
analyze how federal law, the Reconstruction amendments and four Supreme Court opinions defined citizenship and race, from Dred Scott (1857) through Ozawa and Thind (1922-1923), and evaluate how far the amendments ended the racial test for citizenship.
Instruction
If race is a social idea, where do we see it being made? One of the clearest places is the law of citizenship. For most of American history, who could become a citizen depended on race, and courts had to decide what race meant. Missouri sits at the center of the first chapter of that story.
1790: the first rule. The first naturalization law, passed by the first Congress, opened naturalization to “any alien, being a free white person.” (Naturalization is the process by which an immigrant becomes a citizen; the law said nothing about people born here.) The words were not defined. Courts would have to decide what they meant.
1857: a St. Louis case. Dred Scott and his wife Harriet sued for their freedom in St. Louis in April 1846. After trials and appeals in the Missouri and federal courts, the Supreme Court decided the case on March 6, 1857, with seven Justices agreeing and two dissenting. Chief Justice Roger Taney, writing for the Court, asked whether a Black person “whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves” could be a citizen, and answered that such people “are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution.” Justice Benjamin Curtis dissented: in several of the original States, he wrote, free Black persons “were citizens of those States” when the Constitution was formed. Two Justices read the same history and reached opposite conclusions about it.
1865-1870: the Reconstruction amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment (ratified December 6, 1865) ended slavery. Congress’s Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed” were citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) put the principle into the Constitution: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.” The Fifteenth Amendment (ratified February 3, 1870) said the right to vote could not be denied “on account of race.” In 1898, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court said the Fourteenth Amendment’s main purpose was to establish the citizenship of free Black Americans, which Taney’s opinion had denied.
Evaluate how well the texts worked. Judge each text by what it promised and what the record shows. The citizenship clause did what the Court in 1898 said it was for: it made people born in the United States citizens whatever their race, including the U.S.-born children of immigrants who were not allowed to naturalize. But the amendments did not change the 1790 test for immigrants. In 1870 Congress extended naturalization to people “of African nativity” and “of African descent,” and the words “white person” stayed for everyone else. So a child born here to Chinese parents who were barred from naturalizing was a citizen while the parents were not.
Two cases, one problem. In Ozawa v. United States (1922), Takao Ozawa, born in Japan, a high school graduate who had spent nearly three years as a university student and had lived in the United States for twenty years, argued that he should count as white. The Court conceded that he was “well qualified by character and education for citizenship,” but held that “white person” meant a person of what was popularly called the Caucasian race, and that Ozawa was not one. Three months later, in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923), Bhagat Singh Thind, born in Punjab, argued that anthropologists of the day classified people from India as Caucasian. The Court now changed its reasoning: the words “white persons,” it said, were “words of common speech and not of scientific origin,” to be understood as the “common man” understood them. Thind lost.
Reading the two cases together. In 1922 the Court used a scientific-sounding category to exclude Ozawa. In 1923, when that category would have included Thind, it switched to popular opinion. Read side by side, the cases are strong evidence for the idea that race was a legal and social construction: the result — exclusion from citizenship — stayed fixed while the definition moved. That is a counter-narrative, a reading of sources that challenges a familiar story (here, the story that the law simply recognized natural categories). Congress finally acted: naturalization opened to Chinese immigrants in 1943, to Filipino immigrants and to people from India in 1946, and in 1952 Congress barred denying naturalization “because of race or sex.”
Contextualise before you judge. Historians ask you to read sources in their own time (9-12.AH.1.CC.B). The justices worked within a statute Congress had written and within ideas about race that were widespread at the time. Explaining that context is not the same as excusing it; it tells you what would have had to change for the outcome to change — and in 1952 Congress changed it.
📖 Read for this lesson
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.
Reading: Who could become a citizen? Five legal texts
Naturalization Act of 1790 (1 Stat. 103); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 (1868); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) · Public domain
The 1790, Dred Scott, Ozawa and Thind passages are short quotations; the Fourteenth Amendment is quoted in full.
Naturalization Act of 1790: naturalization was open to “any alien, being a free white person,” who met the residence requirement.
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Taney, on whether Black Americans could be citizens: they “are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution.” Justice Curtis, dissenting: “free colored persons, before and at the time of the formation of the Constitution, were citizens of those States.”
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 (1868): All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Ozawa (1922), on a man the Court agreed was “well qualified by character and education for citizenship”: he “is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian.”
Thind (1923), on the words “white persons” in the naturalization law: these are words of common speech and not of scientific origin.
Formative check
Work through these before moving on. They are not graded — they tell you whether the standard below has landed yet.
What does comparing Ozawa (1922) and Thind (1923) most clearly show?
Missouri standard: 9-12.AH.2.GS.B
The Fourteenth Amendment’s opening citizenship sentence answered the question the Supreme Court had decided against free Black Americans in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).
Congress removed race as a bar to naturalization in the year .
Missouri standard: 9-12.AH.2.GS.B
Write a counter-narrative paragraph: explain how Ozawa and Thind together challenge the idea that the law simply recognized natural racial categories. Then add one sentence of historical context that explains, without excusing, why the justices reasoned as they did, and one sentence judging how far the Fourteenth Amendment ended the racial test for citizenship, using only evidence from the reading.
How confident are you that you can analyze how naturalization law and the courts defined race and who could be a citizen, and judge how well the Reconstruction amendments worked?
Who Counted as a Citizen? Dred Scott, the Reconstruction Texts, Ozawa and Thind in the Court’s Own Words
Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27; U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); Act of July 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 416; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, section 311, 66 Stat. 239; table and paragraph models SLS original · Public domain (statutes, Constitution and Supreme Court opinions); models SLS original
Why this reading. The lesson asks for a source-analysis table on five legal texts and a short evaluation of how well the Reconstruction amendments worked. Here are the texts themselves, in the words of Congress and the Justices, in the order you will meet them, with a model row so you can see how a row is built. What to look for: who is named as a citizen and who is left out, the exact words the Court chose in 1857, in 1922 and again in 1923, and what stays the same while the reasoning changes.
Content note. The 1857 opinion and the 1922-1923 opinions use the racial vocabulary of their day, including “negro,” “Caucasian” and “Hindu.” Those words appear only inside quotations, because the Court’s own wording is the evidence you are analyzing.
1. The first naturalization law (Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103), Section 1
That any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any common law court of record, in any one of the states wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at least, and making proof to the satisfaction of such court, that he is a person of good character, and taking the oath or affirmation prescribed by law, to support the constitution of the United States …
Notice what the Act does not define. It says “free white person” and stops. What the words meant would be decided by courts, generations later.
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): a St. Louis case reaches the Supreme Court
The path. The National Park Service, which keeps the Old Courthouse in St. Louis where the case began, reports that Dred and Harriet Scott sued Irene Emerson for their freedom in April 1846; that they lost at trial there in June 1847 and won at a second hearing in 1850; that the Missouri Supreme Court reversed in 1852; that a federal court ruled for the Scotts’ owner in May 1854; and that the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision on March 6, 1857, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, with seven Justices in agreement and two in dissent. (Unit 2 follows this case through the courts. Here you read only the citizenship holding.)
The question, in Taney’s words.
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution.
The holding. After defining “citizens” as members of the sovereign people, Taney answered:
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.
Taney reached that answer by describing the opinion he said was held when the Constitution was written, an opinion that, in his words, regarded Black people as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings.” Notice that this is a historical claim about what the framers intended, offered as the reason for a legal conclusion. Historians and later courts examined it.
The dissent. Justice Benjamin R. Curtis disagreed on the facts of history:
… free colored persons, before and at the time of the formation of the Constitution, were citizens of those States.
And as free colored persons were then citizens of at least five States, and so in every sense part of the people of the United States, they were among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and established.
(Curtis refers to five of the original thirteen States, which he names in his opinion, among them New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina.) The two opinions read the same history and reach opposite conclusions about it. That is exactly what a source-analysis table should record.
3. The Reconstruction texts
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27), Section 1, the first federal statute to define who is a citizen:
… all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens …
The Thirteenth Amendment, Section 1 (ratified December 6, 1865, according to the National Archives):
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 (ratified in 1868; the National Archives gives July 9, 1868, and notes that the Secretary of State’s certificate of ratification is dated July 28, 1868):
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Fifteenth Amendment, Section 1 (ratified February 3, 1870, according to the National Archives):
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
What the Supreme Court later said the Fourteenth Amendment was for. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, decided March 28, 1898, Justice Horace Gray wrote for the Court:
Its main purpose doubtless was, as has been often recognized by this court, to establish the citizenship of free negroes, which had been denied in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sandford (1857) 19 How. 393; and to put it beyond doubt that all blacks, as well as whites, born or naturalized within the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States.
(Wong Kim Ark, the son of Chinese parents who were not allowed to naturalize, was born in the United States. The Court held that he was a citizen by birth. Unit 3 reads that case at length.) Notice that the Court itself connects the 1868 text to the 1857 holding.
4. The racial bar on naturalization survives Reconstruction
The Fourteenth Amendment gave citizenship to people born in the United States. It did not change the 1790 rule for immigrants. Congress did add one group. The Supreme Court summarized the history in Ozawa (1922): “The language of the naturalization laws from 1790 to 1870 had been uniformly such as to deny the privilege of naturalization to an alien unless he came within the description ‘free white person.’ By section 7 of the act of July 14, 1870 … the naturalization laws were ‘extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.’” The words “white person” stayed in the law for everyone else.
5. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (decided November 13, 1922), Justice Sutherland for the Court
The facts, as the opinion states them: Takao Ozawa, born in Japan, had “continuously resided in the United States for 20 years,” was a high school graduate who had spent nearly three years as a university student, “had educated his children in American schools,” and had “maintained the use of the English language in his home.” The Court added: “That he was well qualified by character and education for citizenship is conceded.” Its ruling:
The appellant, in the case now under consideration, however, is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side. A large number of the federal and state courts have so decided and we find no reported case definitely to the contrary.
Then the Court added a sentence that shows how it saw its own role:
The briefs filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the culture and enlightenment of the Japanese people, and with this estimate we have no reason to disagree; but these are matters which cannot enter into our consideration of the questions here at issue. We have no function in the matter other than to ascertain the will of Congress and declare it.
6. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (decided February 19, 1923), Justice Sutherland for the Court
The question sent up to the Court asked whether “a high-caste Hindu, of full Indian blood, born at Amritsar, Punjab, India,” was a white person within the meaning of the naturalization statute. Thind’s lawyers argued that scientists of the day classed the people of northern India as Caucasian, the very test Ozawa had used. The Court, in the same author’s words, changed its ground:
… it does not employ the word ‘Caucasian,’ but the words ‘white persons,’ and these are words of common speech and not of scientific origin. … The words of the statute are to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were taken.
‘Caucasian’ is a conventional word of much flexibility …
Thind lost. Compare the two opinions sentence by sentence: in 1922 the word “Caucasian” was the answer, and in 1923 the Court set it aside for what “the common man” understands. The same Justice wrote both opinions, about three months apart (November 13, 1922 and February 19, 1923).
7. How the racial bar ended
- 1943. Repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts. The House of Representatives’ history office writes that the repeal “opened up the naturalization process to Chinese Americans who were not native-born.”
- 1946 (approved July 2, 1946; 60 Stat. 416). Congress amended section 303 of the Nationality Act of 1940 so that the right to become a naturalized citizen extended to “Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent” (clause 1) and to “Chinese persons and persons of Chinese descent, and persons of races indigenous to India” (clause 3).
- 1952 (66 Stat. 239). Section 311 of the Immigration and Nationality Act: “The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is married.”
From 1790 to 1952 is 162 years (1952 − 1790 = 162), a span during which the naturalization statutes carried a racial test for at least some groups of immigrants. The court decisions in sections 5 and 6 stayed on the books until Congress changed the statute.
How a row of the source-analysis table is built (SLS original model)
Columns: Source and date; What it says (quote); Who made it and for whom; What it does; What it leaves unsaid. A filled model for the 1790 Act:
- Source and date: Naturalization Act, March 26, 1790.
- What it says: “any alien, being a free white person.”
- Who and for whom: the first Congress, for immigrants seeking citizenship.
- What it does: makes whiteness a legal requirement for naturalization.
- What it leaves unsaid: what “white” means; the courts would have to decide.
Fill rows for Dred Scott, the Fourteenth Amendment, Ozawa and Thind the same way. Then write your counter-narrative paragraph. A model of the pattern, on a different question (SLS original): “The familiar story is that the Fourteenth Amendment made citizenship a matter of birth. It did, but not for immigrants: for them the 1790 Act’s test of a ‘free white person’ remained. A child born in the United States to parents barred from naturalizing was a citizen; the parents were not. Context explains why the racial test survived Reconstruction, but it does not make the test a natural one.”
Evaluating effectiveness: a three-line chart (SLS original)
For each text, ask what it was meant to do, what it did in practice, and what evidence in this reading shows the difference. Example for the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship clause: meant to settle citizenship by birth, which the Court in 1898 said was its main purpose; did make U.S.-born children of immigrants citizens even when their parents were barred from naturalizing; did not change the 1790 test for immigrants themselves. Complete the same three lines for the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, using only what the quoted texts and dates show. Where the reading gives you no evidence, write “this reading does not say” instead of guessing.
Sources. Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (Statutes at Large text, Wikisource); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), as published by the Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law School); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 and the Act of July 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 416 (GovInfo); U.S. Const. amends. XIII-XV (Legal Information Institute; ratification dates from the National Archives); 8 U.S.C. section 1422; National Park Service, “(H)our History Lesson: Suing for Freedom”; U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives. All retrieved 2026-11-15. The table model, paragraph model and effectiveness chart are SLS original.
Sources: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School (law.cornell.edu); National Park Service, (H)our History Lesson: Suing for Freedom, Dred and Harriet Scott’s Case at the Old Courthouse (nps.gov); Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (Statutes at Large text, Wikisource) (en.wikisource.org); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, GovInfo (govinfo.gov); U.S. Constitution, Amendments XIII, XIV, XV, Legal Information Institute (law.cornell.edu); National Archives, 14th Amendment (milestone document) (archives.gov); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), Legal Information Institute (law.cornell.edu); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), Legal Information Institute (law.cornell.edu); United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), Legal Information Institute (law.cornell.edu); Act of July 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 416, GovInfo (govinfo.gov); 8 U.S.C. section 1422 (Immigration and Nationality Act section 311), Legal Information Institute (law.cornell.edu); U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives: Immigrants and Refugees (on the 1943 repeal) (history.house.gov)