How do past lessons about tariffs inform — or fail to inform — today’s complex trade decisions?
compare the reasons for and effects of trade restrictions during the Great Depression with present-day arguments among labor, business and political leaders over tariffs and trade, and deliberate on current policy.

A tariff is a tax on imports. It raises the price of foreign goods, protecting domestic producers from competition and raising revenue — and it raises prices for domestic buyers, including businesses that use imported inputs. Other trade restrictions include quotas (limits on quantity) and export controls.
Despite historical lessons, the debate over tariffs continues to involve complex, often conflicting, arguments about their economic and strategic impacts.
📖 Read for this lesson
The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.
A tax on imported goods.
A limit on the quantity of a good that may be imported.
Consider a product you use often that is made in another country. What might be the benefits and drawbacks if a tariff were placed on it?
Who pays most of a tariff on imported goods, according to most studies of recent U.S. tariffs?
The case for protection, historically
The federal income tax, established in 1913, eventually replaced tariffs as the primary source of U.S. government revenue.
Alexander Hamilton argued in 1791 that a young nation needed to protect infant industries until they could compete with established foreign producers. Tariffs were the federal government’s main revenue source for much of the nineteenth century, and U.S. manufacturing grew behind them.
Economists agree Smoot-Hawley was the main cause of the Great Depression.
Smoot-Hawley (1930)
As the Depression began, Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1930, sponsored by Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, raising tariffs on thousands of imports to protect American farmers and manufacturers. More than a thousand economists petitioned President Hoover to veto it; he signed it. Other countries retaliated with their own tariffs, and world trade collapsed — falling by roughly two-thirds between 1929 and 1934, though falling prices and incomes caused much of that decline. Most economists today see Smoot-Hawley as having worsened the Depression and damaged international relations, though they debate how much it contributed compared with monetary and financial causes (HI.2 asks you to weigh the complexity of causes). Its lesson shaped policy for decades: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) and the World Trade Organization (1995) all worked to lower tariffs by negotiation.
The international body that administers trade agreements and settles trade disputes.
Tariffs only hurt foreign countries by making their goods more expensive for Americans.
Tariffs are largely paid by domestic buyers through higher prices and can lead to retaliation that hurts domestic exporters and consumers.
Complete a then-and-now chart: the reasons given, who argued for and against, and the effects — for Smoot-Hawley and for one present-day tariff. Then record your 90-second deliberation position and end it with a question that probes the other side’s reasoning.
Today’s debate
Trade policy has become contested again. Recent administrations of both parties have imposed or kept tariffs on many imports, especially from China, and used export controls on advanced technology. The arguments line up in ways that do not follow party neatly:
For restrictions: protecting jobs and communities from import competition; national security and resilient supply chains for critical goods such as semiconductors and medicines; responding to unfair practices such as subsidies and forced technology transfer; and leverage in negotiations.
Against: tariffs are paid largely by domestic buyers through higher prices; retaliation hurts exporters — farm goods such as Missouri’s soybeans and pork are the classic target; protected industries may become less efficient; and supply-chain goals can often be met more cheaply in other ways.
Trade restrictions imposed in response to another country’s restrictions.
Who argues what
Labor unions in import-competing industries often support restrictions; farm groups and exporters often oppose them; businesses that import inputs usually oppose tariffs on those inputs; national-security officials weigh different factors altogether. RH.11-12.6 asks you to evaluate each point of view by its claims, reasoning and evidence — and to notice whose interests each serves.
Deliberation question
Is the present-day case for tariffs stronger than the case made in 1930? CST.1 asks you to compare present with past and determine the lessons learned. SL.11-12.1.c asks you to propel the discussion with questions that probe reasoning. Come with one.
Key terms
The case for temporarily protecting new domestic industries until they can compete.
Reading: Two arguments about protection
Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (1791); the Economists’ Statement against the Hawley-Smoot Tariff (1930), as published in the New York Times, May 5, 1930 · Public domain
Hamilton argued for protecting infant industries. The 1930 economists argued against protection. What premises does each rely on?
Hamilton: The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations who have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry constitutes a more formidable obstacle than either of those which have been mentioned, to the introduction of the same branch into a country in which it did not before exist.
1930 economists: We are convinced that increased protective duties would be a mistake. They would operate, in general, to increase the prices which domestic consumers would have to pay… Countries cannot permanently buy from us unless they are permitted to sell to us.
Practice
Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.
Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)
Fluency
Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.
- A 25% tariff on an $800 imported washing machine adds how much? What does it cost buyers if fully passed on?
Check your answer
Answer: $200; $1,000800 × 0.25. - How does a quota differ from a tariff?
Check your answer
Answer: A quota limits the quantity imported; a tariff is a tax on importsBoth raise domestic prices. - In what year was Smoot-Hawley passed, and roughly how much did world trade fall from 1929 to 1934?
Check your answer
Answer: 1930; by roughly two-thirdsFalling prices and incomes caused much of that decline too. - Which argument did Hamilton make in 1791?
Check your answer
Answer: The infant-industry argument: protect new industries until they can competeFrom the Report on Manufactures.
Application
Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.
- An illustrative U.S. washing-machine market: Qd = 2,000 − 2P and domestic Qs = −400 + P (thousands of machines, P in dollars). Imports are available at the world price of $500. Find domestic production, consumption and imports. A $100 tariff raises the price to $600: find them again, and the tariff revenue.
Check your answer
Answer: At $500: consumption 1,000, domestic production 100, imports 900. At $600: consumption 800, production 200, imports 600. Revenue $100 × 600,000 = $60 million. Domestic producers gain; buyers pay more and buy less.Substitute each price; imports = consumption − domestic production. - A trading partner puts a 50% retaliatory tariff on Missouri pork priced at $3.00 a pound (illustrative). What do buyers there pay? If exports to that country fall from 200 million to 120 million pounds, what revenue do producers lose at $3.00?
Check your answer
Answer: $4.50 a pound; lost revenue $240 million3.00 × 1.5; (200 − 120) million × 3.00. - A world trade index is 100 in 1929 and 35 in 1934 (illustrative). What is the percent fall? Name two causes the lesson gives.
Check your answer
Answer: −65%. Tariffs and retaliation such as Smoot-Hawley, and falling prices and incomes during the Depression.(35 − 100) ÷ 100. HI.2: weigh multiple causes. - Match each group with its usual position on new tariffs: (a) unions in import-competing industries; (b) Missouri farm exporters; (c) manufacturers using imported inputs; (d) national-security officials.
Check your answer
Answer: (a) often support; (b) often oppose, fearing retaliation; (c) oppose tariffs on their inputs; (d) weigh supply-chain security, often favoring restrictions on critical goodsNotice whose interests each view serves (RH.11-12.6).
Challenge
Stretch problems. Expect to think before you write.
- Steel is 20% of the cost of a $10,000 machine made in Missouri. A 25% tariff raises steel prices by the full 25%. By how much does the machine’s cost rise? Who gains and who loses?
Check your answer
Answer: 5.0% → $500. Domestic steel producers and their workers gain; machine makers, their workers and their customers lose.0.20 × 0.25 = 0.05. - Compare the premises of the 1791 and 1930 arguments. What does each assume, and which applies better to semiconductors today?
Check your answer
Answer: Hamilton assumed established foreign producers block new industries, so temporary protection lets them grow. The 1930 economists assumed tariffs raise consumer prices and that countries must sell to us to buy from us. For semiconductors, the security and infant-industry premises have some force; the price and retaliation costs still apply. Any answer must state its value judgment.CST.1: compare past and present, and label normative claims.
Review
Keep earlier skills sharp.
- Real GDP is $22.5 trillion one year and $23.0 trillion the next. Real growth?
Check your answer
Answer: 2.2%0.5 ÷ 22.5. - A tariff is added to imported shoes. Which curve shifts in the U.S. shoe market, and what happens to price?
Check your answer
Answer: Supply (of imports) shifts left; price risesA tax on sellers raises their costs.
When other countries retaliate with tariffs, farm goods such as Missouri’s soybeans and pork are the classic target, because their exports become more expensive for foreign buyers.
Beyond the economic arguments, what ethical considerations or national values do you think should influence a country’s trade policy decisions?
How confident are you that you can compare the 1930 and present-day tariff debates and evaluate each side’s reasoning?
The Shift
- Tariffs are taxes on imports that aim to protect domestic industries but can raise prices for consumers and businesses.
- Smoot-Hawley was followed by retaliation abroad and a steep fall in world trade; how much of the Depression it caused is still debated.
- Today’s debate over tariffs involves complex arguments from various groups, weighing economic protection, national security, and potential downsides like higher costs and retaliatory measures.
Tariffs, Then and Now: Hamilton, the 1,028 Economists, and the 2026 Court
Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791); the economists’ statement against the Hawley-Smoot tariff, Congressional Record-Senate, May 5, 1930; Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (Feb. 20, 2026); BEA national accounts via FRED; USITC Publication 5405 (March 2023); USTR Missouri trade profile; retrieved November 5, 2026 · Public domain
Why this reading. Lesson 4.3 asks you to build a then-and-now chart and then deliberate on whether today’s case for tariffs is stronger than the one made in 1930. Both halves need documents. Here are the arguments in the words of the people who made them — Hamilton in 1791, the 1,028 economists who petitioned against the Hawley-Smoot bill in 1930 — the trade figures for what followed, the measured effect of recent American tariffs, and the 2026 Supreme Court decision that changed who may impose them. Everything in quotation marks is a public document. Where economists disagree, this reading says so rather than picking.
Part One. 1791: the case for protection, made well
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, submitted his Report on the Subject of Manufactures to Congress on December 5, 1791. His argument is not that foreigners are cheating; it is that a new industry in a new country cannot start from a standing position against one that has been running for a century:
The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations, who have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry, constitutes a more formidable obstacle, than either of those, which have been mentioned, to the introduction of the same branch into a country, in which it did not before exist. To maintain between the recent establishments of one country and the long matured establishments of another country, a competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, is in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to forbid a successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and protection of government.
But the greatest obstacle of all to the successful prosecution of a new branch of industry in a country, in which it was before unknown, consists… in the bounties premiums and other aids which are granted, in a variety of cases, by the nations, in which the establishments to be imitated are previously introduced.
That second paragraph is the ancestor of today’s argument about foreign subsidies: it is hard to compete with a rival whose government is paying part of its costs. Hamilton’s preferred instrument, though, was not the tariff. He thought direct payment was cleaner, and said why:
Pecuniary bounties. This has been found one of the most efficacious means of encouraging manufactures, and is, in some views, the best… It avoids the inconvenience of a temporary augmentation of price, which is incident to some other modes; or it produces it to a less degree, either by making no addition to the charges on the rival foreign article, as in the case of protecting duties, or by making a smaller addition.
Read that carefully, because it concedes the central objection. Hamilton says plainly that protecting duties raise prices, and prefers a subsidy precisely because it supports the domestic producer without taxing the buyer. He also set a limit: “The continuance of bounties on manufactures long established, must almost always be of questionable policy: because a presumption would arise, in every such case, that there were natural and inherent impediments to success.” Protection was to be temporary, for infants. An infant industry still protected after fifty years is evidence the argument has failed.
Tariffs were nonetheless the federal government’s main source of revenue for most of the nineteenth century, and American manufacturing grew behind them — a correlation historians and economists still argue about, since the same period brought immigration, railways, coal, a continental market and universal schooling.
Part Two. 1930: the case against, made by 1,028 economists
In the spring of 1930, with the Depression beginning, Congress was moving the tariff bill sponsored by Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley. Clair Wilcox and Paul Douglas drafted a protest; Irving Fisher, Frank Graham, Ernest Patterson, Henry Seager and Frank Taussig sponsored it; it was circulated to the membership of the American Economic Association and signed by 1,028 economists. Senator Pat Harrison had it read into the Congressional Record of May 5, 1930. This is most of it, in its own words:
The undersigned American economists and teachers of economics strongly urge that any measure which provides for a general upward revision of tariff rates be denied passage by Congress, or if passed, be vetoed by the President.
We are convinced that increased protective duties would be a mistake. They would operate, in general, to increase the prices which domestic consumers would have to pay. By raising prices they would encourage concerns with higher costs to undertake production, thus compelling the consumer to subsidize waste and inefficiency in industry. At the same time they would force him to pay higher rates of profit to established firms which enjoyed lower production costs. A higher level of protection… would therefore raise the cost of living and injure the great majority of our citizens.
Few people could hope to gain from such a change. Miners, construction, transportation and public utility workers, professional people and those employed in banks, hotels, newspaper offices, in the wholesale and retail trades, and scores of other occupations would clearly lose, since they produce no products which could be protected by tariff barriers.
The vast majority of farmers, also, would lose. Their cotton, corn, lard, and wheat are export crops and are sold in the world market… They would lose through the increased duties on manufactured goods, however, and in a double fashion. First, as consumers they would have to pay still higher prices for the products, made of textiles, chemicals, iron, and steel, which they buy. Second, as producers, their ability to sell their products would be further restricted by the barriers placed in the way of foreigners who wished to sell manufactured goods to us.
Our export trade, in general, would suffer. Countries can not permanently buy from us unless they are permitted to sell to us, and the more we restrict the importation of goods from them by means of ever higher tariffs the more we reduce the possibility of our exporting to them… There are already many evidences that such action would inevitably provoke other countries to pay us back in kind by levying retaliatory duties against our goods.
America is now facing the problem of unemployment. Her labor can find work only if her factories can sell their products. Higher tariffs would not promote such sales. We can not increase employment by restricting trade.
Finally, we would urge our Government to consider the bitterness which a policy of higher tariffs would inevitably inject into our international relations… A tariff war does not furnish good soil for the growth of world peace.
Notice what the petition is and is not. It is not a claim that trade makes everyone better off; it names the losers from protection occupation by occupation. Its core is a single logical step — countries cannot permanently buy from us unless they are permitted to sell to us — plus a prediction of retaliation. President Hoover signed the Tariff Act of 1930 on June 17, 1930.
Part Three. What happened next
Bureau of Economic Analysis national accounts, current dollars, billions:
| Year | U.S. exports of goods and services | U.S. imports of goods and services | Nominal GDP |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1929 | 5.939 | 5.556 | 104.556 |
| 1930 | 4.444 | 4.121 | 92.160 |
| 1931 | 2.906 | 2.905 | 77.391 |
| 1932 | 1.975 | 1.932 | 59.522 |
| 1933 | 1.987 | 1.929 | 57.154 |
| 1934 | 2.561 | 2.239 | 66.800 |
From 1929 to 1932, American exports fell 66.7% and imports fell 65.2% — two-thirds — while nominal GDP fell 43.1%. Trade collapsed by half again as much as the economy did, and other countries retaliated with tariffs of their own.
But be careful with this table, because it is the place where students most often overreach. These are current-dollar figures in years of severe deflation, so a large part of the fall is prices rather than volumes. Incomes collapsed, so people bought less of everything, imported or not. And Smoot-Hawley was one event among several — bank failures, a contracting money supply, the gold standard’s constraints on policy. The standard view among economists today is that Smoot-Hawley worsened the Depression and the collapse of world trade, and that monetary and financial factors were the larger cause. Anyone who tells you the tariff caused the Depression is overstating the evidence; anyone who tells you it was harmless is ignoring the retaliation.
The lesson drawn at the time shaped policy for two generations: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 gave the President authority to lower tariffs by negotiation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade followed in 1947, and the World Trade Organization in 1995.
Part Four. Now: what recent American tariffs actually did
Who pays. The United States International Trade Commission, an independent federal agency, studied the Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs imposed from 2018 and reported in March 2023 that over 2018–2021 American importers bore nearly the full cost, because import prices rose at close to the same rate as the tariffs — roughly a 1% price increase for each 1% of tariff. The tariff is collected from the American importer at the border and passed along the domestic supply chain. The same report found that the tariffs did reduce imports of the covered goods and did raise production and prices in the protected American industries: steel and aluminum output rose, and so did the cost of steel and aluminum to every American manufacturer that uses them. Both findings are in the same report, and an honest then-and-now chart carries both.
How large the tariffs have become. You can measure the average tariff on American imports yourself, without anyone’s estimate, by dividing customs duties collected by the value of goods imported. Both are in the national accounts, at annual rates, in billions of dollars:
| Quarter | Customs duties collected | Goods imports | Average effective tariff rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 Q4 | 89.1 | 3,321.7 | 2.7% |
| 2025 Q4 | 366.7 | 3,243.8 | 11.3% |
| 2026 Q2 | 306.4 | 3,727.9 | 8.2% |
| 2026 Q3 | 275.3 | 4,019.9 | 6.8% |
The average duty on an imported good more than tripled between the first and third quarters in the table (2.7% to 8.2%, a factor of 3.1), peaked at 11.3% in the fourth quarter of 2025, and had fallen back to 6.8% by the third quarter of 2026 — the latest the national accounts give at the time of writing, and subject to revision. The measure is crude — it mixes duty-free goods with heavily taxed ones and shifts as importers switch suppliers — but it is arithmetic on two published series rather than anybody’s model, which is why it is worth doing.
Who may impose them. On February 20, 2026 the Supreme Court decided Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not give the President authority to impose tariffs. The Chief Justice began with the constitutional allocation:
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution specifies that “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” The Framers recognized the unique importance of this taxing power—a power which “very clear[ly]” includes the power to impose tariffs… The Framers did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch.
The statute the President had relied on authorizes him to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit… importation or exportation.” The Court’s answer was that the list does not mention tariffs and that taxation is not an ordinary part of the power to regulate:
Absent from this lengthy list of specific powers is any mention of tariffs or duties. Had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs, it would have done so expressly, as it consistently has in other tariff statutes.
Many statutes grant the Executive the power to “regulate.” Yet the Government cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the power to tax.
A plurality added that this was in any event a “major question” requiring clear congressional authorization, noting that “in IEEPA’s half century of existence, no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs.” Justices Kagan, Sotomayor and Jackson agreed on the result but would have reached it by ordinary statutory interpretation without the major-questions doctrine. Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh and Alito dissented.
What the case did not do is end tariffs. Congress has delegated tariff authority in other statutes, with conditions — Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for national security, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 for unfair foreign practices, Section 201 for import surges — and the Court took care to distinguish Section 232, noting its “sweeping, discretion-conferring language that IEEPA does not contain.” The decision is about which branch decides, and under which grant. That is itself part of the then-and-now comparison: in 1930 Congress wrote the rates into a statute line by line, and in the twenty-first century tariffs are mostly set by the executive under delegated authority. The 2026 decision pushed that pendulum back toward Congress.
Part Five. The present-day arguments, at their strongest
For restrictions
- Workers and communities. The gains from trade are diffuse and the losses are concentrated. Research on American regions exposed to rapid import growth in the 2000s found job losses that lasted for years in particular places. A policy that maximizes total output while destroying a town has answered the wrong question.
- National security and resilience. Some goods — semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, battery materials, munitions — are things a country may need when the seller is unwilling or unable to supply. Paying more for domestic capacity is buying insurance, and insurance always looks overpriced until the claim.
- Unfair practices. Hamilton’s point, updated: competing with a subsidized rival is not competing on comparative advantage. Tariffs are also negotiating leverage that nothing else replaces.
Against restrictions
- The buyer pays. Not a theory: the USITC measured it at close to one-for-one.
- Retaliation lands on exporters. This was the 1930 petition’s prediction and it is Missouri’s exposure now — the state shipped $5.1 billion of agricultural exports abroad in 2024 (the 10th largest of any state) and $19.6 billion of goods in 2025, of which Canada took $6.7 billion and Mexico $4.3 billion (USTR). Soybeans ($1.5 billion), corn ($514 million), soybean meal ($398 million), feeds ($385 million) and pork ($378 million) were its leading farm exports, and farm goods are the classic target for retaliation because they are easy to source elsewhere.
- Tariffs on inputs hurt domestic manufacturers. Far more American workers use steel than make it.
- Protection can become permanent. Hamilton’s own warning: continued protection is evidence the industry cannot stand.
- There are cheaper instruments. Stockpiles, direct production subsidies, procurement rules and adjustment assistance can pursue the same goals without taxing every buyer.
Where the honest disagreement is
Everyone in this argument accepts that tariffs raise domestic prices and that they help the protected industry. The genuine disputes are about magnitudes and weights: how large the employment gain in the protected industry is against the employment loss in industries that use the input or face retaliation; how much resilience is worth; and how to weigh a concentrated loss in one community against a small gain spread over a hundred million buyers. The last is a value judgment, and evidence will not settle it.
For your then-and-now chart and your question
Three differences between 1930 and now are worth building the comparison on. First, scale and instrument: 1930 was a broad statutory schedule; today’s measures are mostly executive actions under delegated authority, targeted at particular sectors and countries. Second, the institutional setting: 1930 had no system for handling trade disputes, so retaliation was unconstrained; the WTO exists now, however contested its authority. Third, the stated purpose: 1930’s tariff was about protecting domestic producers from competition, while much of today’s is argued on security and supply-chain grounds that the 1930 petition never addressed. Whether that third difference is a real distinction or a new label for the same policy is one of the best questions you can bring to the deliberation — and SL.11-12.1.c asks you to arrive with one that probes the other side’s reasoning rather than restating your own.
Sources: Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (1791), full text (constitution.org); The economists’ statement against the Hawley-Smoot tariff, Congressional Record, May 5, 1930 (reprinted) (econjwatch.org); Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, slip opinion (supremecourt.gov); USITC, Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on U.S. Industries (Pub. 5405) (usitc.gov); BEA exports and imports of goods and services, annual since 1929 (via FRED) (fred.stlouisfed.org); Federal customs duties receipts (BEA, via FRED) (fred.stlouisfed.org); Office of the United States Trade Representative, Missouri (ustr.gov); Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (date of signing; Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934), Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org)