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RLP American Government — Principles of American Democracy

Curriculum

  • 5 Sections
  • 23 Lessons
  • Lifetime
Expand all sectionsCollapse all sections
  • Unit 1: Constitutional Foundations and Rights
    5
    • 1.1
      Where the Constitution’s Ideas Came From
      50 mins
    • 1.2
      The Machinery of Liberty — Separated Powers, Checks and Federalism
      50 mins
    • 1.3
      Deliberation Lab — Rights, Obligations and Becoming a Citizen
      50 mins
    • 1.4
      Workshop — Tocqueville, Civil Society and the Promise and Perils of Democracy
      50 mins
    • 1.5
      Performance Task — Constitutional Principles Argument Essay and Address
      150 mins
  • Unit 2: The Branches and the Court
    5
    • 2.1
      Article I — How Congress Works, and Who Represents You
      50 mins
    • 2.2
      Article II — The Presidency, Executive Orders and Presidential Power
      50 mins
    • 2.3
      Deliberation Lab — Article III, Judicial Review and the Landmark Cases
      50 mins
    • 2.4
      Workshop — Changing Interpretations of Civil Rights, from Plessy to Bakke
      50 mins
    • 2.5
      Performance Task — Moot Court Brief and Oral Argument
      200 mins
  • Unit 3: Federalism, Missouri and Tribal Governments
    5
    • 3.1
      Federalism in Practice — Reserved, Concurrent and Contested Powers
      50 mins
    • 3.2
      Missouri’s Government, Courts and Budget — and Tribal Sovereignty
      50 mins
    • 3.3
      Deliberation Lab — Direct Democracy: Initiative, Referendum, Amendment and Recall in Missouri
      50 mins
    • 3.4
      Workshop — How Public Policy Is Made: Agenda, Law, Regulation and Executive Action
      50 mins
    • 3.5
      Performance Task — Missouri Policy Testimony
      150 mins
  • Unit 4: Elections, Media and Democracy in the World
    5
    • 4.1
      Parties, Nominations, Polls and Money
      50 mins
    • 4.2
      Turnout, Reapportionment and Redistricting
      50 mins
    • 4.3
      Deliberation Lab — A Free and Responsible Press in a New Media Age
      50 mins
    • 4.4
      Workshop — Comparing Political Systems: Democracy, Tyranny and Transition
      100 mins
    • 4.5
      Performance Task — Civic Analysis Project and Defense
      200 mins
  • Unit 5: Missouri American Government Supplement
    3
    • 5.1
      Roots of American Government: Written Law, Colonial Self-Rule and Geography
      50 mins
    • 5.2
      From the Articles of Confederation to Ratification
      50 mins
    • 5.3
      Government in Action: A Missouri Policy Case and the Election Map
      50 mins

Performance Task — Constitutional Principles Argument Essay and Address

Unit 1  ·  Culminating Performance Task  ·  Lesson 5 of 23

Performance Task — Constitutional Principles Argument Essay and Address

🕐 150 mins
The Big Question

Does the system of separated powers still protect our liberty as effectively as the founders intended?

By the end of this lesson I can…

argue whether separated powers still protect liberty as Federalist 51 claimed, using founding-era and present-day evidence, and present the argument in a public address.

Three branches operate separate levers that keep an open gate protecting citizens, beside blank pages and a podium.

The question. Does the Constitution’s system of separated and checked powers still protect liberty in the way Federalist 51 claimed it would?

This is not a trick question with a right answer. Scholars, judges and citizens disagree. What the task assesses is whether you can take a defensible position and build it from evidence.

Key Takeaway

Evaluating whether the Constitution’s system of separated powers still protects liberty requires analyzing historical claims and present-day evidence from various perspectives.

📖 Read for this lesson

The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.

  • Federalist No. 51, in Full Enough to Argue WithThe Federalist No. 51, from the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788, via the Avalon Project · about 10 min

    This is the document your essay argues with: the whole of Federalist 51 in Publius’s own words, plus the four premises laid out so you can test them and the strongest form of the counterclaim on each side.

Why might different people disagree about whether the Constitution’s system of separated powers still protects liberty?

Flashcard

Federalist 10

Tap to reveal
Answer

Madison: control the effects of faction by extending the republic.

Flashcard

Federalist 51

Tap to reveal
Answer

Madison: ambition must counteract ambition; checks and balances.

Flashcard

Federalist 78

Tap to reveal
Answer

Hamilton: the judiciary is the least dangerous branch; judicial independence.

Flashcard

Brutus I

Tap to reveal
Answer

Anti-Federalist: a large republic cannot represent a diverse people.

Flashcard

incorporation

Tap to reveal
Answer

Applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Evidence you need

💡 Did You Know?

The concept of separating governmental powers into distinct branches to prevent tyranny was famously articulated by Montesquieu, whose ideas deeply influenced the American framers.

At least three founding-era sources — Federalist 10, 51 or 78, Brutus I, the Constitution’s text, Montesquieu or Locke — and one present-day example with a reliable source. Present-day examples might include a veto and override, a Senate confirmation fight, a court ruling against the executive or Congress, an impeachment, an executive order and the response to it, or a period of divided or unified government. Choose an example that genuinely tests the claim, not one that simply decorates your view.

+50 XP

Which counterclaim is stated in a form its holders would recognize?

A fair counterclaim is specific, reasoned and something its holder would sign.

What makes the argument strong

WHST.11-12.1.b asks you to develop claims and counterclaims fairly, pointing out the strengths and limitations of both. If you argue that the system still works, the strongest counterclaim may be that party loyalty now outweighs institutional ambition — members of Congress defending a president of their party rather than their branch, which Madison did not anticipate. If you argue that it no longer works, the counterclaim is that the machine has repeatedly stopped determined presidents and Congresses, which is exactly its purpose. Either way, state the counterclaim in its holder’s terms and answer it.

The Constitution’s system of separated powers either perfectly protects liberty or has completely failed to do so.

The effectiveness of the Constitution’s system of separated powers in protecting liberty is a complex question with no single right answer, requiring careful evaluation of competing arguments and evidence.

The evaluation paragraph

One paragraph must evaluate the reasoning of a founding-era argument: identify its premises, test them against evidence, and judge whether the conclusion follows (HR.4 asks you to construct and test hypotheses; here you test the founders’).

The conclusion (WHST.11-12.1.e) should follow from the argument and say what it implies — for citizens, for a reform, or for how we should read Federalist 51 today.

Non-partisanship

This is a question about institutions, not parties. Use examples from administrations and Congresses of both parties where you can, and argue about the design, not the people.

The address

Three minutes, to a civic audience that has not read the Federalist Papers: define terms in passing, state your claim early, carry one quotation they can remember, and address the other side.

Unit 1 checkpoint

Do this before you start the task. It covers the whole unit and tells you what to review first.

+50 XP

Which thinker argued that liberty cannot survive if legislative and executive powers are united in the same body?

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws. The Constitution’s first three articles follow his plan.
Fill in the blank

The Declaration says governments derive their just powers from the of the governed.

+50 XP

In Federalist 51, why does Madison say government must be obliged to control itself?

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Officials are not angels either, so ambition must counteract ambition.
Myth or Fact?

In Federalist 10, Madison argues that the best cure for faction is to remove its causes.

Myth. He says the causes of faction cannot be removed; relief lies in controlling its effects, by extending the republic.
Fill in the blank

An amendment is ratified when of the 50 states approve it (give a number).

+50 XP

Which argument did the Anti-Federalist Brutus make?

Brutus I: in a republic the people’s interests “should be similar,” or representatives will constantly clash.
Myth or Fact?

The Bill of Rights originally limited only the national government.

Fact. Its protections were applied to the states later, through the Fourteenth Amendment (incorporation).
+50 XP

Which of these is a civic obligation rather than a legal obligation in the United States?

Voting is expected but not compelled. The other three are required by law.
Fill in the blank

A lawful permanent resident generally must live in the U.S. for years before applying to naturalize, or three if married to a U.S. citizen.

+50 XP

What did Tocqueville see as the remedy for both tyranny of the majority and individualism?

Associations draw people into public life and give minorities organized voices.
Myth or Fact?

In authoritarian systems, independent associations are typically banned, co-opted or controlled by the state.

Fact. How much room a government leaves civil society is one of the clearest tests of whether it is free.

Complete: Constitutional Principles Argument Essay (900-1,100 words) + 3-minute address

Task: Argue whether separated and checked powers still protect liberty as Federalist 51 claimed, using at least three founding-era sources and one present-day example.

Submission workflow

  1. Stage 1 — Outline. Claim, three founding-era sources with quotations, the present-day example with its source, and the strongest counterclaim.
  2. Stage 2 — Reviewed draft. A parent, guardian or study partner (or you, after a day away from the draft) tests whether your counterclaim is stated as its holder would state it; save a revision note to your portfolio.
  3. Stage 3 — Final essay. 900-1,100 words, MLA or Chicago citations, including the premise-evaluation paragraph.
  4. Stage 4 — Three-minute address. Deliver it aloud to a family member or other audience, or record it; either earns equal credit.

How it is scored

CriterionWhat proficient looks like
Claim and development (WHST.11-12.1)Precise, defensible claim developed with founding-era and present-day evidence.
Counterclaim (WHST.11-12.1.b)Stated in its holder’s terms with evidence, and answered.
Premise evaluation (9-12.GV.1.CC.C / 9-12.GV.1.CC.D)One founding argument’s premises identified and tested.
Constitutional understanding (9-12.GV.3.GS.D / 9-12.GV.4.PC.A)Accurate use of separation of powers, checks and balances and federalism.
Conclusion (WHST.11-12.1.e)Follows from the argument and states its implication.
Address (SL.11-12.4)Clear line of reasoning for a civic audience; claim early; other side addressed.

Separated powers operate in Missouri too: the Governor can veto a bill, and the General Assembly can override by two-thirds of the elected members of each house. The Governor also holds a partial veto over appropriations, which the President does not have.

How has your understanding of the strengths and limitations of separated powers evolved after considering the arguments and evidence presented?

Quick self-check

How confident are you that you can argue a constitutional question from founding-era and present evidence, fairly and without partisanship?

Not yetVery confident
SHIFT

The Shift

  • Evaluate if separated powers still protect liberty.
  • Use founding-era and current evidence.
  • Address counterclaims fairly and avoid partisanship.

Missouri Learning Standards — Social Studies addressed: WHST.11-12.1, 9-12.GV.2.CC.B, 9-12.GV.3.GS.A, 9-12.GV.3.GS.D, 9-12.GV.4.PC.A, WHST.11-12.5, SL.11-12.4, 9-12.GV.1.CC.C, 9-12.GV.1.CC.D

Instructional focus: Argumentative writing and public address on constitutional principles

Reading

Federalist No. 51, in Full Enough to Argue With

The Federalist No. 51, from the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788, via the Avalon Project · Public domain

Why this reading. Your essay question is whether the system Federalist 51 describes still protects liberty in the way it claimed it would. You cannot answer that from one quoted sentence. Below is the essay as it ran in the New York Packet on 8 February 1788, with only two long passages cut, each marked. The Avalon Project’s transcription is used; its capitalization and spelling are Publius’s own. Note that the authorship of this paper is traditionally assigned to Madison, though the original attribution read “Hamilton or Madison.” What to look for: the essay is a chain of premises. Number them as you read. Your evaluation paragraph has to identify those premises and test them, so mark the sentences where Madison asserts something about human beings rather than about institutions — those are the load-bearing ones.

The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

To the People of the State of New York:

TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. […] Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.

An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? […]

There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.

There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.

In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. […] Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger […]

It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good […] It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.

PUBLIUS.

The premises, laid out so you can test them

Your essay must evaluate the reasoning of a founding-era argument — identify its premises, test them, and judge whether the conclusion follows. Federalist 51 rests on at least these:

  1. Officeholders act from interest and ambition, not public spirit. “If men were angels” is not a joke; it is the premise the whole design assumes.
  2. Each officeholder’s ambition attaches to his branch. This is the step the essay states most briefly and defends least: “The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”
  3. Elections alone are not enough — a dependence on the people is the primary control, but “auxiliary precautions” are needed.
  4. A very various society makes oppressive majorities hard to assemble. The Federalist 10 argument, restated here as the “second method.”

Premise 2 is where most serious present-day criticism lands, and stating it in its strongest form is what the task’s counterclaim requirement asks. The criticism runs: Madison wrote before political parties existed, and parties now supply an ambition that crosses branch lines, so that members of Congress may defend a president of their own party rather than the powers of their own institution. The strongest reply runs the other way: the machine has in fact stopped determined presidents and Congresses repeatedly — through vetoes and overrides, refused confirmations, appropriations withheld, impeachments, and court rulings against the executive and against Congress — which is exactly what it was built to do, and a system that produces friction is not the same as a system that has failed. Whichever side you take, state the other in the form its holders would sign, and use a present-day example that genuinely tests your claim rather than decorating it.

Sources: The Federalist Papers: No. 51 (avalon.law.yale.edu); The Federalist Papers (full text, Project Gutenberg) (gutenberg.org)

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