amendment process, and the Bill of Rights further protect rights.
The Argument Over a Large Republic: Federalist 10 and Brutus I
Federalist No. 10 (1787) via the Avalon Project; Brutus, Essay I (1787); U.S. Constitution, Articles I and V, and Amendment XIV; Missouri Constitution, Article II, section 1, via the Revisor of Missouri; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), via Cornell LII · Public domain
Why this reading. In the autumn of 1787 New Yorkers argued in the newspapers about whether to ratify the Constitution. Madison, writing as “Publius,” published Federalist No. 10 on 22 November; “Brutus” — probably the Albany lawyer Robert Yates — had opened the case against ratification a few weeks earlier. They agree about human nature and reach opposite conclusions about the size of a republic. Your lesson’s own excerpt gives you one sentence from each; this reading gives you the reasoning around those sentences, plus the constitutional text the lesson’s checks turn on. What to look for: each writer’s premise, the prediction he draws from it, and the step where the two part company.
Madison: faction is a disease you cannot cure, only manage
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. […] The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man […] But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. […] The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
Note the structure: this is an argument by elimination. Madison lists every way of removing the causes, shows each is either tyrannical or impossible, and concludes that only the effects can be managed. Note also his admission that the majority, not only a minority, can be a faction — and that when it is, ordinary voting is no protection at all:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. […] When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.
Madison’s remedy: extend the sphere
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. […]
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
This is the answer the lesson’s first check is after. Madison does not propose to ban factions or parties. He proposes to make the country so various that no single faction can easily become a majority — and, when one does, so scattered that it has trouble organizing.
Brutus: the same premise, the opposite conclusion
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply this remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be convinced that it forbids that we should be one government. The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. […] a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be composed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles, as would constantly be contending with each other.
Brutus also predicts that the new government will swallow the states, and he names the clauses he thinks will do it — the taxing power and the necessary and proper clause:
the legislature of the United States are vested with the great and uncontrollable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will […] it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way.
Read that last sentence next to Madison’s premise that men are not angels. They are the same premise. Madison concludes that power must be divided and set against itself; Brutus concludes that a national government holding these powers will use them until nothing is left to check it. Judging the reasoning, not just the outcome, is what the lesson’s open question asks of you.
The machinery in the text itself
Three provisions the lesson’s checks require, quoted exactly.
Article V. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof […]
Article I, § 7. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.
Article I, § 8. To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers […]
And Hamilton’s verdict on the third branch, from Federalist No. 78: the judiciary “will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. […] It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”
One later change both men would have noticed
The Bill of Rights, as ratified in 1791, restrained only the national government: “Congress shall make no law.” States were left to their own constitutions. That changed after the Civil War, when the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) was written as a direct limit on the states: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Through that amendment the Supreme Court has, case by case, applied most of the Bill of Rights against the states — the process called incorporation. A Missourian today can therefore invoke the First Amendment against a state or city official, which was not true in 1791.
Two Missouri texts that show the machinery at work
Separation of powers in a state constitution. Missouri’s Constitution of 1945 builds the same machine at the state level. Article II, section 1:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments—the legislative, executive and judicial—each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Compare Montesquieu’s sentence in Lesson 1.1. The exception clause (“except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted”) is the state version of the checks the federal Constitution gives each branch over the others.
Federalism tested by a Missouri lawsuit. In Missouri v. Holland (argued March 2, 1920; decided April 19, 1920), the State of Missouri sued a United States game warden to stop him from enforcing the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, arguing that the act invaded the powers the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states. Justice Holmes, for the Court, answered that the Tenth Amendment could not settle the question by itself:
To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article 2, Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article 6 treaties made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land.
The Court upheld the treaty and the statute. Its reasoning about why the states alone could not do the job is a short, concrete example of the national government acting where the states cannot:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. […] It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act.
Brutus feared exactly this kind of reasoning; Madison would have said it is why the national government has its own powers. Decide which you find more persuasive, and say whether the migratory birds changed your answer.
Sources: The Federalist Papers: No. 10 (avalon.law.yale.edu); The Federalist Papers: No. 78 (avalon.law.yale.edu); Brutus I (18 October 1787) (teachingamericanhistory.org); The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription (archives.gov); Amendments 11-27 (Fourteenth Amendment) (archives.gov); Missouri Constitution, Article II, section 1 (Revisor of Missouri) (revisor.mo.gov); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (Legal Information Institute) (law.cornell.edu)