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RLP Economics β€” Principles of Economics

Curriculum

  • 4 Sections
  • 20 Lessons
  • 10 Weeks
Expand all sectionsCollapse all sections
  • Unit 1: Economic Reasoning and Markets
    5
    • 1.1
      Scarcity, Choice and Thinking at the Margin
      50 mins
    • 1.2
      Supply and Demand Lab β€” Building and Using the Model
      50 mins
    • 1.3
      Deliberation Lab β€” Price Controls and Missouri’s Ban on Local Rent Regulation
      50 mins
    • 1.4
      Workshop β€” Adam Smith, Property, Competition and Liberty
      50 mins
    • 1.5
      Performance Task β€” Missouri Market Analysis Report
      150 mins
  • Unit 2: Firms, Competition and Labor
    5
    • 2.1
      Competition, Profit and Entrepreneurship
      50 mins
    • 2.2
      Location Lab β€” Why Farms, Factories, Ports and Stores Are Where They Are
      50 mins
    • 2.3
      Deliberation Lab β€” Unions, the Minimum Wage and Missouri’s $15 Floor
      50 mins
    • 2.4
      Workshop β€” Wages, Productivity, Skills and Technological Change
      50 mins
    • 2.5
      Performance Task β€” Labor Market Report and Briefing
      150 mins
  • Unit 3: Government, Money and the Macroeconomy
    5
    • 3.1
      What Government Does in a Market Economy β€” and When It Costs Too Much
      50 mins
    • 3.2
      Measurement Lab β€” GDP, Jobs, Unemployment and Inflation
      50 mins
    • 3.3
      Deliberation Lab β€” Fiscal Policy, Deficits and the National Debt
      50 mins
    • 3.4
      Workshop β€” The Federal Reserve, Interest Rates and Financial Markets
      50 mins
    • 3.5
      Performance Task β€” Economic Policy Briefing
      150 mins
  • Unit 4: The Global Economy
    5
    • 4.1
      Why Nations Trade β€” Comparative Advantage and Its Gains
      50 mins
    • 4.2
      Exchange Rate Lab β€” What a Stronger or Weaker Dollar Does
      50 mins
    • 4.3
      Deliberation Lab β€” Tariffs Then and Now: Smoot-Hawley and Today’s Debate
      50 mins
    • 4.4
      Workshop β€” Capital, Labor and Borders in a Global Economy
      50 mins
    • 4.5
      Performance Task β€” Trade Policy Position Paper and Address
      200 mins

Deliberation Lab β€” Price Controls and Missouri’s Ban on Local Rent Regulation

Unit 1 Β Β·Β  Deliberation & Civic Discourse Lab Β Β·Β  Lesson 3 of 20

Deliberation Lab β€” Price Controls and Missouri’s Ban on Local Rent Regulation

πŸ• 50 mins
The Big Question

When governments intervene to control prices, or forbid others from doing so, what are the predictable consequences, and how do we decide if those policies are worthwhile?

By the end of this lesson I can…

use the supply-and-demand model to predict the effects of price ceilings and price floors on buyers and sellers, and deliberate on a real Missouri price-control law using evidence.

Apartment shortage, waiting tenants, declining maintenance, and civic deliberation over rent regulation.

Governments sometimes decide the market price is unacceptable and set a legal maximum or minimum. The model predicts what happens next, and the predictions are some of the most reliable in economics β€” which does not settle whether the policy is wise.

Key Takeaway

While economic models reliably predict the effects of price controls like shortages or surpluses, the decision of whether such policies are wise involves weighing those effects against different values.

πŸ“– Read for this lesson

The reading opens over the lesson; close it to come back to exactly where you were. The checks below draw on it.

  • Ceilings, Floors, and Missouri’s Ban on Local Rent Regulation: The Statute and the Rent and Permit DataRevised Statutes of Missouri section 441.043 as printed by the Revisor of Statutes (effective August 28, 2025; public domain); BLS Consumer Price Index, rent of primary residence and all items, U.S. city average and Midwest region (public data API); U.S. Census Bureau Building Permits Survey, state annual files 2018-2024, and Population Estimates (NST-EST2023); with an SLS headnote and worked model; retrieved November 5, 2026 Β· about 12 min

    Section 1 does the $12 ceiling arithmetic (Qd 720, Qs 420, shortage 300) and shows why a ceiling above equilibrium does nothing β€” that is both checks. Section 3 gives Missouri’s RSMo Β§ 441.043 in its own words, section 5 sets eight years of Midwest rent data against an illustrative cap, and section 6 shows what Missouri has been permitting. Section 7 gives the strongest form of each side and the evidence that would settle it.

Why might a government choose to set a maximum or minimum price, even if it might lead to unintended consequences?

+50 XP

In the bicycle market (equilibrium $15), a ceiling of $12 is imposed. What results?

Qd = 720, Qs = 420 at $12: a shortage of 300.

Price ceilings

πŸ’‘ Did You Know?

Governments have historically used price floors for agricultural products to ensure farmers receive a minimum income, sometimes leading to large government purchases of surplus goods.

A price ceiling is a legal maximum price. It matters only if set below equilibrium. In the bicycle market from Lesson 1.2, a ceiling of $12 means buyers want 1,200 βˆ’ 40(12) = 720 bikes but sellers offer βˆ’300 + 60(12) = 420: a shortage of 300. The goods that are available go to whoever gets there first, knows the seller, or pays under the table, rather than to whoever values them most. Quality may fall, because sellers cannot raise prices to cover improvements. Queues, waiting lists and black markets are the standard results.

price ceiling

A legal maximum price; creates a shortage if set below equilibrium.

shortage

Quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied at the current price.

Myth or Fact?

A price ceiling set above the equilibrium price causes a shortage.

Myth. A ceiling above equilibrium does not bind; the market price stays at equilibrium.

Price floors

A price floor is a legal minimum, binding only above equilibrium. At a floor of $18, sellers offer 780 but buyers want 480: a surplus of 300. Agricultural price supports have produced stockpiles of unsold goods; the minimum wage, a price floor in the labor market, is the subject of Unit 2.

price floor

A legal minimum price; creates a surplus if set above equilibrium.

surplus

Quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded at the current price.

Rent caps just make housing more affordable for all tenants without negative effects.

Price ceilings like rent caps, when effective, create shortages, reduce quality, and redistribute goods, helping some buyers while hurting others and sellers.

Record your 90-second deliberation position on whether Missouri should keep its statewide ban on local rent regulation, let cities and counties decide, or rely on building more housing. Include one positive prediction from the model, one piece of evidence from the Missouri statute or data, and the value that decides your normative conclusion. In two replies, synthesize the other speaker’s evidence and name the information that would resolve your disagreement.

0 words

Who gains and who loses

A ceiling helps buyers who get the good at the lower price and hurts sellers and the buyers who go without. A floor helps sellers who sell at the higher price and hurts buyers and the sellers who cannot sell. Price controls redistribute β€” which is often their purpose.

Rent control

Rent control is the most debated price ceiling. Economists widely predict that strict, permanent rent control reduces the quantity and quality of rental housing over time, as owners convert units to condominiums, defer maintenance or build less. Supporters answer that tenants face real harms β€” displacement, disrupted schooling, lost communities β€” that the market model does not weigh, and that housing supply responds slowly anyway.

Missouri’s approach is different from most price-control debates, because the law does not set a ceiling β€” it forbids one. Section 441.043 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri provides that no county or city “may enact, maintain, or enforce any ordinance or resolution which regulates the amount of rent to be charged for privately-owned, single-family, or multiple-unit residential or commercial rental property.” The statute makes narrow exceptions β€” property that a city, county or authority itself owns, voluntary agreements about subsidized rentals, and properties assisted with community development block grant funds β€” and a 2025 amendment appears in its history. In the language of the model, no binding local rent ceiling can exist on privately owned rental housing in Missouri, and the market price clears the market.

rent control

A legal limit on the rent a landlord may charge or on how much rent may rise; Missouri law (RSMo Β§ 441.043) forbids counties and cities from enacting it.

What the data show

The Bureau of Labor Statistics rent index for the Midwest region rose 41.7 percent from 2017 to 2025, and the national index rose 41.1 percent. On the supply side, Missouri local governments authorized 18,464 housing units in 2024, of which 6,936 were in buildings of two or more units. The reading gives you the full tables. A ban on local rent regulation is a choice about who decides; it is not a statement about whether rents are fair, and it does not settle whether the supply response the model predicts is enough.

Deliberation question

Should Missouri keep its statewide ban on local rent regulation, let cities and counties decide for themselves, or rely on building more housing instead? Use the model for the positive analysis and name the values that decide the normative question. HR.1 asks you to distinguish valid from fallacious arguments: watch for claims that ignore supply entirely, and for claims that ignore the people displaced.

Practice

Work these on paper or in your notebook, then open Check your answer. Aim for all of Fluency and Application; try at least one Challenge.

Printable version: this unit’s practice workbook (PDF)

Fluency

Build speed and accuracy with the core skill.

  1. The equilibrium price is $15. Does a price ceiling of $18 have any effect? A ceiling of $12?
    Check your answer
    Answer: $18: no, it does not bind. $12: yes, it creates a shortage.
    A ceiling binds only below equilibrium.
  2. In the Lesson 1.2 bicycle market (Qd = 1,200 βˆ’ 40P, Qs = βˆ’300 + 60P), what does a price floor of $17 do?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Qd = 520, Qs = 720: a surplus of 200
    Substitute P = 17.
  3. In the same market, what does a price ceiling of $13 do?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Qd = 680, Qs = 480: a shortage of 200
    Substitute P = 13.
  4. Suppose (illustratively β€” this is not Missouri law, which forbids local rent regulation) a city rule capped annual rent increases at 5% plus local inflation, with a maximum of 10%. A $2,000 rent: what is the maximum new rent if local inflation is 3%? If it is 7%?
    Check your answer
    Answer: 3%: 8% cap β†’ $2,160. 7%: 12% exceeds the 10% maximum β†’ $2,200.
    Cap = min(5% + CPI, 10%).

Application

Use the skill in context. Show your reasoning.

  1. An illustrative rental market in a Missouri city (remember that RSMo 441.043 bars a local rent ceiling, so this is a thought experiment): Qd = 50,000 βˆ’ 10P and Qs = βˆ’10,000 + 20P (apartments, P in dollars a month). Find equilibrium, then the effect of a rent ceiling of $1,700. Who gains and who loses?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Equilibrium $2,000, 30,000 apartments. At $1,700: Qd = 33,000, Qs = 24,000, a shortage of 9,000. Tenants who get a unit gain; landlords and the 6,000 households who lose a unit (plus others still searching) lose.
    60,000 = 30P. Then substitute P = 1,700.
  2. In the same illustrative rule (5% plus local inflation, maximum 10%), a tenant pays $1,850 a month. What is the most the rent can rise this year if local inflation is 2.5%? If it is 6%?
    Check your answer
    Answer: 2.5%: cap 7.5% β†’ $1,988.75. 6%: 11% is above the maximum, so 10% β†’ $2,035.
    Cap = min(5% + inflation, 10%).
  3. In an illustrative milk market, Qd = 900 βˆ’ 100P and Qs = βˆ’300 + 200P (millions of gallons, P in dollars). Find equilibrium, then the effect of a price floor of $5 if the government buys the surplus. What does that cost?
    Check your answer
    Answer: Equilibrium $4, 500 million gallons. At $5: Qd = 400, Qs = 700, surplus 300 million gallons; buying it at $5 costs $1,500 million.
    1,200 = 300P. Then substitute P = 5 and multiply the surplus by the price.
  4. Suppose (illustratively) a rule held the price of a hotel room to no more than 10% above its pre-disaster price during a declared emergency. A hotel room cost $140 before a flood evacuation. What is the most it may charge? Using the model, what do you predict about rooms during the evacuation?
    Check your answer
    Answer: $154. With demand surging and price held near its old level, the model predicts a shortage: rooms go to whoever arrives first rather than to whoever will pay most.
    140 Γ— 1.10. The positive prediction does not settle whether the law is wise β€” that is normative.

Challenge

Stretch problems. Expect to think before you write.

  1. Label each claim positive or normative, and name information that could test the positive ones. (a) “Strict rent control reduces rental construction.” (b) “Tenants should not be displaced from their communities.” (c) “Missouri’s ban on local rent regulation has kept apartment construction from falling.”
    Check your answer
    Answer: (a) positive β€” compare construction in similar cities with and without strict control. (b) normative β€” a value. (c) positive β€” compare multifamily building permits in Missouri with states that allow local rent regulation, adjusting for population growth, before and after the 2025 amendment.
    Positive analysis informs the normative debate but cannot settle it.
  2. In the rental market above with a $1,700 ceiling, only 24,000 apartments are offered. How much would the last renter be willing to pay for one of them? What does that suggest about side payments or “key money”?
    Check your answer
    Answer: About $2,600 a month: at Q = 24,000, the demand equation gives P = (50,000 βˆ’ 24,000) Γ· 10. The gap of $900 a month invites under-the-table payments, which is why black markets follow binding ceilings.
    Read the demand curve at the quantity actually supplied.

Review

Keep earlier skills sharp.

  1. Solve βˆ’300 + 60P = 1,200 βˆ’ 40P.
    Check your answer
    Answer: P = 15
    100P = 1,500.
  2. What is 5% plus 3% of $2,400 (that is, 8%)?
    Check your answer
    Answer: $192
    2,400 Γ— 0.08.

Section 441.043 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri forbids any county or city from enacting an ordinance that regulates the rent charged for privately owned rental property, so the question of rent ceilings in Missouri is also a question of which level of government decides.

Considering the predictable outcomes of price controls, what values do you think are most important when deciding whether Missouri should keep its ban on local rent regulation?

Quick self-check

How confident are you that you can predict the effects of a price control and separate that analysis from the value judgment?

Not yetVery confident
SHIFT

The Shift

  • Price ceilings create shortages; price floors create surpluses.
  • Price controls redistribute benefits and costs among buyers and sellers.
  • Missouri bans local rent ceilings, so the rent-control debate is also a debate over which level of government decides.

Missouri Learning Standards β€” Social Studies (Economic Concepts) addressed: 9-12.GV.3.EC.B, 9-12.GV.2.EC.A, 9-12.GV.1.EC.A, SL.11-12.1, RH.11-12.8

Instructional focus: Deliberation on policy using economic models and evidence

Reading

Ceilings, Floors, and Missouri’s Ban on Local Rent Regulation: The Statute and the Rent and Permit Data

Revised Statutes of Missouri section 441.043 as printed by the Revisor of Statutes (effective August 28, 2025; public domain); BLS Consumer Price Index, rent of primary residence and all items, U.S. city average and Midwest region (public data API); U.S. Census Bureau Building Permits Survey, state annual files 2018-2024, and Population Estimates (NST-EST2023); with an SLS headnote and worked model; retrieved November 5, 2026 Β· Public domain

Why this reading. Your deliberation needs three things the mini-lecture only sketches: the arithmetic of a binding ceiling and a binding floor in the bicycle market from Lesson 1.2, the actual words of Missouri’s statute on local rent regulation, and real housing data to test what a ceiling would be up against. All three are here, together with the strongest form of the argument on each side. What to look for: Missouri is unusual for this lesson, because the law does not set a rent ceiling β€” it forbids cities and counties from setting one. Read subsection 1 of the statute word for word, then ask what the market model predicts about housing where no ceiling can bind, and what the rent and building data show.

1. A ceiling, worked out

A price ceiling is a legal maximum. It has no effect at all unless it is set below the equilibrium price; a ceiling above equilibrium is a rule nobody bumps into. Using the bicycle market from Lesson 1.2 β€” Qd = 1,200 βˆ’ 40P, Qs = βˆ’300 + 60P, equilibrium at $15 and 600 bikes:

Legal maximumQdQsResult
$18 (above equilibrium)480780Not binding. The market clears at $15 and the ceiling never comes into play.
$15 (at equilibrium)600600Not binding.
$12720420Shortage of 300. 720 buyers want a bike; 420 are offered.
$9840240Shortage of 600. The tighter the ceiling, the larger the gap.

Two consequences follow from the shortage, and both matter more than the number itself. First, something other than price must now decide who gets the 420 bikes: queueing, luck, who knows the seller, side payments, or a rule written by someone. Price rationing is replaced by some other rationing, and the good no longer reliably reaches whoever values it most. Second, quality has nowhere to go but down: a seller who cannot raise the price has no reason to spend on improvements, and every reason to economize on maintenance.

2. A floor, worked out

A price floor is a legal minimum and binds only above equilibrium.

Legal minimumQdQsResult
$12 (below equilibrium)720420Not binding; price settles at $15.
$18480780Surplus of 300. 780 offered, 480 wanted.
$21360960Surplus of 600.

With a surplus, sellers compete for the buyers who remain, by any means except cutting the price. Missouri’s minimum wage, which you will study in Unit 2, is a price floor in the labor market; agricultural price supports have historically produced literal warehouses of unsold commodities.

Who gains and who loses. A binding ceiling helps the buyers who obtain the good at the lower price and hurts sellers and the buyers who go without. A binding floor helps the sellers who sell at the higher price and hurts buyers and the sellers who cannot sell. In both cases some people are made better off and others worse off β€” which is usually the point of the policy, not an accident of it.

3. Missouri’s statute, in its own words

Section 441.043 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri is titled β€œProhibited ordinances and resolutions, exceptions.” As printed by the Revisor of Statutes (effective 28 August 2025), its first subsection reads:

RSMo Β§ 441.043.1. No county or city, or county or city with a charter form of government may enact, maintain, or enforce any ordinance or resolution which regulates the amount of rent to be charged for privately-owned, single-family, or multiple-unit residential or commercial rental property.

Subsection 2 adds four further limits on what a county or city may do. In the statute’s own words, no county or city β€œshall enact, maintain, or enforce any ordinance or resolution that”:

(1) Prohibits landlords from refusing to lease or rent a privately owned, single-family, or multiple-unit residential or commercial rental property to a person because the person’s lawful source of income to pay rent includes funding from a federal or other housing assistance program;

(2) Restricts a landlord’s ability to use or consider income-qualifying methods, credit scores, credit reports, eviction or property damage history, or criminal history, according to such landlord’s own customarily applied criteria, or prohibits landlords from requesting such information, to determine whether to rent or lease a property to a prospective tenant;

(3) Limits the amount of security deposit a landlord may require from a prospective tenant; or

(4) Requires tenants to automatically receive the right of first refusal.

Subsection 3 lists what the section does not forbid. In its own words, the section β€œshall not be construed as prohibiting any county or city, or any authority created by a county or city for that purpose, from”:

(1) Regulating in any way property belonging to that city, county, or authority;

(2) Entering into voluntary agreements with private persons which regulate the amount of rent charged for subsidized rental properties; or

(3) Enacting ordinances or resolutions restricting rent for properties assisted with community development block grant funds.

Subsection 4 adds one more sentence about veterans’ benefits: β€œNothing in this section shall prevent a county or city, or county or city with a charter form of government, from enacting, maintaining, or enforcing an ordinance or resolution that prohibits a landlord from discriminating against a tenant or prospective tenant solely on the basis that such tenant is a recipient of veterans’ benefits.”

The section’s history line reads: β€œ(L. 1989 H.B. 602 Β§ 2, A.L. 2025 H.B. 595 & 343)” β€” an enactment in 1989 and an amendment in 2025. The 2025 amendment is part of the record you can cite; this reading does not claim to know which subsections it changed.

Notice what is and is not in the text. Subsection 1 bars any ordinance β€œwhich regulates the amount of rent to be charged” for private residential or commercial rental property. It does not cap rents itself; it removes the power of cities and counties to do so. And the exceptions in subsection 3 are narrow: property the government itself owns, voluntary agreements about subsidized rentals, and properties assisted with community development block grant funds. In the language of the model: no binding ceiling can exist on privately owned rental housing set by a Missouri city or county. The market price clears the market.

4. What the ban means for the model, and what it does not settle

With no legal ceiling, the model predicts that rents will move to wherever supply and demand put them β€” rising when demand grows faster than the stock of homes, and easing when building catches up. Two things follow, and they are the two halves of the debate.

  • The supply response is not blocked by a ceiling. Owners who expect to collect market rents have no rent-control reason to convert, defer maintenance or hold back from building.
  • But the price that clears the market may be more than a household already in a unit can pay, and a move imposes real costs that do not appear on a supply-and-demand graph. A ban on local rent regulation is not itself a statement that rents are fair; it is a choice about who decides β€” the General Assembly, or a city or county.

5. The rent data

The Bureau of Labor Statistics measures rent of primary residence as part of the Consumer Price Index. BLS publishes it for the U.S. city average and for the Midwest region, the Census region that contains Missouri; this reading uses those two series, so the Midwest figures describe a region of several states, not Missouri alone. Annual averages (1982–84 = 100) and the change on the previous year, with the Midwest all-items change in the last column:

YearMidwest rent indexChangeU.S. city average rent indexChangeMidwest all-items change
2017262.137β€”308.143β€”β€”
2018270.464+3.2%319.289+3.6%+1.9%
2019279.081+3.2%331.124+3.7%+1.5%
2020287.848+3.1%341.468+3.1%+1.0%
2021296.298+2.9%349.135+2.2%+5.1%
2022312.421+5.4%370.199+6.0%+8.0%
2023334.346+7.0%399.643+8.0%+3.8%
2024354.477+6.0%420.060+5.1%+2.7%
2025371.536+4.8%434.889+3.5%+2.8%
September 2026 (level)392.029β€”450.402β€”β€”

Over 2017–2025 the Midwest rent index rose 41.7 percent and the U.S. city average rose 41.1 percent β€” nearly the same. In the most recent year, the Midwest index rose 4.8 percent and the national index 3.5 percent. (BLS did not collect October 2025 data because of the lapse in federal appropriations, so 2025 annual averages rest on eleven months.)

A thought experiment, clearly labeled. Suppose, illustratively, that Missouri cities were allowed to adopt a rule capping annual rent increases at 5 percent plus the change in the cost of living, to a maximum of 10 percent. That is a made-up rule, not Missouri law. Using the Midwest all-items CPI as a stand-in for the cost-of-living figure:

YearMidwest all-items CPI changeIllustrative cap (5% + CPI, max 10%)Actual Midwest rent-index change
2021+5.1%10% (the maximum would bite)+2.9%
2022+8.0%10% (the maximum would bite)+5.4%
2023+3.8%about 8.8%+7.0%
2024+2.7%about 7.7%+6.0%
2025+2.8%about 7.8%+4.8%

In every one of these years the measured average rent increase was below the illustrative cap. That is a genuinely important fact, and both sides read it differently. One reading: such a cap would rarely bind on the average landlord, so it could do little harm β€” and little good. The other reading: an average conceals the cases that matter, since a cap bites on the individual tenant facing a 30 percent increase, not on the regional mean. Both readings are consistent with the table. Say which one you are relying on.

Two cautions you should name if you use this evidence. The CPI rent index measures rents paid by all tenants, most of whom did not move; asking rents on newly listed units can move very differently. And a regional index cannot say anything about a single Missouri city.

6. The supply side: what Missouri has been permitting

The Census Bureau’s Building Permits Survey counts the housing units that local governments authorize. Missouri, by year (permits are not completions, and some permitted units are never built):

YearSingle-family unitsUnits in buildings of 2 or moreof which in buildings of 5 or moreAll units authorizedShare in 2+ unit buildings
201811,3765,4994,57116,87532.6%
201910,9556,5055,50417,46037.3%
202013,1076,7325,66819,83933.9%
202113,9417,4316,35821,37234.8%
202211,5989,3038,12520,90144.5%
202311,0225,7594,55016,78134.3%
202411,5286,9365,33718,46437.6%
2018–202483,52748,16540,113131,69236.6%

Across 2018–2024 Missouri authorized 131,692 units, of which 48,165 (36.6 percent) were in buildings of two or more units β€” the kind of housing most renters live in. For scale, Census Bureau estimates put Missouri’s resident population at 6,154,426 in July 2020 and 6,196,156 in July 2023, a change of 0.7 percent. A permit count cannot tell you whether that is β€œenough”; it tells you what the supply side has been doing while the rent index above was rising. Notice that the multifamily total moved around from year to year (compare 2022 with 2023), which is what you would expect when building decisions respond to interest rates, costs and expected rents.

7. The strongest version of each argument

The case for keeping the statewide ban. The model’s prediction about binding ceilings is one of the most reliable in economics: hold the price of housing below what it would otherwise be, and over time you get less of it and a worse-maintained version of it. Owners convert units to owner-occupation, defer maintenance they cannot recover through rent, and build less new rental housing where they expect future tightening. The cost falls on people who are not in the room: future renters and newcomers, who face a smaller stock. Supporters add a second, legal argument: one statewide rule gives builders and lenders the same answer in every county, rather than a patchwork that each city could change. On this view, the binding constraint on affordability is the number of homes, and the permit table above is the thing to watch.

The case for letting cities and counties decide. The model describes a market for a commodity; housing is also where people sleep, where children go to school from, and where a community’s ties are. A large, sudden rent increase can force a household to move away from work, school and family, and the losses from that are real even though they do not appear as a shortage on a graph. Housing supply is slow to respond in any case β€” land is fixed, approvals take years β€” so the supply response the model warns about may be small in the years when tenants need protection. And rent regulation need not be strict and permanent: a rule that caps increases but allows rents to reset between tenants is very different from the frozen rents that most of the classic research studied. On this view, a statewide ban removes a tool that a city might use with care, and whether to use it is a local question.

The case for relying on building. A third position sets the ceiling question aside: whatever the law says about rent regulation, the way to ease rents is to add homes, by streamlining approvals, permitting more kinds of buildings and shortening construction timelines. It accepts the model’s logic on the supply side without needing a ban, and it accepts that displacement is real without needing a ceiling.

What would settle it. Both sides can name the evidence that would move them, and you should too. Candidates: permits and completions for rental housing in Missouri compared with states that allow local rent regulation, adjusted for population growth; conversions of rentals to owner-occupancy; maintenance and code-violation records; how often a cap would actually bind on individual leases; and what happened to tenants who received the largest increases. Notice that these are all positive questions. The normative question β€” how much future housing you would trade for present stability, whose interests count, and which level of government should decide β€” is not settled by any of them.

8. Two fallacies to watch for in the deliberation

  1. Arguing only from demand. β€œRents are high because people moved here” may be true and still be only half the story; a claim about a market that never mentions the quantity supplied is incomplete.
  2. Arguing only from the model. β€œEconomists agree rent control is bad” collapses a range of policies β€” from a frozen rent in perpetuity to a modest annual cap with a reset between tenants β€” into one thing. Ask which policy the evidence being cited was about. And β€œthe legislature banned it, so it must be right” confuses a law with a justification: the statute tells you what is allowed, not what is wise.

Sources: Revised Statutes of Missouri section 441.043, Prohibited ordinances and resolutions, exceptions (revisor.mo.gov); BLS, Consumer Price Index, rent of primary residence (series CUUR0000SEHA, CUUR0200SEHA) and all items (CUUR0200SA0) (bls.gov); U.S. Census Bureau, Building Permits Survey, State annual data files (st2018a.txt to st2024a.txt) (www2.census.gov); U.S. Census Bureau, State population totals and components of change: 2020-2023 (NST-EST2023-ALLDATA) (www2.census.gov)

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Supply and Demand Lab β€” Building and Using the Model
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Workshop β€” Adam Smith, Property, Competition and Liberty
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